QUOTE(Old Tanker @ Sun 30 Mar 2008 0525)

I was under the impression that the German WWII army issued the MG-42 down to squad level.
If that is true whether you call it a SAW or not is a matter of nomenclature vs. squad firepower. The tactics employed were generally built around the MG fire base with infantry manuevering under it's cover.
QUOTE(Tuccy @ Sun 30 Mar 2008 0717)

I think the difference is that MG-34 and 42 were viewed as main squad's weapon, therefore MG, while BAR/Bren were viewed as reinforcing rifle fire, ie SAW.
Some thoughts on this...
It's useful to note how the different armies fought WWI, to understand their approaches to providing the MG at the squad level. In WWI, the Allies mostly had magazine-fed light machine guns, such as the Lewis, the Chauchat, and eventually, for a limited time, the BAR. Germany never really had a successful magazine-fed weapon in large-scale use--Whether this was a conscious choice, or if it was just an accident of fate and weapons development is hard to say, but the solution they came up with for the Sturmtruppen was the MG08/15. A weapon which has the defining characteristic of making the US M1919A6 look like a lithe and lightweight little sports car, by comparison. The Germans did have a few Madsen LMGs, but that's not a weapon that saw a lot of use, from what I've read. Mostly, they stuck with the belt-fed heavies.
Come the day, and they're getting ready to fight WWII, the former Allied powers are again arming themselves with magazine-fed weapons, and the Germans are developing a super-lightweight belt-fed MG. Cultural choice? Chance of what the designers provided? Hard to say, as a lot of what's in print about these things doesn't go very deep into the underlaying philosophy that made the various armed forces make the choices they did. Most of that data probably rests, untranslated, in some archive. It certainly hasn't made it's way into print, that I've seen. From all appearances, they just procured better versions of what worked in the last war, and that's what drove the choices, for all concerned armies. If anyone knows of anything I've missed in my reading, over the years, please let me know--I've always been fascinated by some of the little hints I've seen sprinkled about the histories, particularly about the Germans.
Supposedly, and I've seen this more than one place, the Germans did extensive human-factors engineering when they designed their weapons. The Ju-88, for example, was supposed to have had it's layout driven by a Germanic desire to keep it's airmen within direct reach of each other, in order to facilitate communications and enhance morale through physical contact with one's comrades. The US and the UK, by contrast, scattered their bomber crewman throughout the aircraft, and paid little attention to such things. I've seen similar things written about how the Germans designed their crew compartments for tanks, as well. Whether any of this is based on reality, I've never been able to ascertain, but it is an interesting question: How much of German superiority on the battlefield was the result of "little" things like these subtle design choices?
I once spoke with a German Infantry officer, who'd been crippled early in the war, and had done a lot of training of soldiers after his recovery (he was never judged fit for combat duties, right up until the end, when he got tapped to command a Volksturm battalion, or something similar). As such, he had a pretty good idea of how/why the Germans did the things they did, but couldn't help me out with any research sources. I asked him about this subject, and he told me that he didn't know much about the armor or the aircraft, but in the Infantry, they'd done what they did for very similar reasons. He had been taught that the MG crew was the basis of operations precisely because the crew-served weapon was a lot more effective, and more likely to stay in action, because of the "human factor" inherent in its operation--when your buddy is right next to you, reinforcing your morale, keeping you in action via the "shame" reflex, the weapon is kept in action a lot more effectively. This is why the Germans chose to use the MG as the base of the squad. He told me that he'd been taught, in the 1930s, that all this was based on extensive research done by the Wehrmacht, and that there had been a bunch of stuff in print that officers of his generation had been exposed to, pre-war.
He was totally disdainful of the American approach, which put a bunch of individuals out on the battlefield on their own, with individual weapons and limited contact with each other. His principle was that if they weren't within arms reach of each other, they might as well be on a different planet, in combat. Supposedly, there was an entire school of "industrial psychology" devoted to this stuff, in Germany. Where the hell did all this data go? Why hasn't anyone ever published anything on this, if this former Major wasn't full of crap? Or, have I just managed to miss it?
How much of this stuff got passed down, to the Bundeswehr? I've noted, through watching some of their guys, that a lot of things about the Wehrmacht have continued on in the Bundeswehr. In example, the Allied sources I've read talk a great deal about how the German infantry would make a lot of noise, just communicating with one another, particularly on the attack. My German Major said this was a deliberate choice that they trained the men for, in order to keep morale up. Bundeswehr infantry do the same thing, the same way, when I've observed them on exercises. So, some of this stuff is still out there, or it's an unconscious choice due to culture. On the other hand, it could well be just an accident of history--"Ve do dot because dot's how ve've alvays done it...". I wish I knew which it was.
On a doctrinal basis, I think Tuccy has it right--at the tactical level, the Germans saw the MG as being the base weapon, and the rest of the squad served as a crew to get that weapon into position, provide it with ammo, and keep it safe from opposing infantry. The Allies mostly envisioned their squad machine guns as adjuncts and supplements to the rifleman, and as such, it didn't get the same focus, or the belt feed.