Colin, indirectly, all tank development stems from the genesis of the tank in World War I. But the actual genesis of and development of the 79th Division as an assault formation was as a result of the peculiar requirements seen for the Normandy invasion.

Just because something walks looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and talks like a duck doesn't make it a duck, it could be a goose.

Sarge, as far as I've been able to reconstruct the situation was this. Sometime in May 100 tankdozer conversion kits were received by ETOUSA (this conversion kit was one of the most requested and hotly desired items in the ETO, they were in short supply for the entire war). Some of these were allocated to British forces and some to the armored divisions and tank battalions of First and Third Army assigned as part of the "Build-Up" Forces. It appears that a total of at least 42 were assigned to the Assault and "Follow-On" Forces. Specifically, six each were assigned to the 70th, 741st, 743rd, 745th, 746th, and 747th Tank Battalions. Another six were assigned two each to the three Engineer Light Equipment Companies assigned to the Engineer Special Brigades at UTAH and OMAHA.

At OMAHA and UTAH, the six tankdozers of the ESB were specifically assigned to aide the Beach Obstacle Demolition Party (UTAH) and the Special Engineer Task Force (OMAHA), along with a number of D7 armored bulldozers and then as later waves arrived, D4 unarmored bulldozers. The same task was done on the British beaches by D7 and D4 bulldozers alone, because there had been no time to outfit British tankdozers (it appears they arrived much later, as Crusader and Centaur tankdozers, which were acknowledged to be useful, but less useful than Sherman tankdozers). It appears that the total number assigned to the task were roughly the same on the British and American beaches (SWORD 8 D7, JUNO 8 D7, GOLD 1 D4 and 1 D7, UTAH 2 tankdozers and 4 (?) D4, OMAHA, 4 tankdozers and 8 D4).

The tankdozers assigned to the tank battalions (and manned by the crews of the Assault Gun Platoon and the assault gun assigned to the medium companies - they didn't have M4-105mm yet, so why not?) were assigned to act as the US equivalent of the Funnies in that they were to land with the standard M4 off of LCT (A) and clear a path forward to the edge of the beach, then bulldoze paths over the seawall or embankment, and then doze in the tank ditches. Of course on OMAHA, assuming they weren't shot up, then they were pretty much stuck until the antitank walls at Vierville and St Laurent were demolished, which required hand emplaced explosives (BTW, the other draws weren't considered viable exits, even for tracked vehicles, which was essentially correct).

In retrospect it would have been better of course to equip all of the tanks of the US assault battalions with dozer blades, at least the non-DD ones. That would have been a requirement for an additional 78 though, 20 more than what was available though. But if that had been done, then in theory there would have been - allowing for rounding - perhaps 30 in each sector of the American beaches instead of 8, quite possibly enough to have made something of a differance at OMAHA - if the Germans had refrained from shooting them up or had conventiently neglected to build their antitank walls.

Just jumping into this - sorry if its already been covered, but while watching a docu on D-day and seeing how many US soldiers got killed by a couple of pillboxes, it made me wonder
1. Why didn't they think of deploying some kind of bullet proof shields in the first waves?
2. or why didn't they use armoured boats with canon on them to deal with these things?

I don't know. This one doesn't look AVRE-proof -

They did. The shields were called "tanks." Had things gone as planned, the tanks would have been on the beach before the infantry.



They did that, too. USN DDs went in until they were scraping bottom to provide fire support, and there were LCI gunboats and all sorts of support vehicles. The problem is that the shores off an amphibious landing are very crowded, and fitting all this stuff in a limited area gets a bit tricky. Also the smoke and stuff makes it difficult to see things like small slits in bunkers from ships offshore.

One of the DDs mentioned above cooperated very well by watching one of the few Shermans on OMAHA. The M4 would fire at an obstacle, the DD would spot where the tank's shell hit, and then smother it with 5"/38 and 40mm fire. The German MG positions on the bluffs were definitely unthrilled when a few hundred 40mm Bofors shells landed on them.

"No plan survives contact with the enemy," and "No one can see everything that is going on on a battlefield," are quotes that should be remembered when one asks, "Why didn't they...?"

Gee, why was I just waiting for that one to come up?

Actually it's a very curious question - and AFAIK unexplained - as to what was in the Germans head on this one. The antitank wall at the Vierville exit looked very similar, but was in reality completely different. For some reason the St Laurent wall was constructed without any rebar, and as a consequence was first "cracked" by a small amount of explosive and then cleared by simple bulldozing. OTOH the Vierville exit required 1,100 pounds of explosive to "crack" it, followed by extensive bulldozing and regrading of the exit road. All told it took about three hours IIRC.

So yes, the St Laurent wall probably could have been breached by a Petard and a bulldozer combo, but then the Allies did not know that, did they?

Sadly, the story of the effectiveness of the destroyers on D-Day appears to have grown a bit over the years. In fact, as best I have been able to make out, the closing in of the DD's actually occurred after the first troops got off the beach and over the bluffs and quite possibly after the first WN fell. They do appear to have had a material effect supporting the assault of the 16th Infantry on WN 61 nad 62 though, but at the same time also inflicted a number of fratricidal casualties. Surprisingly, perhaps some of the most effective support given on that day has been missed in most accounts, that of the GMC of the 197th and 497th AAA (AW-SP) Battalions landed at roughly H+120. They suffered pretty heavy casualties, but fought their multiple mounts from the waters edge and effectively silenced a number of the German positions. Evidently the Germans were also unthrilled to have a few thousand .50-caliber and a few hundred Colt 37mm shells landed on them.

The real problem at OMAHA was the basic plan, which placed the assaulting troops directly against the German defenses under the misplaced assumption (misplaced, but repeated over and over again in amphibious assaults) that the preassault aerial bombardment would "shock" the defenders into docility. This also placed the assault craft effectively in the line of supporting fire for the flanking LCG, LCF and DD of the bombardment force, which had to check fire when the assault waves approached the beach. The DD tanks were supposed to deal with this problem, but we know what happened there.

How does rebar make a concrete wall Petard proof?

John, to clear the Vierville exit required 1,100 pounds of explosive. That amount, placed against the base of the wall, completely destroyed a section approximately 8 feet wide, 8 feet high, and 3 feet thick, cutting all of the extensive rebar, and excavating about a 2" deep drench along the road way. Is a forty-pound Petard round cpable of that? And if not, how many are?

It is not a question of being "Petard proof" it is a question of what was required to effectively demolish such a structure so as to make it passable for vehicles?

I thought I already posted on this, but:

WO 232/55 Reduction of concrete defences by arty and bombs
"Hits per standard breach" are quoted as being 54 for Petard
and
WO 291/598 Attack of Concrete Walls by Petard
"In two trials, at Foulness and Hankley Common, the number of effective rounds required to demolish a
concrete wall 12 feet high and 9feet 6 inches thick were:
Location Effective rounds Cubic feet removed
Foulness 54 1091
Hankley Common 50 780

A half troop of AVREs firing 'dustbins' at a rate of 2 per minute each could cause a breech in a concrete wall 3 metres thick in 10 minutes or so.

Thanks John, but a couple of questions.

Were the walls tested simple concrete structures or reinforced concrete structures?

That is the requirement for demolition. What was the requirement for clearing the demolished area to make it passable?

If the above is correct the best time for a passable breech (1,091 cubic feet yields a breech roughly 9.5 feet wide, so just about wide enough for a tank ), then at the best rate of fire, in theory 27 minutes would be occupied by a single AVRE to get the result, two of course could do it faster, and three faster still. But not by a factor of two and three respectively, nor do I think the 27 minutes by a single one is really viable. Given the blast and obscuration, and thus the effect in aiming, I believe that the practical time to acheive a workable breech would probably be higher. But lets call it, 30, 20 or 10 minutes, depending on the number firing. Which leads to:

What are the Germans doing in the meantime? Specifically those manning the casemated 88 adjacent to the wall, the 50mm in the casemate that can bear from the western part of WN 72, and the 50mm that could fire down from the bluff to the east of the wall in WN 71. Those pieces knocked out a lot of tanks before they succumbed, why couldn't they hit a couple of AVRE standing stationary 50-60 yards from them for 10 minutes or more? Or are they already conveniently knocked out in this scenario? And if so, whats the point of the Petard anyway, you may as well emplace the explosives by hand?

Oh, and in connection with the above, I assume your AVRE have also crossed the sand and shingle that resulted in so much bogging and tracking, then surmounted the 6-8 foot seawall there, gotten past the antitank ditch cut in the roadway, and so on, also without casualties to the antitank defenses?

BTW, in the closest analog to the Vierville situation at Le Hamel, all three of the gapping teams landed were ineffective. Although one of the three AVRE landed intact there eventually did take out the rather elderly 75mm that had caused all the trouble.

On Hankley Common at least the concrete wall was a specially built reinforced type. The initial requirement for breaching is if a Churchill could pass through, once through the AVREs would Petard from the other side.



Ahead of you Rich, rather drily put from WO 291/598
"Presumably if three or four AVREs are allowed by the enemy to stand in a group 80 yards or so from the front of the wall for a period of about 10 minutes while making a breach, they would have a good chance of passing through and firing for a further 4 or 5 minutes from the other side."

If the Petard can't reach the casemates then the DDs or Crabs will have to 'post' them a 75 first.
When the A/Tk weapons have been disposed of the Engineers can perform their breaching tasks relatively immune from shell and small arms fire.



Bobbins, log carpets, fascines, bangalores, Boase torpedos, Beehives, Wade charges and SBGs were designed with the defeat of those sort of obstacles in mind. No one is saying there won't be casualties, which is why the armour was intended to be used en masse.



In what timescale? AIUI one breach was in use on Jig Green in the morning. The draw at Vierville was only breached and cleared by 1700 or so?

How many "flying dustbins" did an AVRE carry as an average load-out?

Did they carry 1,000lbs worth of projectiles each?

It must have been some kind of sight to see a troop, half troop, or any combination of AVRE's "have at" against a wall. Once they were into the "fire at will" part, it must have been a steady streem of bombs flying one way, and big chunks of concrete flying all the others.

-Mark 1

Not trying to be snide, but what choice was there other than, "placed(ing) the assaulting troops directly against the German defenses"? OMAHA was one of those places that you couldn't go around. I've been there and done lots of map studies, and if you have to have OMAHA and those bluffs, there just isn't another way to do it other than head-on.

The planners felt that they had to have OMAHA. Even with all the FUBARs (everybody landing in the wrong spot, DD tanks sinking etc) it woulld have basically been a walk if the 352nd hadn't decided to play wargames just there and just then.

And again, even with the FUBARs the men of the 1st and 29th took the place. They didn't make it as far inland as the phase lines on the planning maps said, but nobody else did either. Funnies didn't get the Brits to Caen on D-Day, did they? {not Brit-bashing, just trying to get back into the topic perspective of "would the Funnies have helped?"}

IMHO, the biggest problem on OMAHA was the unexpected current that swept everybody off their planned landing areas. The men had rehearsed exactly what they were supposed to do on their objectives and all of a sudden they were acting on a different stage. If everybody else was in the wrong place, any Funnies present would have been in the wrong place too. Suppose there had been Petards to blast gaps in a draw. They would not have landed where they were supposed to, so they would have had to figure out where they were and how to get to someplace where they could be useful.

The infantry on OMAHA wasn't so much "pinned down" as reassessing and reorganizing to make new assaults in new areas where they hadn't studied photos and models of the defences. Even if their support had made the beaches, they still would have had to do that.

ISTR the basic load of an AVRE was 26 Petards of 40lbs (26lb charge) each.
They could also carry a number of 'Beehives' (70lb charge) but I don't know if that was in addition to or instead of 'Dustbins'.

Not to be snide for my own part Sarge, but where have I ever posted anything that would make you think that I was idiot enough not to realize that? I'm talking tactically here, not operationally. The landing plan at OMAHA placed C, 2nd Rangers and the 1st, 116th Infantry on CHARLIE and DOG GREEN beaches, directly opposite WN 70, 71, 72, and 73 (Charlie Company, 2nd Rangers objective was WN 73, the "Stone House"). The 2nd, 116th Infantry was to land on DOG RED and WHITE and EASY GREEN.EASY GREEN and DOG RED were immediately opposed by WN 66 and 68. The 2nd, 16th Infantry were to land on EASY RED, directly opposite WN 64 and 65. And, finally, 3rd, 16th Infantry was to land on FOX GREEN, immediately opposite WN 61 and 62.

The problem, like much of the OVERLORD planning, was that it focused on two phases, the "getting the troops to the beach" part and the "getting the troops inland on the Calvados plateau" part, and paid little attention to the "getting the troops off the landing craft, over the beach, and onto the Calvados plateau" part. As a consequence the planning focused on getting the troops in neatly organized bunches onto land at the exits so that they could form up and march inland (the bombing and naval bombardment would have rendered most of the Germans hors de combat by that time, with the DD tanks picking off any pesky survivors).

But of course the exits were really only neccessary for vehicles, the infantry found it difficult, put practical to scale the lightly defended bluffs, eventually taking the exits from the flanks and rear. And that was done, in virtually every case, by troops that either mistakenly landed between the exits (and the German WN) or were intentionally directed to land between the the exits. As an example, BG Cota with C, 116th Infantry, elements of B and H, 116th Infantry and the reinforced 5th Ranger Battalion eventually seized Vierville and the Vierville exit, as well as Ormel Farm, by landing on DOG WHITE, between WN 68 and 70.

Is it so far a stretch to think that a better plan would have been to land the assault troops midway between the heaviest concentrations of German defenses that were at the exits, rather than directly opposite to them? In other words to land columns of battalion teams in the gap between WN 60 and 61, between WN 62 and 64, between WN 65 and 66, and between WN 68 and 70, with the better protected armor landing on their flanks and engaging the defenses directly along with the LCG, LCF and DD? That would have placed the landing troops closer to the extreme range of the German machine guns that were the deadliest killers at OMAHA, and would have concentrated the armor to protect their flanks rather than strung along the entire beachfront.



That of course is the wildcard working against any "plan" at OMAHA. It is also why I say that my "plan" was probably more logical and doable - in theory - but would have suffered from the same mischances that effected the actual plan (there was also the little last minute problem of the tidal obstacles to deal with). So it is possible that my "better" plan could have resulted in placing the assault troops opposite the German defenses anyway, with quite possibly worse results. It is why I am so loath to actually "second guess" Gerow.

Well yeah. Of course if the defenses are surpressed, then why are armored vehicles neccessary?



Hand carried bangalores were common on all the beaches, and beehive and General Wade charges were also hand emplaced. Meanwhile, the log carpets (also known as "Roly Poly's") all failed, emplacing them at the waters edge meant that invariably the buoyant logs simply floated away after being layed. By the "Boase torpedos" I think you refer to the "flying bangalore"? So far, there most notable use was in killing Lt.Col. Cocks and his Signal Sergeat at SWORD, I have yet to find another reference to their critical use. The Bobbins at least worked as intended, sadly though despite their employment carpeting the soft clay patches, most of the CRABs that became bogged did so in the soft sand built up along the edge of the seawall, or just past it, so the neccessity of the Bobbin may be questioned. None of the Fascines employed to breach the seawall were usable, although a number of SBG were successfully used for that purpose. However, Fascines were successful in breaching a number of ditches and the major crater blocking the beach road at GOLD.

So, in retrospect a number of SBG would have been useful at OMAHA, but it is doubtful they could have traversed the shingle to get their bridges in place, unless a large number of Bobbins could have been successfully employed. Wheter or not that was practicable or not is questionable though, again given the defenses the Germans could bring to bear at the critical points (quite simply, the antiarmor gun defenses at the OMAHA exits were not matched in any of the other beach sectors).



Sorry, you are only partly correct.

At JIG GREEN West the LCT carrying the party for Lane 1 was struck by the German gun at Le Hamel, and the first vehicle jammed the exit ramp. The LCT broached to, but eventually managed to withdraw and did not land its load until 1330. Lane 2 failed completely, while Lane 3 was open to the beach road by 0840. Of course in the process, 1 of the 2 CRABs was mined and lost as was the Plough AVRE. The Bobbin AVRE bogged after jettisoning its mat (it was thought to be unneccessary ). And the last AVRE was hit as it came out of the LCT, wounding the driver and killing the commander. When they were replaced it laid its fascine at the seawall and then overturned when trying to climb it. Luckily, the single CRAB left and an AVRE that managed to get forward from the Lane 2 party, finally got to the beach road and were able to support the assault at Le Hamel at 1345, eventually clearing the position by 1600.

The three lanes at JIG GREEN East fared a bit better. Lane 4 failed completely, but lane 5 and 6 were succesful in clearing access to the beach road. But then they encountered a huge crater which required considerable resources (3 Fascine AVRE) to breech. However, by the time the lateral was open and vehicles could proceed to help at Le Hamel the battle there was already over. The lateral beach road was open through to Le Hamel by about 1800.

At Vierville in contrast, the majority of the opposition was subdued by infantry attacking from the rear and right flank, over the bluffs. Patrols got into the village by 1000 and it was clear enough by 1300 that the 121st Engineers began to emplace the explosives at the antitank wall, blowing it at 1400. The road was declared open for traffic through to Vierville at 1800.

Overall, it appears that the difficulty in breeching the crater in the lateral road at JIG GREEN was about as difficult as breeching the wall at Vierville (it effectively took an hour less since the landing at GOLD were an hour later than at OMAHA). Both roads were open effectively at the same time, although the Vierville exit required more brute work to make it passable (the four hours between 1400 and 1800 were occupied in bulldozing the debris, filling the antitank ditch, breeching the seawall, and clearing AT mines on the verges.

OK, so the time taken to breach was similar. Were the casualties similar as well? I'm learning a lot from this discussion. Having been to the beaches a couple of times, I confess to not having really considered the operational art required to take them.

David

Okay, I gotcha, and I agree with what you are saying about the tactical placement. Still, given the restricted area, the troops were going to take fire from somewhere once the bombardment had failed to render the area sterile of hostile life.

And I also agree about the drift, that your "change" might have put everyone right back where they were.

I wonder what would have happened if the sea had been calm and the 352nd off drinking in barracks....

Casualties on JIG Beach were about 438 and were almost identical at MIKE Beach, 434. That includes the casualties of the infantry battalions and other 50th Infantry Division troops attached to 69th and 231st Brigades and the 6th Assault Regiment, RE, but does not apparently include those of the LCOCU or the 8th Armoured Brigade.

In contrast, on OMAHA losses of the 116th Infantry were 797, so were nearly twice that as at either JIG or MIKE. If the loses of units attached to the 116th are included, then the losses are well over twice those on MIKE.

OTOH, there were a total of just six German WN opposing the British at GOLD, while there were at least 12 and as many as 14 (depending on whether or not you include WN 60 and 74 at the extremities of OMAHA) opposing the Americans at OMAHA, with a comensurately higher number of troops and especially heavy weapons.

Well, there were no "barracks" the troops were simply quartered in the local villages and units rotated through the WN as garrisons on a regular basis, in between working on improving the obstacle plan. So it isn't like the elements of 352 ID wouldn't have been there. And if you have a calm sea and no 'drift' then the result is the landings occur nearly exactly as planned, which could have resulted in a worse bloodbath and possibly (remote) the failure of the landing at OMAHA. The only thing to mitigate that would have been that an additional 27-odd DD tanks would have landed with the 16th Infantry, but given the experience of the 116th Infantry there is no real reason to think that would have had a major result in reducing casualties there.

Sorry John, but as much as I am a supporter of the AVREs and some other Funnies (and as much as I enjoy butting heads with Rich!), I don't think one could count on more than one or two AVREs being at the same place at the same time. The record of knocked out, bogged, and drowned tanks of all sorts on the British beaches clearly shows that it was usually a relatively small number of vehicles that did most of the work clearing obstacles and helping the infantry forward.

OTOH it should be remembered that one of the primary jobs of the AVRE was to provide armored transport for engineers with demolition charges. I'm sure they didn't carry 1000 pounds of explosive, but at least the petard wasn't the only option. At Omaha I can see the AVREs and Crabs being of particular utility in eliminating the strongpoints below the bluffs, such as Les Moulins, bridging or filling the antitank ditches, and clearing mines. No matter what covering fire or engineering support was available, the strongpoints at the various beach exits were best tackled by flanking infantry assaults from across the bluffs rather than frontal assault through the obstacles. Presumably the presence of large numbers of tanks working their way through toward the beach exits would have drawn German attention away from some of the infantry and reduced casualties.

quote=Rich,Mon 24 Jan 2005 1639]
Well yeah. Of course if the defenses are surpressed, then why are armored vehicles neccessary?
[/quote]

Sorry, I think you're looking at it the wrong way, the question should be - why NOT use armoured vehicles?


From 'Blowing our Bridges: Major-General Tony Younger' "..we found that soft sand dunes presented a problem, so Dickie Boase, who commanded 3 Troop [26 Assault Squadron] , tried using a tank to push a steel pipe loaded with explosive into a dune and then detonating it. The result was successful, so the Boase Bangalore became part of our equipment."
Obviously just as achievable by hand.



At least part of the problem on JIG and a cause of the heavy casualties to the AVREs and Crabs was that they landed first, ahead of the DDs. Arguably the rough seas of June 6th had more effect on the British beaches, because of their greater sophistication of their plans, than on the American ones.

Not really, as I understand it GOLD beach had at least five exits off the beach, out of the twelve attempted, by the morning. The lead elements of 50th Division and 8th Armoured Brigade penetrating 6 miles or so inland.

You should have also had naval gunfire and aerial bombing on target, the DD tanks hitting the beach first (presumably with greater effect than coming in later off the LCTs), and troops landing where they were familiar with the terrain and objectives. The biggest delay on the beach was the troops having to start all over again from scratch to reconnoiter, plan, and execute attacks on unfamiliar objectives. The fact that the units were mixed up and intermingled didn't help either.

Well of course, but the why of "why not" in a sense is the subject of this thread. Part of the problem is that many simply assume that the OVERLORD plan sprung fully formed out of the head of COSSAC "years" before 6 June (I cringe every time I see a Mythtry Channel program that talks about the "years" of preparation that went into the plan). But the reality is very different. The "plan" wasn't fully formed until February 44, the final amendments did not get included until late May (one of the final amendments was the inclusion of the three LCT (CB) for SWORD and JUNO, a change that evidently was finalized as the LCT were being loaded), and the equipment wasn't in place or available even for troop training until quite late (as we have seen AVRE began issue to units in mid-April, Sherman-DD production wasn't even begun until March, most Fireflies were actually issued to units in the last week of May!), and the availability and allocation of craft continued to change on an almost day to day basis.

So the question really shouldn't be either why or why not use AVRE? Rather it should be was it practicable to get AVRE into the hands of troops at OMAHA and UTAH in a timely enough manner and in sufficent quantatity so as to warrant yet a further change in the landing plan (the last is very important, so many changes continued to be made to the NEPTUNE plan that it was finally frozen as is, IIRC 22 May, albeit minor detail adjustments on craft loading continued to be made)?

Frankly, I think the answer is no.

Thanks, I knew I had run across the term, but couldn't place it.



Sorry, but that statement is simply weird. The DDs were also delayed at UTAH and OMAHA, as well as at SWORD and JUNO - why does that fact have such a unique significance at GOLD?

And odder still, what "sophistication" of the British plans are you referring to? It certainly wasn't the landing plan, or the timing of the landing waves, that was virtually the same on each of the beaches, and was determined by craft availability - not by "sophistication". Was it that on the British beaches that the initial wave was intended to be DD tanks, followed by clearance parties that combined armored vehicles and engineer teams working together to clear obstacle lanes, followed by assault troops to carry the beach, supported by armor? But wait, that's the plan on the American beaches as well? The fundamental difference is that on the British beaches the supporting wave of armored vehicles following up the DD were intended to be Centaurs (most of which didn't arrive), Crabs and AVRE. On the American beaches those supporting waves consisted of Shermans and Sherman tankdozers, due apprently simply to the lack of availability and time to get other vehicles into the hands of the troops.

Except that after the fact it was discovered that the 100 and 250-lb bombs employed were completely ineffective against the German shelters. Given that it was assumed - correctly - that heavier bombs would cause such cratering as to impede movement off the beach and you have an effective wash.

It was also discovered after the fact that the 4", 4.5", 5", and 6" rounds that were the main component of the naval gunfire into the beach defenses were also totally ineffective against the wing walls protecting the German positions on the beach. In one analysis it was mentioned that at least on the British beaches none of the German defenses gave evidence of any effective damage from the naval gunfire. The sole exception was one emplacement on GOLD that couldn't be found at all on the ground, but it remained unclear whether the crater that was found had obliterated the position or that the position had simply never been there at all.

And at least at OMAHA the critical factor doesn't really appear to be the time of arrival of the tanks or whether they were DD tanks or not. Rather, the simple fact that they couldn't maneuver effectively on the shingle is the thread that links many of them. A very high proportion simply bogged or threw a track before they were able to get off the beach.

Geez John, you really are missing the obvious aren't you? By afternoon pretty much 2 exits from JIG and 5 from KING were open to traffic. But on OMAHA only two exits (later three after considerable engineering work) were even viable, let alone cleared. That's a simple consequence of the nature of the terrain, on GOLD once the beach obstacles were breeched virtually the entire frontage of assault was open to movement.

And do you think that maybe perhaps that factor, combined with defenses roughly twice as strong as those encountered at GOLD, might account for the gretaer penetration acheived there?

Perhaps the bombs were ineffective because they missed, being dropped inland to avoid 'blue on blue' in the poor visibility. A/c being able to see and hopefully hit the target might have been effective.

Again, being able to see the targets might have improved effectiveness. The BBs were there to take out heavier defenses, but they couldn't see them in the conditions.
The fact that support was ineffective in the actual conditions on 6 June is not necessarily proof that it would have been ineffective under more favorable conditions.

Getting off the beach was not, AIUI, the purpose of the tanks, at least not until the exits were cleared. Their mission was to provide fire support and cover for the infantry. Since they could not get there until after the infantry (rather than before as planned), their support value was limited. So I'd say the time of arrival was fairly important.

Exactly! Doesn't that mean that specialised engineering vehicles (preferably armoured) are even more important on OMAHA?



True but the defences were in greater depth on the British beaches. The breakthrough on GOLD also diverted 2 battalions of 352. and the StuG company(?) away from OMAHA.

Sorry, but no, there was little practical effect that could be expected. To quote from the Aberdeen Terminal Ballistics Volume I "Bombing" from August 1944, tests showed that "semi-armor-piercing bombs weighing less than 1,000 lb. are ineffective against concrete fortifications 5 feet or more in thickness. The 1,000 lb. Semi-Armor-Piercing Bomb, AN-M59 or AN-M59A1, and the 1,600 lb. Armor-Piercing Bomb, AN-Mk.1 are effective for destruction of pillboxes when it is possible to obtain direct hits."

It is later mentioned that GP bombs are only valuable in removing dirt from the surface of concrete emplacements.

Given the dispersion characteristics of most heavy naval ordnance (after all, they were designed to hit objects hundreds of feet long and tens of feet wide) and their limited ammunition capacity, combined with the concealed and dispersed nature of the targets, then it must be said that they were also impractical for use against heavy protected positions. They were effective against coastal gun positions, which was really their primary task, but that is a different kettle of fish since those perforce must have their embrasures exposed to seaward (for those that were protected by casemates, of course it was actually found that unprotected guns actually suffered less damage on the whole).

The firing of Texas and Arkansas against the Vierville and St Laurent draws was about as effective as shooting at the moon. And I'm surprised considering your vehement opposition to the Pacific island assaults, that you hadn't noticed that heavy naval gunfire has pretty much never had a significant effect against protected positions.



Oh I agree 100 percent, but we'll never know then, will we?



Oh granted, but it was intended that they be able to maneuver freely on the beach to provide that support, which they could not do because of the combination of the raising tide, soft sand, shingle, and seawall. Many bogged or were tracked immediately after debarking, about the only real solution was to dump so many tanks on the beach at once that at least there would be sufficient to have an effect from the ones not stuck.

Well Monty's order for the offer of Funnies came before the "plan" was fully formed.



No I meant all the British beaches. If the weather had been kinder they could have gained fuller value from the "menu" probably taking less casualties and perhaps making deeper gains. I know the weather affected the American plans too but that has already been raised on this thread.
By greater sophistication I mean the AVRE and Crabs.
From 'Achtung Minen:Ian Hammerton' an Lt. in 22nd Westminster Dragoons on what could be achieved "Flails were to flog the mines, AVREs to follow through and plant their 'beehive' charges on the roofs of the bunkers, and the Royal Marines were to mop up. All went to plan. Casualties were minimal and the Commandos did not even bother to wear their steel helmets."

Of course, but since the best evidence is that they simply weren't available their importance is rather moot don't you think?



Do I really have to trot out my canned analysis and comparison of the defenses? Or would balderdash suffice?

Well, it was sure not as effective as hoped (neither was strategic bombing), but I wouldn't say NEVER....

BTW, might not the poor visibility and rough seas contributed to the "ineffective" shooting on 6 June?

BTW#2, my opposition to Pacific island assaults is based on strategic reasons, not that the assaults were not done well (on occasion).

Leaving aside Utah with the various German units capable of moving up to block the causeways unless stopped by airborne units and Sword with the intervention of the 21st Panzer, my impression is that the defenses at Omaha, Gold and Juno were very shallow. Once the assault forces moved off the beaches there were neither fixed defenses nor adequate German reinforcements to put the cork back in the bottle

Dear me, Ian's memories must have gotten pretty rosey late in life? The actual concise report of the activities of 2 Troop at Yellow Gap, NAN WHITE was:

"Touched down 500 yards east of planned gap. High tide and mined obstacles forced gap to be made opposite point of landing - wall 12' high. Flails start flailing to the wall but br [SBG AVRE] shot awayas it left the craft (comd. cas). Second comd. killed by MG fire. Two petards out of action due to enemy fire. Ten dustbins at lip of wall but crater too steep and soft. Inf then began landing some way to the right. Moved down beach towards ramp blocked by Element C (10 shots). Flailed up ramp with two flails. One flail caught up in wire. Eventually clear after some hand clearance in smoke. Facine dropped in A.Tk. ditch and ramped by hand. Second gap made to bypass BERNIERES."

How do you get "all went to plan" out of that?

Okay, please be aware this is from a work in progress:

GOLD Beach encompassed a front from slightly west of La Hamel to Grey-sur-Mere, a distance of about 6.5 kilometers. Along that frontage were ten Wiederstandsneste (resistance nests) numbered from east-to-west WN 32, 33, 34, 35, 35a, 35b, 36, 37, 38, and 39. Of those, a total of four could observe and bring direct fire on GOLD JIG and GOLD KING, WN 33, 35, 36, and 37 (WN 38 with another two 7.5cm FK had a limited field of fire partly covering the western edge of WN 37, but it and WN 39 were primarily designed to defend the seaward and eastern landward approaches to Arromanches). Between them they were armed with one 8.8cm Pak, two 7.5cm FK (f), five 5cm Pak, one 3.7cm Pak, two mortars (apparently all 5cm), and 18 machineguns. The six positions backing them up included three artillery batteries: 3/HKA 1260 at WN 35a (the Mont Fleury Battery) with four 12.2cm K390 ®, 5/AR 1716 at WN 35b (the Crepon Battery) with four 10cm leFH 14/19 (t), and 6/AR 1716 at WN 32 (the Mare Fontaine Battery) also with four 10cm leFH 14/19 (t) and a minor backup position WN 34 with a single 5cm gun. WN 38 and 39 were stronger, mounting two 7.5cm FK (f), two 5cm Pak and one 5cm mortar, with perhaps as many as eight machineguns. Most of the non-artillery positions included one or two casemates and three or more ‘Tobruck’ mounts for machineguns.

Note also that none of the positions could be characterized as either extensive of deep, nor were there extensive built-up areas for the Germans to take advantage of. WN 37 at La Hamel on the far western edge is the only area that could be so characterized and that just from a single large building, the Sanatorium. The three villages backing GOLD, Asnelles-sur-Mer, Ver-sur-Mer and Meauvaines were not incorporated in the strongpoint system, while only parts of Mont Fleury and la Riviere were.

A great weakness to the position was the lack of reliable infantry to defend it. Located with the artillery at WN 35b was a headquarters unit, Stab/Ost Btl 441. This battalion also had four infantry companies. 1/Ost Btl 441, based at Vaux north of Bayeux, was well out of the GOLD sector and played no part in the days events. 2/Ost Btl 441, based at Reviers, was also not involved against GOLD and spent the day fighting the Canadians at JUNO. 3/Ost Btl 441 based at Meuvaines, made up the garrison of WN 33, 34 and 35, “stiffened” by 7/Gren Rgt 726 (see below). Elements drawn from a platoon of 7/Gren Rgt 736 occupied field fortifications in Graye-sur-Mer (the bulk of the company was at WN 31 at La Riviere, also facing the Canadian landings on JUNO). 4/Ost Btl 441 occupied field fortifications along the low ridge in front of Ver-sur-Mer.

The second infantry element defending in the GOLD sector was II/Gren Rgt 726. The battalion Stab and 7 Kompanie was at Sainte-Croix-sur-Mer, with 7 Kompanie providing “stiffening” at WN 33, 34 and 35. 6/Gren Rgt 726, based at Bazenville, occupied WN 36 and 38. 5 and 8 Kompanie formed a reserve at Creully about five kilometers inland. Finally, Grenadier Regiment 916 of 352 Infanterie Division was present in the form of a single company occupying WN 37 (La Hamel), 38 and 39. The rest of this battalion was deployed to the west between Arromanches and La Hamel (the regimental and divisional boundary ran through La Hamel (inclusive to Gren Rgt 916 and 352 ID) and Bazenville (inclusive to Gren Rgt 726 and 716 ID)

Thus the actual defenders of the positions “on the beach” (WN 33, 35, 36, and 37) consisted of 6 and 7/Gren Rgt 726, 3/Ost Btl 441, a platoon of 7 Gren Rgt 736, and a platoon of II/Gren Rgt 916, a total of three and two-third companies of infantry. They were supported by another three and two-third infantry companies, three artillery batteries, and two battalion headquarters companies. All told these may have amounted to about 1,600 men.

In comparison, OMAHA Beach encompassed a front from slightly west of Ste Honorine des Pertes to slightly east of Pointe et Raz de la Percee, a distance of about seven kilometers. Along the frontage were 14 Wiederstandsneste, WN 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 73. Of those all except three, WN 63, 67 and 69, could engage targets on the beach with direct fire. And those positions included a massive array of firepower, including two 8.8cm Pak, one 7.62 FK ®, six 7.5cm FK (f), two 7.5cm turreted guns (taken from the VK3001 tank prototype), 10 5cm Pak, one 4.7cm Pak, six 3.7cm guns (mostly turreted), 17 mortars (at least two 8cm), and 85 machineguns. Four artillery batteries from I and IV/AR 352 (five if Pointe du Hoc were included) backed the position up with a total of 12 10.5cm leFH and four 15cm sFH.

Infantry defense initially comprised 3/Gren Rgt 726 based at Colleville-sur-Mer occupying WN 60, 61, and 62, 10/Gren Rgt726 occupying WN 64, 65, 66, and 68, and 11/Gren Rgt 726 based at Vierville occupying WN 70, 71, 72, and 73. Stab I/Gren Rgt 726 was at Maisons, Stab III was at Chateau du Jucoville and Stab II/Gren Rgt 916 was at Formigny. 5/Gren Rgt based at St Laurent-sur-Mer and 8/Gren Rgt 916 based at Colleville-sur-Mer “stiffened” 3, 10 and 11/Gren Rgt 726.

In addition immediate reserves included 1/Gren Rgt 726 at Port en Bessin, 2/Gren Rgt 726 at St Honorine, 9/Gren Rgt 726 at Château Englesqueville, 6/Gren Rgt 916 at Formigny, and 7/Gren Rgt 916 at Surrain. Thus a total of five infantry companies occupied positions “on the beach” supported by another five infantry companies and four artillery batteries.

In terms of beach obstacle weight and density there was little to chose between GOLD and OMAHA. At GOLD it was calculated that the density of obstacles was about 0.43 per yard of frontage, at OMAHA it was slightly higher at 0.49. At GOLD the average weight of obstacles per yard was calculated as 394 pounds, while at OMAHA it was 401 pounds. But overall the natural advantage at OMAHA versus GOLD (and SWORD, JUNO and UTAH) was so superior that it was remarked that:

“The British beaches and UTAH were all backed by more or less flat terrain. The main passive obstacles to movement from the beaches were minefields, and, in some places, a sea-wall 6’-10’ high. Provided this sea-wall was breached and exits could be cleared through the beach minefields it was in most cases possible for MT and personnel to move off the beach at any point.

The terrain in the OMAHA Area was of great natural strength. The beaches were backed in some places by sheer cliffs and in other places by steep ascents reaching to a height of upwards of 100 feet within a few hundred yards of the beach. There were few easy exits and all natural exits were blocked by ditches or walls. Tank traps and antitank ditches intervened between beaches and road exits.” (Army AORG Group Report No. 292 “Comparison of British and American Areas in Normandy in Terms of Fire Support and its Effects” 14 August 1945).

Overall we can see that GOLD was approximately 93 percent the width of OMAHA, so they were fairly similar in terms of frontage.

But GOLD was defended by just four Widerstandsneste that could fully cover the landing area, rather than the 11 at OMAHA, 2.75 times as many.

At GOLD there were at most 11 direct fire heavy weapons bearing on the beach, at OMAHA there were 28, 2.54 times as many.

At GOLD there were at most three mortars bearing on the beach, at OMAHA there were 17, nearly six times as many.

At GOLD there were 18 machineguns bearing on the beach, at OMAHA there were 85, more than four times as many.

At GOLD there were 12 artillery pieces dedicated to defending the sector. at OMAHA there were 16, all of them heavier and longer-ranged pieces.

At GOLD the immediate defenders and their reserves totaled seven and one-third infantry companies, only one of which could be considered “first class” while two of the remaining companies were Ost Truppen, noteworthy for collapsing almost immediately. At OMAHA there were ten companies immediately available to defend the beaches, four of them “first class” and none of them Ost Truppen.

As far as the 352 Division reserve goes, I/IR 914 was utilized to counterattack the Rangers at Pointe du Hoe, while KG Meyer was split (after considerable indecision) and II/IR 915 and 2/Panzerjaeger Abtl 352 (Marders) were sent to reinforce IR 916 at OMAHA. The rest (IR 915 Stab, I/IR 915, Fus Btl 352, 1/Panzerjaeger Abtl 352 (StuG)) were sent to GOLD. I'm still trying to track it down, but I believe Pi.Btl. 352 was also sent to OMAHA. Finally, Landesbau-Pi. Btl. 17 (HQ in Littry forest about 15 km south of Colleville, its 4 companies were engaged in construction activities along the coast) was employed to reinforce IR 914 and 916 on D-Day between Pointe du Hoc and St. Laurent and lost nearly 400 men in the process.

In other words, the forces used to counterattack OMAHA were about the same as those at GOLD, and of course both met with the same lack of success.

Sorry, the quote was actually from the (3rd/4th?) assault on Douvres de Deliverande.
Just wanted to point out the potential of the weapon.

Sneaky, cheeky John!

But I agree as to the potential of the AVRE.

Thanks very much for the informative post. I only wonder about the above, particularly the mortars. Did the individual German companies deploy any mortars or was it really just 3 for Gold Beach? I seem to recall reports of mortaring that seem difficult to achieve with only three small mortars.


BTW, in an indirect way back to the original topic, are there records for the later temporary transfer of British Crocodiles to the US Army for the assault on Brest?

Sorry Colin, I was being overly concise. The strength is that derived from a number of British ORS reports that investigated the strengths of the German defenses and as far as I can make out did so pretty thoroughly. However, it also appears that they were looking at emplacements, so may not have captured all the weapons in inventory with the units occupying them. It does appear that the counts for MG do account for all of the unit inventory as well as unit holdings, but the mortar counts may not.

For completeness, the unit holdings were approximately:

GOLD:
Ost Btl 441 - 28 MG, 5 mortars (probably 5cm)
II/Gren Regt 726 - 48 MG, 9 5cm and 6 8cm mortars
Coy/Gren Regt 916 - probably 12 or 13 MG and 3 8cm mortars
Total 88/89 MG and 23 mortars (9 8cm)

OMAHA:
I/Gren Regt 726 - 48 MG, 6 5cm and 9 8cm mortars
III/Gren Regt 726 - 48 MG, 3 5cm and 9 8cm mortars
II/Gren Regt 916 - 63 MG and 12 8cm mortars
Total 159 MG and 39 mortars (30 8cm)



There are records, but they were not temporary transfers, it was an attachment of a squadron of 141 RAC. They were used on two days in the attack of one of the forts on the outskirts of Brest. The first attack was pretty much abortive, with losses to the Crocs, which were ineffective. The second was more effective and eventually successful. All in all the Americans liked the tank mounted flamethrower and desired same for US equipment (not neccessarily in Churchills), but did not consider it's use crucial in the assault of Brest (it was not).

And are you accusing me of getting off topic in my own thread!?

I’ve just come across the interesting discussion about the offer of funnies to the Americans. The demonstration to Eisenhower on 27th January by 617 Assault Squadron has been mentioned. Kenneth Macksey, in his Hobart biography, says that Eisenhower passed the matter on to Bradley, who then passed the onus to his staff. He is critical of Bradley for not giving the matter more attention himself.. I also remember in Adrian Lewis’ book on Omaha that he mentions that Bradley did actually envisage the use of Churchill Engineer tanks as part of the US landing. Any such plan was certainly modified, and I get the impression that Gerow and V Corps may have had a significant part to play, reinforcing Macksey’s argument. (Gerow also opposed the use of DD tanks, according to Lewis).

I have also found an interesting reference in a document in the National Archives in the UK (formerly the PRO), number WO205/626 (79 Armoured division: organisation and equipment training. Part III). This says that the US 1st Army’s technical advisers were to see the 79th Armoured Div’s equipment on 11th February (1944), and then were to notify the British of any requirements; this was a meeting at HQ 79 AD at which Lt Gen Bradley was present. I haven’t found any documentation that mentions a response.

Interestingly, a few of the veterans I have spoken to in 1st Assault Brigade were of the opinion that they had been ‘reserved’ for possible use with the Americans.

As to whether any specialised armour would have made a difference. Lewis is of the opinion that the terrain at Omaha was such that it would be a foot soldiers’ battle, and that more specialised vehicles would not have survived very long there.

Very interesting Paul. I did not get a chance to review WO205/626 when I was at NA-UK last November. But that gives me a lead to check at this end to see if there is any record of the meeting in the US-NA (it was so much easier when it was the PRO, it was easy to distinguish them from NARA, which was the official US Archives acronym). )

I'd be interested if you come up with anything, Rich. Can I ask, are you researching the 1st Assault Brigade specfically, or D-Day in general?

What I found in a recent opus by Steve Zaloga
US Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO 1944-1945
Osprey Battle Orders 10, 2005 (pages 46 and 48)
"Tank battalions in an amphibious assault In preparation for Operation Neptune, the ETOUSA began to address the need for specialized armored units to assist in overcoming German coastal defenses. The British Army had been working on this problem since the ill-fated amphibious landings at Dieppe in 1942. As a result, the US Army tended to follow the British lead in regards to specialized equipment. However, due to McNair's strong aversion to specialized units, the US Army decided against following the british practice of a dedicated armored division for the specialized armor. Instead the 2 armored groups of the First US Army, 3rd Armored Group with V Corps at Omaha Beach and the 6th Armored Group with the VII Corps at Utah Beach, were assigned to provide specialized training to their constituent battalions for operations on D-Day. Three tank battalions were assigned to the task, the 741st and 743rd Tank Battalions (Omaha Beach) and the 70th Tank Battalion (Utah Beach). At first, the US Army decided to use British equipment for this operation including Duplex Drive (DD) amphibious tanks, 25 Crab Flail mine-clearing tanks and 100 Sherman Crocodile Flamethrowing tanks. British industry was barely able to equip its own forces, and as a result the DD tanks had to be locally assembled in the US, and the mine-clearing and flamethrowing tanks were not available in time for the D-Day operations. The US Army rejected the use of the British Churchill AVRE combat engineer vehicle as it was developping its own equivalent, and also rejected the use of British bridging tanks, which it felt unnecessary."

The author does not state exactly the source of these informations, but he can be reached by email as he is a moderator on this discussion group
Missing Lynx
HTH