The British operated the F-4 Phantom on their last full scale carrier and we have discussed in in bits and pieces.
The French operated the F-8 Crusader until not too long ago (until replaced the the Rafale)
Of the comparison needs to be between the aircraft during the same time frame. Comparing a 1975 Phantom against a 1995 Crusader is likely an unfair comparison.

If I understand, the F-4 was faster and longer ranged

What I am wonder is which had the better radar system, which is more maneuverable, which had the better gun, which had teh higher payload, and other factors involved in a discussion.

Finally, if it came down to a fight between the two fighters, which is better?
As well, in carrier defense roles, which was the better fighter?

Isn't the F-4 as a design a whole generation newer than the F-8?

F 8 :

... the last fo the gunfighterz ...

I think it would outmaneuver an F 4 any day of the week.

Plus it got FOUR gunz!

The radar ´winder wasn´t too reliable ...

I dunno, what the better Radar of the F 4 and the longer range and heavier weapons fit of the Mighty Phantom play a role in AA Combat.

Hermann

Yes

F4



Depends on the density altitude, fuel weight, & a host of other nit-picky factors

F4 (6x20mm M61 Vulcan vs 4×20 mm Mk 12 cannons)



F4 by a wide margin



Depends on the circumstances, wx, pilots, and scenario.
F8 v F4 from the old Wings series

F4, the F8 had only a rudimentary short range system, the F4 was a powerful long range set.

F8, but the F4 wasn't quite the slouch many make it out to be.


F8, the F4K had no onboard gun, and AFAIK only the RAF F4M was cleared to carry the SUU-23/A gun pods.

The F4 could carry a lot more, a lot further.





If you want to keep regiments of Bears, Badgers and Backfires away from your carrier and convoy, the Phantoms are far and away the better option, to find, fix and kill the enemy, but given the small airwings of both carriers and how small their respective SAG's would be it is a bit pointless.

The F4 also gave much, much greater offensive payload and range, and remember range isn't just distance but loiter time while CAP'ing the CVBG.

The F8 had it's place and was an excellent aircraft for tackling fighters in WVR engagements, but I don't know how many of those were envisaged in WWIII short of supporting Norway in close.

Was the F-8 ever armed with missiles or was it a pure gunfighter til the end?

Also look at what they were to be tasked to do: the 'strike' aircraft on the RN carriers was the Buc, which the F-4 would have been much better able to escort and do CAP in connection with those whereas the F-8 would have been more appropriate to the Etendard / Super etendard, that was a much lighter and low powered aircraft than the Buc.

In general terms the RN flew heavier aircraft than the (whatever the Frence Navy is called) and this extended to the anti-sub fixed wing as well, and probably helicopters too.

Carried 4 'Winders' which were able to be replaced by pods carrying 8 rockets. The AIM-9 were carried alongside the fuselage rather than on the wings. I don't have reference material with me - at work - but I seem to recall that some French AA missiles were able to be carried.

It could carry 4 Sidewinders. French F-8s could carry 2 Mantra, or 4 Magics. Most of the AtA kills in Vietnam were achived by Sidewinders. Mainly because the Colt 20mms had a high jam rate.

Interesting bit of trvia is that the F-8 was the only aircraft rated to carry the AIM-9C. It was a short-lived SARH version of the Sidewinder.

- John

Actually, the French F-8s in 1995 were not much different than what they orignally purchased. The FN acquired their F-8Es in 1964, and despite a "rebuild" in 1991 that involved some modest upgrades like a RWR, they really didn't do much with them (though they were redesignated F-8P).

By far. The F-4 set speed records that I don't believe were broken until the F-15. British F-4s had RR Spey engines which had even higher rated thrust.



The F-4. The Phantom was envisioned to by a BVR interceptor, in an age where the USN was strongly concerned with intercepting Soviet bombers. The British had similar concerns. The F-8 was strictly a daylight knife figher, built in the same vein as the F-9 Cougar it replaced, but with the capability of going supersonic.

Generally, the F-8 in most flight envelopes.



The Crusader wins by default because the RN/RAF Phantoms didn't have internal guns. Adding an SUU-23/A gun pod would mean that the Phantom gets the nod.

The Colt Mk12s used in the F-8 had a high jam-rate under intense G-loads. I dunno if the French ever fixed this though. Presumably if they thought it was a big problem, they could have retrofited DEFA cannons.

F-4. Again, by a wide margin.



This is impossible to answer without giving a specific scenario.

Generally, if the RN/RAF Phantom has the FN Crusader on radar, the Crusader would be in deep doo-doo. The Phantoms have Skyflash. FN Crusaders could carry 2 Mantra missiles, but they didn't have the radar reach the Phantom did (and I don't know if they had the FCR to handle the SARH versions).

OTOH, in a knife fight, assuming equally skilled pilots, the Crusader probably has a slight advantage. Keep in mind, the Phantom can disengage pretty easy and run for it though. The Cursader would be hard pressed to keep up.

In terms of carrier defense, one only needs to look at the development of the F-14 to descern what the USN thought was the better design (the Phantom). However, again, the USN was highly paranoid of a Red Storm Rising type scenario involving Russian bombers. Fleet defense has to take into account what you intend to defend against.

- John

I was under the impression that only the F4M's were modified to accept the SUU-23/A gunpods not the RN F4K's?
Did they ever carry them? I can't think of ever seeing an RN F4 with a gunpod.

Either way gunpod accuracy was considered pretty average by pilots compared with fixed guns.

Originally the F4K could not carry the pod, though the ability was added later on.

I am curious why the Brits didn't go with the internal M61 20mm of the F4E model...wonder if it had something to do with the wheel well modifications for carrier use?

SUU-23 20

You're probably right about the K model. Though it doesn't make much sense when you consider it's basically a modified J. Still, the point I'm trying to make is that the F-8 kinda wins this by default unless you consider an M with a SUU-23/A. In which case, I'm inclined to give the nod to a Phantom with the gunpod.



The Mk12s were also not terribly accurate:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colt_Mk_12_cannon

Given the choice between a dubious and documented reliability record, or a gun that's highly reliable but maybe not quite as accurate: I'd take the later. It's not like the pilot can climb out of the aircraft and clear a jam in the middle of a dogfight.

- John

No naval F-4 had an internal gun. The reasons for which are not entirely clear to me, but one might be that their radar systems were much bigger then the "smaller" radar in the F-4E/F.

One important drawback of the French F-8 would have been the Magic I AAM though.

It wouldn't fit.

There were basically two nose types used on the F-4. The "long nose" and the "short nose." The short nose is what most Phantoms were originally (including all USN models). The long nose was originally devised to accomodate additional avionics of the RF-4C. However, it was later used by the USAF when building the F-4E. This allowed an internal cannon to be fitted. The Wild Weasel G (essentially a rebuilt E) also used the long nose, but the cannon was deleted in favor of adding additional avionics.

The the K and M models were both based off the US Navy's J. Not the E.

No carrier-capable Phantom that I know of ever had an internal gun. They were all short nose.

- John

Damn, just lost my post...



I remember a few years ago on SimHQ one of the contributors was a USAF F4D & E pilot in Vietnam (Also F104 and A10) and openly stated that he would take an E model with the fixed gun over the larger radar but poorer accuracy of a gun pod any day.



I would imagine the primary issue was that when the F4K/M was ordered in 1966 the F4E didn't exist.
That plus there is the fact that I can't imagine the British were able/willing to absorb the cost of navalizing a variant on their own for what was at it's peak a total order of 140 aircraft and ended up being much less when the government took the knife to the carrier force.

As to why the USN didn't develop a navalized F4E, I would imagine that by the time it showed up the F14 was close to entering service (in theory at least) and that would've made up the short-fall.

I might even hypothesize that there may have been issues with the F4E's enlongated, downward angled nose with landings on carriers.

It would come down to pilot experience. The pilot that fought his aircraft's strengths better would win. If it's strictly a close-in turning fight, the F-8 gets the nod. A good F-4 pilot, though can use his greater thrust to go vertical or disengage and come back in (look up Cunningham's fifth kill, where he nailed with a far more maneuverable MiG-17). This gives the Phantom pilot the ability to control the battle. Remember, the 'winders available to either fighter were rear-aspect only.

I don't think it was fixable with any gun, because the main problem was the length of the ammo belt run between the ammo tanks high in the fuselage and the guns which were much lower down. G forces in combat tended to pull the belt links apart.

A belt-less feed system? Don't know if they like g loads either though.

Sorry, the dates do not support your hypothesis.

The first YRF-4C was modified to carry the 20mm M61A1 and flew as YF-4E on August 7, 1965. The RFP for VFX (which led to the development of F-14 Tomcat) was only issued in 1968, and the Grumman design was selected in 1969.


There was no chance that the US Navy would have adopted the F-4E. For the USN, the primary role of F-4 Phantom II was fleet air defense, i.e. shooting down hordes of Soviet bombers at long range before they could launch anti-ship missiles. For this, the important factors were powerful radar and long range (for its period) air-to-air missile armament. A gun armament was much less useful because in order to use it, the F-4 would have to take time to close the Soviet bomber and maneuver to bring it into gun range, time during which the Soviet bomber (or other Soviet bombers in the attacking formation) could launch the anti-ship missile. So there was no way the USN would accept a less powerful radar to get an internal cannon.

I don't know if the long nose of the F-4E was a problem in carrier landings, but it certainly presented problems once it was on board. Carrier flight decks and hangars are very limited in space, so there is a definite need for carrier aircraft to take up as little space as possible. This was even more of a factor with the smaller British carrier, and the F-4K had to have a folding nose radome and radar in order to fit onto the flight deck elevator of HMS Ark Royal. Given where the nose fold fell on the F-4K, I don't think the F-4E could have fitted the British elevator; it looks like the fold line will fall across the M61A1.

Hojutsuka

Of USN credited F-8 victories in Vietnam, 14 were achieved with AIM-9's alone, 2 w/ AIM-9 and 20mm, 1 with Zuni rockets and 20mm, 1 with just 20mm, and one maneuver kill credited without any weapons. So the 20mm was not the F-8's dominant air-air weapon in practice even against other fighters. The main effect of the gun/AIM-9 armament in the F-8 v AIM-9/AIM-7 armament in F-4 was probably to retain more of a fighter combat mentality in F-8 units than F-4 units, prior to Top Gun and the strengthening of emphasis on fighter combat in all USN fighter units.

But as mentioned the F-4, and F-14 for that matter even though it was in part a product of the disappointment with fighter combat results in Vietnam, both retained a major mission of fleet defense against bombers. That would not be sacrificed just to put a gun in the F-4. In fact the F-4J developed during Vietnam had a much more capable long range fleet defense oriented radar/fcs than the F-4B, AWG-10. In case of the still larger F-14 a gun and a big radar/fcs (the ironically lower numbered AWG-9) both fit. In an F-4 they didn't. The Navy did also have a 20mm gun pod Mk.4, containing the Mk.11 type 20mm, a high rof twin barrel revolver type gun, unrelated to the Vulcan and Vulcan pods carried by AF (and later RAF) F-4's. USN F-4's could carry it, but it wasn't much of a success and accounted for no aerial victories in Vietnam.

Joe

Joe, any info on which planes carried this gun pod (I believe that the A4 was a major user), what the USN thought of it and whether any other countries had it (Israel)?

Then again a Navy Phantom pilot whose Sidewinders were AIM-9D/G instead of AIM-9E/J might ave a different opinion about the necessity of a gun...

Using various references including acig and wiki, I was surprised to see the number of 20mm kills in the c,d, & e models.
aim-4..5
aim-7..50
aim-9..31 (not taking into account the +1 20/aim9 combo kill)
20mm..15.5 (none i found listed with the Suu)

I was very surprised during my very brief research to see:
..the number of F105 kills. 25 total with 22 of those being with the 20mm.
..mig-17 shot down by an AH-1 20mm from VA-176 (would love to read the official story on that one)

F-105s scored mostly gun kills for the simple reason that most of the time that was the only air-to-air armament that they carried...

As for the second, that's a typo for A-1H (which is an unusual occurence in itself of course, but not quite as strange as a Cobra shooting down a MiG...)

The VFX may only have been initiated in Oct '67 but it was a direct replacement to TFX which was the gun-armed F-111B which was intended to offer both performance and handling improvements over the F4. That it didn't is irrelevant because since 1960 there was always supposed to be a better performing, more agile, swing-swing gun-armed F4 replacement in the works 'just around the corner'.




I know that, I was enunciating the reasons why they (or more to the point the RN) didn't.

It should also be remembered that in an incredibly short period of time the USN probably had a wider range of fighter type aircraft than any other 'air force' in the world.

Between 1950 and 1965 the USN had in service the Grumman Panther, Grumman Cougar, small numbers of the Grumman Tiger, the Vought Cutlass, The FJ-4B Fury, Douglas Skynight, McDonnell Banshee, Douglas Skyray, McDonnell Demon and F-8 Crusader. Also of course the F-4.

I have probably missed a couple. Some were desined essentially as gunfighters, others carried both guns and missiles, the Cutlass, Skyray and Demon come to mind. In some ways the Crusader was to the USN what the F-100 was to the USAF.

So, we have heard about the various capabilities of the F-14 vs F-15, and F-18 vs F-16.

What say you F-8 vs F-100? Skyray vs F-102? Demon vs F-86D? Skynight vs Northrop Scorpion?

Sure, different roles, as the USN needed both fleet defence fighters and (until naval SAMs matured) point defence fighters. To the extent that the USN layered defence was more like that attempted for 1945 Germany, with large twin engined fighters defending large areas, single engined for shorter range and Me-163 for point defence.

I have seen photo's or direct references to Mk.4's being carried by A-4's, F-4's, A-7's and USN OV-10A's of VAL-4; and a safety document discussing the mounting on the A-6. For USN F-4's it was pretty rarely used. In 1966-67 VF-114 and 213 on Kittyhawk made a habit of fitting these pods, centerline station, but achieved no air-air results. Apparently they were more often used by Marine F-4's in close support missions. Besides the claimed unreliability of the pod, giving up the 600 gal centerline fuel tank was more of an issue for carrier F-4's because the wing 370 gals, even though supersonic capable, were not considered as desirable when catapulting; one can see they are often missing on USN F-4's in Vietnam photo'ed on the carriers or in combat, while usually present on USAF F-4's. I also assume Navy F-4's didn't have an interface to allow eg. lead computing function for the gun pod; the non AAM combat avionics, on the F-4B at least, were very rudimentary. I don't know of any other country using that pod.

On SUU type 20mm gatling gun pods used by the USAF, they were credited with several MiG kills in Vietnam. Four (of 42) credits to F-4C's were with SUU-16 ram air turbine powered Vulcan pods. The F-4C also had no lead computing function for the gun. Six (of 44) F-4D credits were with SUU-23 gun gas powered pods. The F-4D's sight could provide a lead computing function for the gun pod. The use of the pods didn't start until 1967. Five (of 21) F-4E credits in Vietnam were with the integral gun. Source is official USAF data reproduced in Boyne "Phantom in Combat". In "Clashes" Michel presents USAF data that in the Rolling Thunder period a kill was credited in 13% of gun attacks v 11% of missile attacks; however in 100 of 140 F-105 gun attacks the sight hadn't been put in air-air mode (which was notoriously difficult to do on the fly); eliminating those cases it was 16% for gun attacks, and still includes no lead computing for F-4C's.

The other USN v USAF difference, already mentioned by Jussi, which is that the USN scored most of its Rolling Thunder AIM-9 credits with the somewhat better AIM-9D, though it also used the AIM-9B, while AF's AIM-9's in RT were all B's. And by the 1972 resumption it had the AIM-9G which was pretty close to a fully satisfactory tail chase only IR AAM. Whereas, the AF's AIM-9 improvements, E and J, still left much to be desired. The USN approach of more intensive ACM training and AIM-9G largely solved the problem without a gun.

Joe

Thanks for that. Interesting that the Mk 4 pod was retained in use after the M61 had been adopted, given that they used incompatible ammo.

This makes no more sense than your original idea that the US Navy was not interested in a navalized F-4E because the F-14 was "close to entering service".

Look at the dates.

As can be seen here, the YF-4E (modified from YRF-4C) first flew on August 7, 1965.

The F-111B first flew on May 18, 1965, and the first Naval Preliminary Evaluation was held at NATC Patuxent River in October of 1965. This showed that the F-111B was seriously overweight, with the fully equipped service aircraft expected to weigh 78,000 lbs at takeoff, or over 10 tons more than the Navy requirement for maximum takeoff weight of 55,000 lbs. link

So the F-4E was coming into existence just when the Navy was coming up against the hard realization that F-111B was not going to be "a better performing, more agile, swing-swing gun-armed F4 replacement" and that rather than being ready for operational service 'just around the corner' it was in fact highly unlikely ever to be fit for carrier operations at all.

The fact that the US Navy did not try to navalize the F-4E has to do with the disadvantages of F-4E for naval roles and operations rather than any expectation that a newer and better gun-armed naval fighter would be available in the immediate future.

Hojutsuka

Tony, the US Navy did not adopt the M61 Gatling gun immediately. IIRC the first USN aircraft to have the M61A1 was the A-7E which entered service in 1970, i.e. after the period of Mk 4 pod use that Joe Brennan was talking about. Earlier Navy aircraft had the Mk 12 which used the same ammunition as the Mk 11 used in the Mk 4 pod. Even after the M61 entered USN service, many aircraft with Mk 12 20mm gun continued to be in service, the F-8 Crusader finally left carrier service in 1976, for example.

Hojutsuka

Joe, did any of the authors mention manually dialing in the mills for use with the Suu?

All good and fine Luke, except the parameters I am presented with is a F-8E(FN) vs. an F-4K or M. A fixed Vulcan is outside the scope of that.

In the case of the 4K vs.8E, the F-8 wins by default.

In the case of the 4M (with gunpod) vs. the 8E, you have your choice of either an unreliable feed mechanism, or an inaccurate, but highly reliable gun.

I much rather have the reliable gun. I don't care if the Crusaders fixed guns might have been more accurate (which again, I've read the Mk12s were not terribly accurate anyway).

- John

Actually, this idiocy was SOP for the day.

You will recall that before the M61, the USAF used the M39. At the same time period, the Navy used the M3 and the Mk 12. The USAF used 20x102mm, while the USN used 20x110.

Like hojutsuka pointed out, the US military didn't standardize on 20x110mm until several decades later. Even then, there was still some overlap (ie. The A-4 and F-8 remained in USN service for a while longer).

- John

Hojutsuka, you're missing the point - They were never interested in the concept of a naval F4E or fixed-gun armed short-fat nosed F4B/J/S/Whatever full stop. It was never looked at, considered, proposed, thought of, dreamed of, hypothesized, conceptualized or requested.

If they were desperate to fit a fixed gun to an F4B/J they could've/would've found a way, but they weren't and didn't, which leads to one of two possible reasons: 1) They didn't think it was important enough or 2) They believed the role would be filled soon enough by VFX/TFX and wasn't worth the effort.

Either way the argument is pointless.

I think that needs clarifying a bit...

The M3 dated from the end of WW2 and was a modified Hispano which used the original 20x110 HS 404 ammo, with a case diameter of 25mm (the USAF used the same gun and ammo, but in the M24 version gave it electric rather than percussion priming).

The USAF then introduced the 20x102 which is actually more powerful than the 20x110 HS since the case diameter is just over 29mm. This was a necked-out version of the .60in cartridge (15.2x114) originally developed for an anti-tank rifle but adopted for several different aircraft gun projects. This was introduced in the M39 revolver and later the M61 rotary, and is still in service today.

The USN looked at the 20x102 and decided to stretch the case to 110mm length to fit the Hispano action, so this 20x110 (known as the 20x110 USN or MK 100 series) was fatter and more powerful than the original HS type. This round was only used in the MK 12 gun (a modified Hispano) and the weird twin-barrel revolver MK 11. The MK 12 was the USN's standard gun from the mid-1950s until it was replaced by the M61. The MK 11 was only used in the MK 4 gunpod. Neither is in service any more except possibly with some A4 users, and the ammo is not in regular production.

With the benefit of hindsight, the 20x110 USN cartridge was a waste of resources. It fired a slightly heavier shell than the 20x102, but not enough to make any difference - 110 grams compared with 102 (the HS shells were around 120 grams, but fired at a lower velocity).

The photo below (from the Ammo Photo Gallery on my website) shows the 20x110 HS (far right of the group on the left) with the .60in and derived rounds in the central group (the 12.7x114 was necked down to produce a very high velocity .50in)
.

Tony, are you indicating that USN was trying to get the most utility out of their older (and mostly paid-for) 20mm gun design, while the Air Force was working with cutting-edge tech in the M61, requiring a new cartridge? This would be a sensible explanation for the different cartridges.

The USN MK 12 project must certainly have involved a lower cost and risk than either the M39 or M61 (which were far more complex new designs). I understand that some MK 12 guns even reused parts from the older MK 3.

Basically, the MK 12 was a "hot-rodded" MK 3, with a more powerful cartridge and a speeded-up rate of fire.

Thanks, Tony. Considering that the Mk 12 was primarily intended for AtoA work, was its "inaccuracy" really a drawback? While getting multiple hits close together is desirable, a somewhat dispersed pattern would increase probability of any hits, given the fleeting nature of AtoA gunnery. Rate of fire (when the guns work) should fill the voids.

Luke, that's a strawman. Nobody is claiming that the USN was interested in navalizing the F-4E. We are discussing why the USN was not interested in navalizing the F-4E.


Reason 2) is just in your imagination. The timing of aircraft developments during the '60s make it improbable, to say the least, that in 1965 the USN believed that a new gun-armed fighter would be ready any time soon (the F-111B was having major problems and as for VFX, later to become the F-14 Tomcat, it would be three more years before USN could get Congress to cancel the F-111B so that USN could even issue an RFP for it).


Since you appear to be only interested in avoiding having to admit that your original statement (your post #16: "As to why the USN didn't develop a navalized F4E, I would imagine that by the time it showed up the F14 was close to entering service (in theory at least) and that would've made up the short-fall.") did not make much sense, I agree that further discussion with you on this subject is useless.

Hojutsuka

It's also interesting to note that the F-4S (the definative USN version) remained in carrier service until 1986 (albeit in a reserve capacity after '83). The Marines kept theirs until 1992 because the Tomcat couldn't haul iron worth a darn.

That gave the Navy almost two decades after the F-14 project was started to find someway to fit an internal cannon into the Phantoms (perhaps by retrofitting an "E" nose). They didn't because I don't think they felt it was oh so important. The USAF was a far bigger purveyor of the need for internal guns. Like Joe and Jussi pointed out, they had somewhat crappier missiles.

A far bigger problem facing the Navy was that their pilots had poor dissimilar combat training. The kill ratio in Vietnam jumped dramatically in the USN's favor after they instituted "Top Gun". Ironically, still without a gun.

- John

A gun just wasn't a priority for the Navy at the time. What the Navy wanted was missiles. The F-4 was to be an interceptor first and foremost, and anything that detracted from intercepting bombers as far out as possible made the interception mission less effective. Small radome? Bad idea. Their lack of desire to adopt an F-4E derivative had nothing to do with the TFX/VFX programs. Those programs were able to make provisions for a gun without the perceived negative impact on the primary mission. As has been said, the Navy used gunless F-4s for many, many years. Had there been a desire to have an internal gun, it could have been done.

There's no need to draw inferences about who was thinking what. The F-4 requirements just didn't include an internal gun, and for 20+ years the Navy didn't see fit to change that. The F-4 was remarkable in one way that is rarely discussed--it began to put an end to all of the experimentation that the Navy had been doing to find the right sort of fighter to meet its needs. The number of types that the Navy had in service prior to the F-4 is astounding. The F-4 provided the right mix of power, size, armament, and capability after years of refining that mix. The F-4 got everything right except the looks, but that's a subjective sort of thing. The F11F was a hard act to follow in that regard, as shown by the Blue Angels.

Apparently, it happened twice (I imagine you meant AD-1, given the unit designation). Here is one account:




http://www.vnafmamn.com/Skyraider_vs_MIG17.html


"June 20, 1965 – A-1 SKYRAIDER MIG Killers
Frustration and fatigue were starting to simultaneously set in on me on 20 June 1965. We were 30 days into our third at-sea period, and the ops tempo was intense. Ten days prior we had our first loss, one of our nuggets, Carl Doughtie. The last four days we had not been especially successful. During those four days I had flown 21 hours on an Alfa strike, two road recces and a seven and one half hour RESCAP. The strike was marginally successful with 40 percent BDA, the RESCAP was not. We had to leave the downed pilot when it got dark. One road recce was nothing more than harassment. The other I scored one truck, but someone almost scored me while I was executing a life-saving pullout just short of bending the prop. I logged two nice round holes in the aft fuselage.

PHOTOS OF US PILOTS & THEIR SKYRAIDERS


The day began normally with the starboard catapult crashing into the water-brake outside my door acting as my alarm clock. It was supposed to be a stand-down day, but by noon we were suiting up for an emergency RESCAP. An Air Force photo-recon pilot had been shot down very deep into the northwest corner of North Vietnam. There were already RESCAP aircraft over the downed pilot, but they were running low on fuel. We were needed for backup coverage.

We manned up, started and were told to shut down. Someone else had covered the pilot, and they did not need us. We unmanned and returned to the ready room and waited. Two hours later we got the call again. We manned up, but did not get started again before we were again put on hold. By the time we got to the ready room we were told to man up again. By now we were fast becoming the leaders in the squadron sweat stain contest. The sweat stain contest was unique to Skyraider squadrons. The winner was the pilot who could merge the salty white left and right armpit stains in the center of his flight suit first. This contest was made possible by the USS MIDWAY (CVA-41) laundry and morale officer who would accept only one flight suit per week per pilot from us. At any rate we were hot, sweaty and beginning to worry that this man up was going to mean no dinner. This time, however, we started, were told that we were a go mission and began our taxi forward to the catapults. At the last minute my Plane Captain, AN Halcomb, gave me a slush filled thermos and a hopeful look (hopeful that he would not have to do a fourth preflight on old 577). I gave him thumbs up and taxied forward to the starboard catapult. It was almost 1800. I spread and locked the wings, got thumbs up from the final checker and agreed with the flight deck officer on a 21,300 pound launch weight. As I felt the Skyraider settle into the catapult holdback, I release the brakes, added full power and scanned the engine instruments. Everything looked good and with the canopy open everything sounded good -- well at least loud. I returned the cat officer's salute and waited. I saw my flight leader go off the port cat and turn right for our standard starboard side rendezvous. The humidity was so high that his flap tips left contrails and my prop was making corkscrew contrails as the carrier moved through the sultry gulf air.

The cat shot killed my radio. We rendezvoused 1,000 feet on the starboard side of MIDWAY and headed west. After reforming in a finger four formation I tried to get my radio working. As the second element leader I had a "Middleman" aircraft. My airplane had two radios with a relay control box that could be switched so that the low aircraft covering the downed pilot could transmit through my aircraft to the ship using my aircraft at a higher altitude as an antenna relay. I was able to get the number two radio working, but continued to fiddle with number one so that I could act as relay. I got it working and checked in on tactical frequency as we went feet dry. Then it failed again.

Feet dry at 12,000 feet heading northwest we were passing north of Thanh Hoa. LCDR Ed Greathouse was in the lead. On his port wing was LTJG Jim LYNNE. I was on his starboard wing with Charlie Hartmann on my starboard. We all had the standard RESCAP load: two 150 gallon drop-tanks on the stub racks, four LAU-3 pods with 19 2.75 inch rockets apiece and 800 rounds of 20mm for the four wing cannons. We were flying steadily toward the downed pilot while I navigated, searched for active low frequency ADF stations (Until September 1965 the North Vietnamese MiGs used the ADFs listed in our 1964 navigation supplements) and considered what the situation ahead might be.

Suddenly Ed Greathouse rolled inverted into a near vertical dive with Jim Lynne following. I rolled and followed him down. I was concerned that I had not heard anything and that we were only 70 miles inland, at least 80 miles from our RESCAP point. A quick radio check confirmed that my radio was dead. I had missed the buildup to the run-in with the USS STRAUSS (DE-408) alerting us to MiGs in the area. The MiG pilots were on an intercept for two Skyraiders south of us, but missed and were coming around for another intercept when they spotted us. STRAUSS was keeping Ed Greathouse updated, and when it was apparent that we were the target, Ed took us down. At 12,000 feet and 170 knots we looked like Tweetybird to Sylvester the Cat. Our only hope was to get down low and try to out turn the MiGs. Ed was doing just that. Our split-S got us some speed and reversed our course toward the ship. I figured that any time my nose was pointed at the ground my ordnance should be armed. I armed the guns and set up the rockets. About that time I saw a large unguided rocket go past downward. My first inclination was that it was a SAM, but SAMs generally go up. A second rocket hit the ground near Ed and Jim. There was no doubt we were under attack by MiGs. This was confirmed when a silver MiG-17 with red marking on wings and tail streaked by Charlie and me heading for Ed. Tracers from behind and a jet intake growing larger in my mirror were a signal to start pulling and turning. As I put g's on the Skyraider I could see the two distinct sizes of tracers falling away (The MiG-17 had two 23mm and one 37mm cannon in the nose.) He stayed with us throughout the turn firing all the way. Fortunately, he was unable to stay inside our turn and overshot. As he pulled up Charlie got a quick shot at him but caused no apparent damage. He climbed to a perch position and stayed there.

Our turning had separated us from Ed and Jim. Now that we were no longer under attack my main concern was to rejoin the flight. I caught a glimpse of the leader and his wingman and headed for them. As we had been flying at treetop level in and out of small valleys, we had to fly around a small hill to get to them. Coming around the hill we saw Ed Greathouse and Jim LYNNE low with the MiG lined up behind them. I fired a short burst and missed, but got his attention. He turned hard into us to make a head-on pass. Charlie and I fired simultaneously as he passed so close that Charlie thought that I had hit his vertical stabilizer with the tip of my tail hook and Charlie flew through his wake. Both of us fired all four guns. Charlie's rounds appeared to go down the intake and into the wing root and mine along the top of the fuselage and through the canopy. He never returned our fire, rolled inverted and hit a small hill exploding and burning in a farm field. Charlie and I circled the wreckage while I switched back to number two radio. We briefly considered trying to cut off the other MiG, but were dissuaded by the voice of Ed Greathouse asking what we thought we were doing staying in the area when STRAUSS was reporting numerous bogeys inbound to our position. We took the hint and headed out low level to the Tonkin Gulf were we rejoined with our flight leader.

By now the sun was setting guaranteeing a night arrested landing back at MIDWAY. Our radio report was misunderstood by MIDWAY CIC which believed that one of us had been shot down. It took some effort for Ed Greathouse to convince them that we were OK and the North Vietnamese were minus one. Rarely does a night carrier landing evoke as little response from a pilot as ours did. We were so pumped up that we hardly noticed it.

After debriefs all around the politics started. Charlie and I were informed that we would get no recognition or awards for our MiG kill. SECNAV had been aboard three days earlier when VF-21 F-4 pilots had bagged the first kills of the war. Their awards were being held until SECNAV could get to Washington, announce it to the President and present it to Congress with the plea for more funds for F-4 Phantoms to fight the air war.

Obviously, the success of primitive Skyraiders would undermine his plans. Unfortunately, someone had included our kill in the daily action report to MACV where it was read by COMSEVENFLT DET "C" who thought that it would be an excellent opportunity for Navy public relations. Indirectly Ngyuen Cao Ky, the new Premier of South Vietnam, and a Skyraider pilot, heard of it and recognized Ed Greathouse's name as one of the Skyraider instructors from the RAG. He then demanded our appearance for Vietnamese awards.

The next day we flew to Saigon for the Five O'clock Follies and were instant celebrities, since the news media did not yet know about the F-4 kills. They assumed that we were the first which made an even better story. We stayed at the Majestic Hotel in Saigon where we thoroughly enjoyed the lack of water hours and the availability of our favorite beverages. The next day we were guests of Premier Ky at the palace were we were awarded Air Gallantry Medals and honorary commissions in the South Vietnamese Air Force. After the awards ceremony we sat down to tea with Premier Ky and some of his young hot pilots and traded war stories. He told us that the Skyraider MiG kill had boosted morale tremendously in the VNAF Skyraider squadrons.

Upon arrival back at MIDWAY we were surprised to learn that there had been a change of heart and we would to be recognized at the same ceremony as the F-4 pilots. Since they had already been recommended for Silver Stars, Charlie and I go the same while Ed and Jim got Distinguished Flying Crosses. Due to slow processing of earlier awards Charlie and I wore the Silver Star and one foreign decoration for about a month as our only medals. Nothing like starting from the top.

A few days later the carrier went to Yokosuka where Japanese reporters were very interested. We even became the subject of an article in a boy's adventure comic book. There was a lot of hometown interest also with reporters looking up our wives and parents for comments. This caused me a problem because I had not told my mother that I was flying combat to avoid worrying her.

Needless to say, the VA-25 pilots were not about to let the slack-jawed beady-eyed jet pilots (Ed Greathouse's description) forget our success. The squawk box in the fighter ready rooms got plenty of incoming from our ready room. There was much frustration in the swept wing tail hook community as the next two kills went to the Air Force in July. Then the North Vietnamese pulled the MiGs for more pilot training. The only kill between July 1965 and April 1966 was a single Navy kill in October 1965. We maintained that we embarrassed them into pulling the MiGs.

A combat action happens fast and it is difficult to include all the influences that affect the outcome, but some sidelights are of interest. The day of the shoot down was the first that gun camera film was not loaded in our planes. Charlie fired 75 rounds and I fired 52. We both thought we had fired more. I had considered firing rockets to ensure a kill, but was afraid that the widespread pattern of the LAU-3s would also hit Ed or Jim. Three of our aircraft suffered engine failures in the near future. There were no fighters airborne at the time and they missed a great opportunity for the bogeys launched after the shoot down. Two years later I was invited to Miramar to brief the people setting up "TOP GUN." My briefer said, "Well, you were flying the F-4?" "No." "Oh, the F-8?" "No." "The A-4?" "No." "A-7?" "No." "Well, what the hell were you flying?" "The Skyraider." Then his jaw went slack and his eyes got beady. They're all the same.

I believe the other Skyraider kill was with rockets.

Looks like the French Crusaders did not had so many problems with their guns.

The F-8 was the logical election ofr the French Navy at the time it was bought. French carriers were rather small and the Crusader fitted nicely and was a huge advance over the Aquilon (a French version of the Sea Vixen). Of course, nobody planned having the F-8 around until 1999!

By the 1980s the Crusader was obsolete and there were various attemtps to replace it. In 1986 or so the French Navy almost bought a couple squadrons of F/A-18 as replacement, although the plan was aborted by pressures from Dassault. They feared the Navy could drop from Rafale (which was supposed to enter service in some five more years) after flying the Hornet as provided much of the capability at a lower price.

After the end of the Cold War the Rafale was deeply delayed, while the Crusaders were in a very bad technical condition. There was a quite ambitious plan to upgrade them with an Anemone radar and Super 530 capability, but in the end it was decided to refurbish the best planes so they could fly until 1999. Many spares were bought in the US from USN surplus and the best airframes refurbished and modestly upgraded. The "new" plane got the designation F-8P, P meaning "prolonguee".

On weaponry, the original model could carry four AIM-9B or two Matra R530. The APQ-94 radar was a variant of the F-8E standard radar tuned to the R530 SARH seeker and also taking advantage of electronic evolution, having about 20% better range than the basic E model radar set. In any case, it was a short range radar in any way comparable to the F-4 Phantom radar, specially the F-4K/M with the APG-59, a far bigger and more powerful radar set with limited look down capabilities thanks to Doppler shift measuring.

France only used the AIM-9B, so by the 1970s the French AF had a quite obsolescent missile as their main WVR weapon. Matra developed the Magic I as a replacement, with a huge improvement in manuoverability and seeker capabilities, although the initial model was still limited to side/rear engagements (it could be fired within a 45º degree cone from the engine axis of the target). The idea was to fit four Magics, but due to missile weight four misisles dangerously strained the launchers and its attach point, so in the end it was decided to fit only two missiles, one in each side. The R530 was retired by 1981.

Later, the Magic II replaced the Magic I.

The Aquilon wasn't a version of the Sea Vixen, though both were twin boom de Havilland designs. It was a version of the Sea Venom - half the size of the Sea Vixen, older, slower, etc.

Sea Vixen in flight, 2004. And no, despite how it looks, it's not photoshopped.


Sea Venom -


Oh yeah - I agree, the F-8 was perfectly logical at the time, for the small French carriers. Probably the best-suited aircraft which could have been bought.

Aquilon stuff:

http://www.aviastar.org/air/france/sud-est_aquilon.php

Thunder and Lightning section on Sea Vixens....

http://www.thunder-and-lightnings.co.uk/seavixen/index.php

For anyone not familiar with it, the "Thunder and Lightnigs" website is one of the neatest on British jet-age warplanes. All the favorites are there, with lots of photos...in-service and surviving examples. Do not miss the "Vulcan" section...

http://www.thunder-and-lightnings.co.uk/contents.php

Interesting pic in that the aircraft still has pylons. Also interesting for those who know their Sea Vixen history, as it was a Vixen (precursor to the Sea Vixen) that broke up mid air during an airshow and one engine smashed into the crowd, killing 31 people. To see a Sea Vixen flying airshows would be spectactular.

Here you go, then....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XdvR4Tl3iY...feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6pbkbdXcKUM

I can't praise Red Bull enough for investing the money to keep those classics flying, but DANG! I wish they would paint them in their military schemes! "Red Bull" nose art would do for advertising!