What is the best way for the USN to address the resurgeance in piracy, especially since US ships have again become prominent targets of opportunity?

Best way? Probably a 5 inch gun. In a few years however the USN will have to resort to piracy to get new ships.

has it happened yet? - prominent targets you say?

That's one US ship, out of over 100 attacks off Somalia in the last year. It's prominent, in that it's prominent in the news, because it's a US ship. That's all. These people attack anything they think they can get away with, & don't always know what they're attacking. One bunch tried to seize the German navy tanker Spessart recently - all captured*. There is no evidence whatsoever that they are singling out US ships.

And what's with the "again"?

*She has a security squad aboard. Better armed & much better trained than the pirates, & when the pirates fled, they ran straight into the Greek frigate the Germans had called up. Nice.

I don't understand what the problem is with a few PMC's on these ships while in dangerous waters. It doesn't seem like rocket science to see the need for security on a multimillion dollar cargo.

Again? Historical perspective.

You don't think it significant that these people see US ships as potential targets (prominent = US because of our high visibility and claims to a powerful navy)?

US ships went long years without such groups considering them to be targets because they expected a serious repsonse.

That's my question: what should be our response? We once fought a war over this, you know (twice, actually, with sideshows and sequels). Unless this incident is met with a credible response, what are the odds this won't be the last incident.

You actually expect a serious response from the current regime? They cant even get their DVD's straight.

What should be our current response? Gather intel and launch air strikes I suppose. But that has lots of risks and this administration is risk adverse(at least where Muslim nations are concerned.) And yes its not the last incident.

You didn't understand what I wrote about their targeting? I'll repeat it:

SOME SOMALI PIRATES TRIED TO SEIZE A GERMAN NAVY AUXILIARY. Gettit? An almost suicidally stupid thing to do. It didn't have fixed weapons, but it did have a squad of marines, who were a lot more than a match for the pirates. The pirates may, sometimes, attack carefully selected targets, but a lot of the time it's pretty well random. That particular bunch may not have even known it was American. As for not attacking US ships, well, that's explicable in terms of their number & where they operate. The US merchant fleet is about 4% of the world total, & trades mostly out of US ports.

There is no reason to think this was a deliberate selection of a US ship because it was a US ship.

Most people have access to intl machines, can ignore the DVD 'zones.'

There is no evidence [in how many days?] that the present US regime is risk averse, nor coddling the Muslims. Launching armed UAVs to strike in Pakistan is as risky as the previous regime's actions, all of which you have adored, blindly. OTOH, there is little risk [or gain?] associated with bombing or attacking the coast of Somalia. It's maybe useful though to have a president not harrying his staff, "are bombs dropping yet?"

There has been a JTF Horn of Africa since 2002, so intel is being collected, as usual. Maybe there is no hurry to invade this time.

Blindly? You have no room to talk. Oh grandmaster of BDS.

Any American should realize that if he gets held hostage in that part of the world there is a good chance he wtll be turned over to al qaeda and get his head slowly sliced off.

Interestingly it is being reported that the US crew also attempted to defend themselves with firearms but failed.

Interesting to find out the details when this is over.

A fleet of Djibouti based predators or global hawks? With hellfires?

In Somalia? What examples do you have of such events. Do tell all.

From WSJ, a discussion of options and consequences:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1239235506...emEditorialPage

Oh, I got it, but I don't buy it yet. There is no reason to think this was NOT a deliberate selection, either. I think somebody's poking with a sharp stick to see if there's any life in the beast. No conspiracy or anything, just a group getting too bold for comfort. But a LOT of people will be watching to see how we react to this provocation.

Thanks for the link.

Mike: I don't expect much at all. That's why I'm wondering out loud what we should (but won't) do.

http://cei.org/news-release/2009/04/09/cei...-pirate-problem

This would work.

We're talking about the same clowns that have mistaken naval vessels for soft targets of opportunities.
Others might be watching to see the reaction to 'poking with a sharp stick to see if there's any life in the beast' but its going to be pretty short odds these morons who actually did it aren't amongst them...

No, I don't think you do get it. You're making the classic mistake of seeing what others do from your viewpoint, and attributing your perceptions to them. You are Galtieri et al in 1981-2, and innumerable others, in many places, in many times. You think that because you are the most important thing in the world to yourself, everyone else sees you as equally important

These guys are strictly commercial. The footsoldiers have bugger-all idea of the difference between one ship and another. They know not to attack things with visible guns, & sometimes their masters direct them to a specific high-value target, but in general, they pick on targets of opportunity. Apart from your belief that the USA is special to everyone in the world, because it is special to you, there is no reason whatsoever to think this is other than yet another opportunistic attack. Statistically, the lack of previous attacks on US ships is perfectly understandable. Hardly any US ships ply the vulnerable routes.

Give us an argument - just one - or a single piece of evidence - to support your view. I can't think of any. You're putting forward the "you can't disprove it therefore it's true" argument. Not valid. You're the one making the claim, you have to back it up. An absence of disproof is not proof. Only proof is proof. And you not only don't have proof, you don't even have any evidence.

BTW, what's this "getting too bold for comfort"? Whose comfort? They've been too bloody bold for comfort for at least three years. What part of "attack naval ship" don't you understand? Do you think that was a deliberate provocation? Or just stupid? And why do you think the attack on a US ship was different, apart from your personal emotional reaction?

Let me see if I can make something perfectly clear to you: I am under no obligation whatsoever to repsond to your demands. If you want to respond to the epremise of the thread, fine: do so. If you think it has no merit, then don't bother wasting your (and my) time on reading or responding to it. And to further clarify, I resent you attributing and opinons or emotions to me other than those I have explicitly stated. To assume my question is motivated by chauvinism is to sidestep the issue at hand and attack ad hominem.

Insofar as I am making a claim (rather than asking questions), I claim that it's been nearly 200 years since a US ship has been attacked by pirates, and the reason for that gap has a great deal to do with the perceived likelihood of an overwhelming reaction to the attacks. Shores of Tripoli, and all that jazz. More recently--that is, since WWII--the USN has dominated the world's oceans just as the RN once did before. Piracy and other sea-borne crime have flourished at a level just below the threshold necessary to invoke wide-spread response, and the distraction of the cold-war followed by the US' legacy of military power meant both that the US public imagined piracy to exist only in Disney films and--here I speculate on the historical pattern--AND that pirate groups have given US shipping wide berths. The one scenario that has seen US shipping at risk since WWII was the escorting of reflagged tankers into and out of the Persian Gulf, and the entire exercise was predicated on the intimidation factor of that US flag (and the legality of response). Think of Operation Preying Manits, for example.

Without delusion but with a firm eye on historical context, I claim that the US needs to think about how to respond to these situations because US shipping is special to the US (though our almost criminal neglect of it sometimes suggests otherwise). It is our responsiblity to protect it. Part of our national identity has been built about the freedom of the seas and defense of our trade. And an attack on it is different because it is so nearly unprecedented.

And I further repeat that intention on the part of these Somalian clowns is irrelevant. This event may be an accident, though I am not all reluctant to believe it purposeful. But what matters is our response because--and this IS a claim (whose vailidity will be borne out out or not in the future)--the likelihood of future attacks--quite deliberate ones--increases rapidly if our response is seen to be impotent. Therefore, I am asking what kind of response we should be looking at and what kinds of preventitative measures we should take.

So, swerve: if you think the premise silly, skip the thread. If you have something useful to add about effective response, please do. But leave your pointless speculation on my motivations or my emotions out of it.

Actually, the US quietly resumed paying tribute to the Barbary tribes after the 'Shores of Tripoli' events, far more economical than stationing the squadron there, just as the Europeans had found out earlier. The problem did not go away until France took Algeria, beginning in 1830. Beau Geste, and all that jazz....

False perceptions.

Firstly, US ships have not been immune to piracy in the last 2 centuries. Your ignorance of pirate attacks does not make them non-existent. The last report I found (it took me 10 seconds) of a pirate attack on a US ship was 2nd December 2008.

Secondly, the "shores of Tripoli" thing is another matter where you mistakenly think other countries share your US-centric perceptions. I doubt these Somali pirates have ever heard of it. I doubt most Algerians, Tunisians & Libyans know about it. And it did not, despite what some USians fondly imagine, end either the depredations of the Barbary pirates, or even their attacks on US shipping. After the first US war on the Barbary pirates (note: various European countries had fought them before, wreaking equal or greater devastation, without stopping them), the USA resumed tribute payments. But the pirates resumed attacks on US shipping during the War of 1812. Cue what the USA calls the Second (in European counting, probably the 50th) Barbary War in 1815. USN raids the Barbary Coast, signs a treaty, sails away - the pirates publicly repudiate the treaty. And what did the USA do? Nothing. The RN & Dutch navy bombarded the hell out of Algiers in 1816, & piracy forthwith slumped. Also, the Dey of Algiers stopped enslaving Christians, a concession the USA had not forced from him. But we had to return in 1824 (no US contribution), because they'd returned to their old ways. As Ken says, only the French conquest brought a complete end to the state-sponsored piracy - and that is what the locals remember, & think important, not a couple of brief punitive campaigns by the USA, which are lost among many, many others (which you, clearly, are unaware of) by other states.

As I said - you think that because something (e.g. the "shores of Tripoli") is important to you, it's important to the rest of the world. You are also arguing that what you are ignorant of does not exist. Need I point out the fallacies?

No, I am not unaware. And the broad trends I identified remain notwithstanding.

In any case, your reply contributed nothing toward the point of the thread. I don't care what you think of my perceptions, I want to know what you think are necessary responses. If your answers is "None; Nothing to see here, Move along," then so be it. Move along. Let it go. Not your cup of tea.

No, one action was not sufficient; even one group of actions was not. But the cumulative effect was (and France benefiteed in the process by all of the effort which had gone before, did it not?).

This is what I want to get at: what IS a sufficient response? Are you suggesting that we should pay tribute or take Somalia?

Going a little overboard once you get yourself wound up on 'US-centrism debunking'.

After the first Tripolitan War the USN maintained a squadron in the Mediterranean to make the Tripolitans keep their end of the bargain, until harassment of US warships by the supreme(ly self centered and arrogant ) naval power of that era, caused the USN to withdraw all units back to US waters, IOW after the Chesapeake/Leopard affair in 1807, and with Jefferson's Embargo Act.

It wasn't practical, in the overall world situation, for the US to send naval forces to the Mediterranean until after the war of 1812. After the initial American treaty with Algiers the British felt as Brenton said in "The Naval History of Great Britain" that "it was not to be endured that England should tolerate what America had resented and punished". The Dey having been further weakened by the British attack in 1816, the US didn't do nothing but sent another squadron that year and forced re-acceptance of a treaty with the US. Thereafter the USN maintained a Mediterranean sdn and US merchant ships had no more significant trouble with Barbary pirates, which was the US goal.

US merchant ships did have trouble with pirates in other areas in the following decades, so right it isn't so close to 200 years since, even not including recent more minor modern attacks v US flag ships before the present one. Other USN operations v pirates included USN Med sdn encounters with Greek privateers who crossed over into piracy in Greek War of Idependence, (mutlinational) anti-pirate operations that mainly cleaned piracy out of the Caribbean in the 1820's; punitive landings v Sumatran pirates in 1831-32 and 1839, anti-pirate operations on west coast of Mexico in 1870, etc.

Joe

Two words...

"Trojan horse".

Q-ships?

I was thinking the same thing myself.

Perhaps, but you must admit that there was quite a bit of US-centrism to debunk there. Mr Allens fantasy that the incident which prompted this thread was the first pirate attack on US shipping since the USA single-handedly dealt with the Barbary pirates, & was a deliberate attack on a US (as distinct from whatever hove into view) ship, was rather an extreme example.

As for the current crop of Somalis. Tricky. I don't think escalating the level of violence is a good idea. The pirates have been very reluctant to kill, so far. I don't want that to change.

Ultimately, a solution lies in the establishment of order along the Somali coast, by a government that is susceptible to outside pressure, & has an interest in peaceful trade. That isn't going to happen tomorrow, so we should think of how to ameliorate the problem, while encouraging an orderly government (or governments - I don't care how many states Somalia turns into) in Somalia.

The convoys & transit lanes in the Gulf of Aden seem to be reasonably effective, but the pirates have adapted. It's not going to be easy. I think it needs multiple actions. Go after the money: track down money transfers (I know, they take cash these days), etc. Go after the overseas contacts, the lawyers, accountants, negotiators. Arrest them wherever possible, bar them entry to your countries where not, etc. Track down & block mobile phones. Hunt their spotters. None of these will stop it, but they'll make business more difficult & expensive for the big guys.

Meanwhile, go for the pirates on the high seas. Where practical, rescues like those the French have pulled off one or two of may demoralise pirates, as well as the obvious benefit of freeing hostages. Best possible intelligence & information-sharing between the naval patrols, & try to make sure that all the warships in the region co-ordinate their patrols. Most do, I know, but if there are any doing their own thing, try to persuade them to join the co-operative effort.

Offer rewards for good information. You want to emigrate with some cash? Identify a mother ship, or a warlords bank account, or something else worth it.

And establish a public policy that if a group of pirates start killing, or shooting to kill, it's no holds barred in dealing with that bunch. Let them know that if, for example, one of their boats shoots at a naval helicopter, it should expect to be immediately sunk.

Agreed, it was a cumulative effect. For 150 years, after the pirates came to be, in effect, the governing power in the Barbary coast ports, European states vacillated between attempts at forcible suppression, buying off, & using the threat of force to keep down the cost of buying off. The pirates took advantage of any weakness or war to resume piracy or force up the price of immunity. The USA joined the system when it became independent. & followed much the same mix of policies, for much the same reasons. After the Napoleonic Wars, the increased wealth & power of Western states relative to the Barbary Coast, combined with a spell of peace, enabled more effective suppression than ever before.

France both benefited from & contributed to the suppression - as did the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, etc. The US campaigns were part of the process.

I am not suggesting either tribute or conquest. See my last post.

More from mil.com: Pros and cons of arming merchies against pirates

http://www.military.com/news/article/ship-...l=1186032310810

The problem with Q-ships is that with the resources (money and tech)available to the pirates' backers, they could set up tracking networks to monitor the ships' locations, then, of course, strike where they ain't.

...and that's why I said just Trojan Horse...."reception committees" can easily be moved from one platform to another, or be on numerous ones simultaneously without the attendant costs of specially outfitted vessels.

"Hi, let me introduce you to our Cruise Director and his friendly staff...."

I agree. Then there's no doubt as to who/what they are. They show up and attack your Q-Ship, you don't capture them, you don't drive them off, you sink them, leave them for the fish. Then you hunt down their mother ship which your UAV spotted and video taped. Get it all on tape so it's QUITE clear who and what they are.

That's why the Cruise ships change appearances at night, change transponders, etc. Even with a maritime security contingent on some ships, you still need to go hunt down the motherships that get the faster boarding craft out to sea near the target vessels.

To those following closely, would it be a fair observation to suggest that the pirates have very deliberately remained 'peaceful' to crews in order to help fly underneath the radar and keep business going?

I'm not so sure. According to the Military.com article shep854 posted, the pirates are increasingly opening fire on the vessels they are boarding. Sounds like things are escalating even with less-than-lethal responses by the ships. Frankly, brandishing a weapon implies intent to do harm & is generally considered justification for a lethal response. If I were to walk out in the street and point a gun at a random passerby, that's considered assault at the very least. If I shoot the window out of a random car driving down the road, that's attempted murder, no matter whether I claim I was just trying to get the driver to stop so I can rob them. To claim that arming merchant crews would escalate the situation where the criminals are already shooting at the ships with RPGs and automatic weapons is just silly. Now, it can be argued that a crew that fights back may be more likely to be harmed by the pirates if they have to surrender, but it still comes back to the fact that the pirates opened the dance and called the tune.

Besides the legal issues (both dealing with the weapons laws in the countries the ships are visiting, as well as the civil liability risks), another issue is whether the ship owner is willing to:

1. Pay for the weapons to outfit the vessel.
2. Pay for initial and recurring training for the crew to maintain proficiency.
3. Pay for additional crew to maintain a continuous watch when in known dangerous waters, instead of the current minimal manning that makes it difficult to avoid the chance of pirates sneaking aboard--a 360-degree watch with one or two watchstanders who also have other duties is difficult/impossible to maintain.

With the small crews on board modern ships, adding even one or two additional crew members represents a significant percentage increase in the manning cost column and maintaining a proper watch against pirate attack will require more than one or two additional personnel. As a WAG, figure at least 12 additional people--two teams of two people on each of three watches. Say the ship is normally crewed by 20-26 (and some ships have even fewer people aboard)--that's approximately a 50% increase in manning costs. Now add in the additional training costs and it becomes clearer why shipowners are willing to buy kidnapping insurance and play the odds that their ship will make it through without trouble.

I support arming the crews, or at least giving them the option. While the Military.com article somewhat breathlessly talks about "long-range assault rifles capable of firing up to 600 rounds per minute," it should be obvious that many assault rifles are firing intermediate cartridges and potentially well out-ranged by a good .30-06 deer rifle with a 3-9x scope--although I do note that the pirates can, and often do, have access to heavier caliber weapons. Further tilting the table in favor of the ship's crew, the majority of freighters are going to be much stabler firing platforms than an open boat, or even a small trawler, and a marksman aboard the ship should have a height advantage if positioned on the pilot house/bridge wing, which means a better field of fire and better concealment. Of course, effective use of a marksman is dependent on detecting the pirate vessel as it is on approach, as opposed to being surprised by the pirates after they've already boarded the vessel--i.e. maintaining a proper watch for hostile vessels, as opposed to the normal navigational watch. It is also dependent on the manner in which the marksman is equipped. A .30-06 with a 3-9x scope is good in daylight, but doesn't work so well at night. Obviously, night-vision equipment (either TI or light-intensification scopes or both) for the weapons should be considered required equipment.

If I were tasked with coming up with a USN response independent of other Navy obligations, timelines, budgets, and reality, I'd suggest the following:

• Recommend to ship owners that they arm their crews.
• Institute a voluntary convoy system in high-traffic zones. Ships in those zones that opt out of the convoys may proceed at their own risk, with the understanding that naval response to an attack on their vessel may not be timely.
• Adjust the ROE to give Navy captains more leeway to attack pirate vessels & kill the pirates. I won't say "encourage killing pirates" since I'll be happy if they surrender--but they get shipped to Guantanamo or Nome or Kiska or some place, tried, and sentenced (sentences obviously to vary from relatively short prison terms, up to and including the death penalty, depending on the circumstances and whatever recovered evidence there is). Encourage the Navy to take a shot if it presents itself, as appears might have been possible with the attempted escape of the Maersk Alabama's captain.
• Send all PAOs back to school for retraining and implement a program to make sure the news gets out. The USG needs to make sure that the message gets out to the pirates, the global community, and, most importantly, Joe Blow that the nation is serious about doing something about the problem and is actively doing something. We've heard about the French doing something. We've heard about the Indians doing something. But, from the news, it would appear that the USN is content to drive around and watch events unfold, instead of making events happen.
• Develop, build, and deploy a proper FFG similar to the NSC in size. 3,500-4,500LT full load, 4,000-6,000nm range at ~20kt cruise (more, if I can get it), 30+kt max speed (35kt preferred), 1x5", 16-cell VLS, 2xPhalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2xH-60 (or 1 H-60 + 3 RQ-8), 2x11m RHIB, and a complement of ~75 plus at least two SEAL boat teams and space for some number of prisoners, rescued hostages, etc. Before y'all get to picking at the specs of this FFG, this isn't even a concept design & this isn't the thread to get into a discussion of the design. In any event, simply buying more NSCs and painting them grey would also be satisfactory.
  The FFG will be used to patrol the region in place of the DDGs currently deployed. With lower manning levels and increased emphasis on ASuW, these ships would theoretically allow more hulls to be deployed for better coverage. I shy away from single purpose designs and the more basic patrol vessels some navies have because, in spite of my comment about ignoring "other Navy obligations," I don't think the dollars are there for a specific anti-pirate vessel, which is what such vessels would be for the USN. High speed is necessary to respond to incidents and to adequately escort 20+ kt freighters & cruise ships, although I am unwilling to push for LCS-type speeds in this scenario--that's part of what the FACs are for. The SEALs are carried for non-cooperative boarding operations and hostage rescue if an opportunity presents itself, although the vessels would not necessarily always have SEALs embarked. I'd prefer to deploy multiple ships to the region with the intent that they work in loose pairs, with one FFG equipped with 2xH-60 and the other with 1xH-60 + 3xRQ-8 to extend sensor reach (via drones & heloes) and have the ability to lift & support the SEALs, if needed. The heloes also have many other uses, of course.
• Develop, build, and deploy a proper FAC. Heck, unretire the remaining Ashevilles, since this is just about exactly what I want. ~250LT, 40+kts, either a 57mm or 3" (76mm), 20-30 crew (and closer to 20 than 30) plus accommodation for 1 SEAL boat team, 1 x 7m RHIB, a couple of RWS, 1,500+nm range at economical cruise (probably at 15 or 16kts, although I'd prefer 20kt). Waterjet propulsion.
  FACs bring a number of capabilities to the table. First of all, they have a lot of persistence when compared to a helo, both in endurance and in weather tolerance, even though they are more uncomfortable for their crews than larger vessels. They can also be used directly to board other vessels when conditions make boarding operations via RHIBs difficult or impossible. More hulls = more coverage. They easily overmatch any pirate vessel and can be used to escort single ships or small groups of ships as necessary. High speed reduces response time when such speed is required. The FACs can also work closer inshore than larger ships, allowing closer blockades when required. The FACs would be supported by the FFG helo dets and could receive resupply at-sea from the FFGs as necessary. FACs do require some external maintenance & support facility, which brings us to:
• Field a tender for the FACs at some suitable port in the region to handle maintenance.
  Ideally, the tender could be a smaller LSD-type vessel with a floodable well for heavy maintenance, but it could just as easily be a converted freighter that would provide maintenance & logistics support for the FACs on some kind of rotating schedule. The tender should be based near the area of operations, obviously, but should be self-sufficient in the event an unimproved anchorage is to be used.
• Reactivate Salem and, maybe, Wisconsin.
  Mostly in jest. The plan is to monitor pirate movement and, whenever a support base becomes evident, crater it. All bombardments to be preceded by a blockade of the coast via FACs to prevent departure of pirate vessels, possibly a land-based blockade of the town to prevent escape of pirates & evacuation of weapons, and leaflet drops/loudspeaker passes by heloes with a message such as: "This town/city/port/harbor has been determined to harbor/support/encourage pirates and will be destroyed in 24 hours. All residents are advised to leave town on Road X and may take only what may be carried on foot. No boats or vessels are permitted to leave the harbor. No vehicles or weapons may be removed from the town/city/port/harbor. Stop pestering ships flying the American flag and we'll leave you alone. Have a nice day. This is El Presidente Ol Paint, and I approve this message." And follow through. The idea is to discourage piracy by making it painful to the pirates and the people that support them. We don't want to take and hold territory, so what better than some nice, big guns on a nice, big, intimidating platform to work on the psychological aspects? While I'm at it, I might occasionally divert a B-1 or B-52 to cruise over and unload a bunch of dumb bombs so the USAF can get in on the act.
• Deploy at least one SSGN to the AO with embarked SEAL team.
  The SEALs aboard the SSGN shall conduct hostage rescues and vessel re-captures whenever the opportunity presents itself. The SSGN may also support bombardment taskings if y'all won't let me reactivate Salem.
• Station an ESG in the AO.
  The ESG will provide additional aviation assets, as well as facilities for processing rescued hostages and/or prisoners. In the event the pirates move their prisoners inland to prevent the ships from being retaken with their crews (as has occasionally occurred in the past), the embarked MEU may be tasked with landing & rescuing the prisoners. The MEU may also assist in isolating pirate havens that are to be bombarded in an attempt to minimize the escape of pirates & weapons. The Marines don't go ashore without a permissive ROE. For that matter, no US forces go ashore without a permissive ROE and access to overwhelming firepower. The MEU aviation department is to maintain a pair of attack heloes and a pair of V/STOL jets on Alert 5 or Alert 10 to respond to attacks.

Does this fix the "root causes?" No--it isn't intended to. The intent is to make them go bother somebody else. The US is also not going to suddenly develop and deploy a bunch of new vessels, even if Ol Paint thinks it might be a good idea and have a side benefit of being a good jobs program. No, Salem will not return to active service. No, the US is not likely to put a MEU ashore in Somalia any time soon, no matter how short the intended duration. No, the ROE probably won't become much more permissive. Yes, the US will likely continue muddling along without taking an obviously aggressive approach. All of these, and more, are why I made the notes about leaving reality, timelines, budgets, and other obligations out of the equation.

I've seen it suggested the best approach might be for the US to simply escort every US ship with a DDG and ignore everyone else's shipping--it'd be one way to encourage shipowners to US flag their vessels... However, I do believe that this is an opportunity to strengthen some alliances and get some positive diplomatic side benefits. After all, if the USN works to reduce the piracy problem with direct benefits to our allies, they will find some benefit for themselves to ally with us. From this standpoint, the approach to dealing with the piracy is greater than its simple effect on the immediate AO. We have good allies in a number of nations (some of whom have been able to send ships to the region, others who have not) and working to our strengths--i.e. a large and capable navy, in this case--is a form of payback for their support in other areas. And vice versa.

Douglas

[Edited for misplaced parentheses and incomplete thought.]

We deployed FACs to the Horn of Africa (under OEF), but grew out of it. Part of the problem was that they were built for the Baltic rather than tropical waters, but the distances and open sea conditions in the AO just put too much of a strain on the boats and crews. There's a reason almost everybody who used to employ FACs is moving to corvettes.

From online.wsj.com: "Pirates Challenge Obama's Pre-9/11 Mentality; Distinctions between lawful and unlawful combatants go back to Roman times."

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123940383654409651.html

FACs have a more restrictive deployment profile than larger & slower naval vessels. They need a heavy support element (tender or forward base) near, or in, the AO to give the crews some time to rest up. I seem to recall that the Ashevilles were employed on a rotational schedule during Market Time to give the crews time to rest up. I'd be tempted to suggest that the FACs be deployed with "Blue" and "Gold" crews, or that there be more crews than boats (say 3:2 ratio) and that the crews be rotated to extend the FAC patrol time without unduly fatiguing the crews. In any event, FACs don't have big-ship persistence and shouldn't be deployed without support from heavier units, the FFGs, but they do and are capable of independent operations, unlike RHIBs or speedboats like the Mk V. You don't send them out by themselves for 6 months at a time, but they can engage in patrol, interdiction, & escort operations of longer durations--i.e. a few weeks at a time.

FACs also provide a fast response capability that's cheaper to build than making frigates capable of 40+ kts. (I should have noted that 40kts is a threshold & I'd prefer speeds in excess of 45kts for the FACs, although I still want a round-bilge hullform.) A 45kt FAC will arrive in 2/3rds the time a 30kt ship will take to get on station and in half the time it takes a 20kt OPV. FACs are cheaper, therefore more numerous than frigates, which is very important in this type of operation. The best time to intervene in a pirate attack is before the pirates board the victim vessel, which means having a vessel nearby and capable of rapidly closing the scene of the attack is important. Helicopters on a slower vessel are even faster than a FAC, given the same distance to the datum, but are more weather-limited than FACs and have much shorter on-station times. FACs also have the overtake speed to chase down a captured vessel where a slower OPV may not--but this depends on exactly what type OPV is chosen. A FAC also has the ability to conduct non-compliant vessel boarding that a helicopter does not, which is why I want both helo-equipped FFGs and FACs in the force. FFGs fill the role of both OPVs and DDGs, for the most part, and allow the FACs to bring their unique capabilities to the fight without misusing their hulls as might otherwise be the case if they are the only vessels in the contingent.

Not to get into the whole discussion about LCS speed, but LCS is designed to provide the helo support and foul-weather persistence of an FF/FFG with the speed and shallow-draft of a FAC. I'm not necessarily sold that the conglomeration of ideas they've packed into a single hull offsets the benefit of additional numbers that could be had with separated capabilities and increased numbers.

Douglas

How about an anti-piracy version of the HSV-2? You have speed, endurance, you can equip it with several go-fast boats and it's already been armed with stabilized 25mm cannon and 40mm AGL as well as several .50. Also, facilities for helicopters or UAV's for recon etc.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HSV-2_Swift

If you carry a 180 knot helo, do you really need the ship itself to do thirty knots?

I'd suggest for this, and the LCS for that matter, something no faster than 25 knots with at least a 57 mm gun, some 30 mm guns, a half dozen torpedoes, a pair of helos, UAV's, and a boarding party group of a dozen or so.

Something like the Danish Absalon Class would work well.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absalon_class...nd_support_ship

Helicopters are very useful but can't do everything themselves, especially in a "nonpermissive environment". I think it would be helpful to have a ship that has some respectable speed as well.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armidale_class_patrol_boat

I'm sure Austral would be happy to do a 30+ knot version, but they'd be fine even 'as is' if part of a multi-layered system that can provide them with helicopter/UAV/MPA support.

The really fast pirate craft, Zodiac's etc, can't maintain speed for long or in anykind of seaway, that's one of the reasons they have motherships.



shane

Actually, yes. It isn't so much as running down pirate boats, although that is useful, as well, but running down a captured 20-24kt merchant ship which can maintain speed in a seaway. If convoy operations are to be undertaken, the escort needs a certain speed margin to be able to investigate contacts and catch back up or to reposition from one part of the convoy to another. Not every merchantman is a 20+kt vessel, but the patrol vessel has to be equipped to protect them as well as the slower ships.

Also, helicopters are limited by their crew endurance even moreso than a FAC and a FFG can only carry a limited number. Simple maintenance will prevent 24-hr operations, even if there are more crews than helicopters unless you have more than two heloes. VTUAVs like the RQ-8 can be carried in enough numbers (3) to maintain continuous coverage and are useful for monitoring a situation and even attacking a pirate boat, but they don't have the ability to carry a SEAL team if you want to put a team on a freighter. Bigger heloes like the NH-90 or H-60 can, but they take up a lot of space. And they still can't do the things a ship can do. I'd consider 27kts an absolute minimum, 30kts as a threshold, and 35kts as an objective for an FF for this particular activity. Now, there's no reason you couldn't build a ship like the Japanese DDHs to carry several helicopters and plop a medium caliber gun on the foredeck, if all you wanted to do was anti-pirate patrolling. But that's a lot of investment for a limited role.

Douglas

That's been in force for quite a while in the highest-risk, highest-traffic area. There are also defined shipping lanes where naval protection is concentrated, entry & exit monitored, etc - and if you're outside them, you may have a long wait for help.

Singaporean uses USVs to combat piracy and other FAC threats. Currently the Protector from Rafael is deployed from Endurance-class LPDs. It is equipped with day/night EOs, armed with one 7.62mm GPMG, capable of 40 kts and eight hours endurance. The onboard loudhailer can be used to interrogate or warn off suspicious boats, before escorting them away. The more capable Spartan USV is being developed in cooperation with the USN.

The Protectors were used during patrols off the Iraqi coast while protecting the oil terminals. Where a heavier response is needed, the LPD carries two helicopters armed with .50 cal door guns, along with boarding teams and eight FACs. These small USVs are weapons meant for naval LIC or COIN, giving numbers, speed, persistence and low cost against lightly armed but numerous and quick foes.

Also, there was an initial aborted attempt to hijack the Maersk Alabama which was radioed to the US Navy. The navy then dispatched the Bainbridge to intercept but it didn't get there in time to stop the second, partially successful attempt. The faster speed may have made the difference in closing the distance.

I'm just brainstorming, but what about we assign a couple hundred guys to "anti-piracy duty" and station a small fireteam (3-4 guys with M-16s and a SAW) on each US-flagged merchant ship? Hell, they wouldn't have to be SF, we could probably just use federal LE agencies, USCG, etc.

Would be a lot cheaper than developing and deploying new anti-piracy vessels, and it sure falls squarely into the "government's job is to protect its citizens" category...

That's one practical solution for the small number of US flag merchant ships found in those waters. The other is not to send them to that area. The main reason they go is US govt policy of requiring US flag ships to deliver food aid (or some portion of it), so waiving that reqt till things quiet down is the easiest solution. The main problem with the latter is PR aspect. But either way the US flag merchant ship issue is easy to solve for very moderate cost.

Then for all the other nationalities making up the overwhelming majority of ships in that area, the basic predicate issue is for some consortium of countries and owners, or countries forcing their owners, to accept armed guards and/or convoys. It's popular around here to point out the manliness of the past v the PC wimpery of now but in the past there would be a rational system of protection (convoys, which reduce the efficiency of a merchant ship, and/or armed teams the owners pay for) , but for those owners who didn't participate, tough sh*t, or force them to participate*. Figuring out ways to dash around and make patrol effective with no impact on owners doesn't make any sense. Patrol is just not the main way to do it.

Between convoys and armed teams provided by international militaries, the trade off is one of cost and efficiency. There have to be some warships around anyway to support and back up the teams as they rotate among ships. But one warship can escort a large number of merchant ships against pirates, if the owners are willing or forced to reduce their efficiency by waiting for a convoy.

The most efficient type of ship would helo-capable OPV of fairly large size to support armed teams and stay there awhile, Absalon class was mentioned, a little lower down same totem pole would be French Floréal class (~3000t 20kts). The ship really just has to be fast enough to keep up with a convoy, and even 25kt containerships now are often operating at 10kts because shipping demand has collapsed.

But there's a really basic 'who is we?' type question here, which exists or would be likely in most other pirate cases too. Few of the ships or even cargoes are American. If it's a waste of time to deal in international efforts including coordination of what foreign owners do, then this whole issue is a waste of time to talk about once the few US flag merchant ships in pirate areas are secured, which would be easy.

*if the goal is wider than owner interest, like making piracy non-remunerative for Somali's.

Joe

While the problem of extra lookouts and watch keepers is a large one. the question of weapons might be e bit cheaper and easier. 2-3 water cannon with 2" nozzles would cover a fair amount of the stern of the ship. remote controled and fed from the existing fire pumps such monitors would make an observed boarding rather difficult. 1000gpm hitting boarders or their small boat would discourage most peaple.
And no worries about legal problems of bringing firearms into various ports/countries.