I'm not talking about in combat per se, but for all the other tasks of asssociated with war when operating independently. How did they intend to provide security during refueling, recovery operations, perform maintenance, set out OP/LPs for the night, etc. with so many fewer men than an equivalent Western company? From what I've gathered, there are around thirty men in such a formation, did the Soviets manage to figure out how to do more with less or did they simply place that much faith in their ability to breakthrough or bypass effective resistance?

By drawing on the battalion it's attached to, for some of them. Tank companies are not really meant to be deployed by themselves.

Is that just for the Soviets/Russians or Western tank doctrine as well?

Probably more so for Soviet/Russian. For US Army anyway, while most of the time they are organized into combined arms task groupings with Mech Inf., they do have the capacity to operate as "tank pure" tactical organizations up to the Battalion level.

At least they did before this whole "units of actions" foolishness...

I have read a little bit on misconceptions in current US Army structure, but could you elaborate?
In the main topic, typical Western company is 14 tanks, Soviet bn - 30. I think bn is the smallest force to operate independently.

So essentially, any commitment of Sovet tanks would have been a battalion effort... interesting. I suppose that does go a long way towards working around the problems of reduced crews in three tank platoons.

Was task organization part of Soviet doctrine as well? Outside of wartime.

Somewhat, though Soviets were less "cross-attachment happy" as a rule.

I believe it was standard (in wartime) in a motorized rifle regiment to break the regiment's tank battlion up, allocating one company to each of the three motorized rifle battalions. This implies to me that, in peacetime, the tank battalion of the MRR is maintained solely as an administrative entity. But perhaps others can correct me. Did the TkB of an MRR train at the (tank) battalion-level?

What you're suggesting runs counter to the soviet doctrine of concentrating strength rather then dispersing it in penny-packets. I'd expect the tank battalion act as a nucleus of a reinforced task force on the attack, consisting of a TB,MRB,and regimental artillery and air-defense. The other two MRBs would making supporting attacks.

Wrong level. The Tank Regiment was the key attack force with tank battalions supported by infantry. The MMR was a supporting effort force, each BN reinforced with a tank company.

Probably not quite each battalion - the Russian publications talk about the tank battalion being attached (or possibly dispersed amongst) the MRR's 1st echelon battalions ( probably two forward, one back ). But you're more right then I was.

Well, I've been doing some more reading, reviewing James Dunnigan's "How to Make War" and "Tank Rider" by Evgeni Bessonov and I was struck at how theoretically and practically fragile tank units were. Bessonov's unit of tank riders, upon commencing any sort of offensive seems to lose it's tanks in very short order while the riders themselves soldier on with ever dwindling numbers. Dunnigan's various explanations and formulas seem to support this as a general trend and not the exception.

So just what is the lifespan of a typical tank battalion on the offensive? One or two major fights before they are rendered combat ineffective by losses? Or are replacements planned to be more forthcoming?

If I remember correctly didn't Soviet doctrine emphasize that the logistics of sub units was handled by the next unit above it? Something about maximum tactical manuverability of the sub unit? I'm quite certain that from a repair point of view the emphasis was on fixing minor things and leaving knocked out or heavily damaged tanks to rot rather than pulling them clear when compared to Western practices. Basically speed of advance was valued over sheer numbers and staying power; commit some forces immediately rather than the perfect force later. There were a lot questions about how longSoviet units would last in face of determined opposition and continued advance, though they seemed to have plenty of units to plug the gaps as others became ineffective.