The Red Army was notorious for its huge artillery and tank concentrations in 1944/45 - hundreds of guns and tanks each per kilometer of their offense center of gravity.

They kept a strong emphasis on quantity of both tanks and artillery post-war.
That's confusing me a bit for two reasons

1) I consider such a massing of forces for breakthrough in part as a measure to compensate for training deficiencies. That was understandable in WW2 because of their serious leader losses in 1937-1941. It's not as easily understandable in a post-war army that had enough time to train its leaders and was able to draw on significant combat experience.

2) Tactical nukes.

Is my impression that the WP still intended to mass armor/artillery for breakthrough battles during the Cold War correct?
1960-1989 WP operational planning and tactics isn't exactly a strength in my library.

A lot of it has to do with the Soviets' doctrinal mentality. It was deemed necessary that every commander be specifically equipped with a means of directly affecting the battle. So MR battalions had mortar platoons, MR regiments had artillery battalions, MR divisions had artillery regiments, etc. A Soviet unit or formation commander was supposed to have his mortar/artillery commander always at his side, ready to respond to orders to blast anything that got in the way, without having to seek higher echelon support or converge assets previously doled out to lower echelons.

As for tanks -- what better form of armed mobility in a nuclear environment, especially if supported by infantry mounted in something like a -- you guessed it -- BMP?

My "Tanks yesterday and today" book written by Pavel Rotmistrov in 1973 (commander of 5GTA during WWII) says that Soviet tactics was much based on experience from WW2. That experience said that if you had a huuuuge concentration of strength, it allowed to do a decisive breakthrough fast, and didn't allow the opponent to organize efficient resistance in the operational depth, even at scheduled positions, and the best example of that is Vistula-Oder operation. I mention this one both due to its obvious properities (the average speed including breakthrough was 30 km/day - that means during work in operational depth the speed was much higher), but also the fact that the skill of German soliders was not-so-high at this time, and the skill of elite units (Guard, Shock Armies) increased. Still, concentration of arty and tanks gives a tremendous effect. If you have many tanks and can use them properly during one moment in line with tactics, you can cause a disaster on the opponent's defense, even if it is not-so-weak (has organic amounts of quite efficient anti-tank means etc, to some extent like in 1945 on Magnuszew and Sandomierz bridgehead). If the breakthrough of tactical defense zone is fast, then the enemy doesn't have time to organize resistance, most of his units are either retreating or cut out, and places of stubborn resistance can be overrun. As far as the artillery concentrations are concerned, this is the same. Proper concentration causes even more effect on the enemy defense, and this refers both to infantry and tank/rear forces (some useful information on this was here not much times ago). If 2x or 3x more rounds hit defence in very short time, then enemy's losses (both direct- killed, wounded, equipment) and the mess caused by the-really-huge barrage will be even more higher. So, the defense of the opponent will be easily broken.
Yep, it has a disadvantage, the enemy can withdraw from initial defense positions, then he has some advantage (Berlin operation), but some good maskirovka, suprise and Furthermore, if we have mobile arty, it can be moved and have good effect.
Aevans did a very good point - it is the factor of the speed of the attack that encourages having much good arty, everywhere.
As far as the tactical nukes are concerned, after 1967 and the Volga-Dnepr exercise (I might have mistaken the date but the idea is good) it was decided that war without tactical nukes indeed is possible and Soviet Army must be prepared to it as best as possible.
My soruce is the same book, but if you don't find Rotmistrov credible look at the air force - prior to 1967 there was no need for ground attack aircraft, during that exercise crews of MiG-21 and Su-7 were given the task of ground attack and failed, as they were too fast. As a result, Su-25 appeared, a purely ground attack aircraft with its features clearly designed to work in the enemy's close air defense zone (armor - still works ) and slower speed (easier targeting of small, mobile targets) and fairly high payload of different bombs and unguided missiles (weapons used to ground support - until now)
I hope I helped you a bit
EDIT as for tanks, for Russians there was no better form of moving in nuclear enviroment, as you say with BMP support, and i.e. after breakthrough enemy's tactical defense zone, such mechanized force may rush into operational depth and crush everything it ecounters. The larger the force is, the faster will it crush, and the less time the opponent will have to organize defense even far away etc...

Well, there's another reason as well -- Russians are and always have been goofy about artillery, going back to the first Romanovs.

And to have good understanding of Soviet tactics from this period - what it was in theory, or rather what were Soviet commanders going to obtain - the book I mentioned says that "the officers from the level of platoon to tank brigade are the most relevant", so despite all the concentration, numbers, maskirovka there was understanding of the relevance of good training of small units. The lessons learned from WW2 were to improve all the areas that malfunctioned during the war (like individual skill - but, as I said previously, among elite units it already increased in 1944 and 1945) and develop areas where succes were obtained (concentration of forces, arty barrages, maskirovka, operations in depth of hundreds of kms etc).

The authoritative source in English is Prof Chris Bellamy's "Red God of War - Soviet Artillery & Rocket Forces", 1986.

Traditionally modern Soviet artillery doctrine recognised three phases:
- Fire preparation for the attack, typically starting about 30 minutes before the main elecmys of the leading attack troop reached the FLOT
- Fire support of the attack as the enemy positions were penetrated, this could be somewhat like a moving barrage but probably only where there was actual opposition.
- Fire accompaniment of the battles in the enemy's tactical depth leading to the battle in the enemy's deep rear.

However, with the development of Operational Manouvre Groups a new first phase was introduced - Fire protection of forces moving up to attack.

Arty units and formations existed up to Front level and would be assigned to the sectors where they were needed.

Needless to say this is quite a big subject and no simplistic summary can do it justice.

Organic artillery was part of the all-arms unit,

Supporting artillery (basically battalions) was under command of the senior artillery comd of an all arms regt or division, but at some stages delivers fire as ordered by the all arme (ie not arty) comd at battalion or regt level.

Allocated arty is under full comd of an all arms unit or sub unit, but if necessary at critival times can immediately revert to control of a seniot arty comd.

Arty under Comd belongs to the arty comd at regt, div or higher that it belongs to but attacks targets in the interest of lowere formation or unit that it is assigned to.

Basically there were three 'levels' (intensities) of fire against a target - 'annihilation', 'suppression', or 'harasssing'. The actual amounts were determined by tabulated 'norms' for different types of guns and targets. But annihilation meant destruction of combat capability (70-90% cas or 50-60% of a group of targets), suppression meant 30% destruction of targets.

Incidentally, I wouldn't call Red Army use of arty 'notorious', 'famous' would be a better word. Traditionally they were very technically competant, tactically, even in 1945, they were still a bit primitive, although this was enabled by sheer quantity, they didn't need to try and be tactically clever.

Damn it, yet another book I must trawl through the internet to get.

One other worth looking through is Isbys 'Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet army' which has an excellent section on artillery (and illustrates how primative some of their artillery systems and tactics were in the 1981 edition).

Ive noted some of the British army guides to the Soviet army produced in the 70s and 80s are also excellent sources on Soviet artillery practices.

They were good on organisational matters (as far as it was possible to judge) and the equipment characteristics stuff was not too bad as far as it could be judged, although there was a lot of potentially useful detail that was not available. Higher level tactics were reasonably covered, mainly because there was a reasonable amount published in the Soviet professional journals. Doctrinal detail and operating procedures stuff at battery and battalion level was notable for its absense. 'Excellent', is not the grading I'd give (as a former specialist user of the product), I had too many unanswered questions.

The most interesting document I've come across was the USAF translation of part of the Soviet RT&A encyclopedia. This gave a lot of detail in isolation although if you have a good understanding of artillery and can see beyond your national ways (and very few non-gunners do the former and rather a lot of gunners are incapable of the latter) you could join the dots to some extent, but the translation I've seen lacked a lot of pages which was very frustrating. I also learnt some interesting stuff from an Egyptian LtCol who had been trained in the USSR but got the distinct impression that the foreign students' schools didn't teach the full picture or even the then current Soviet thinking.

Soviet tactics changed a lot during the Cold War wrt tactical nukes. Prior to massed nukes their tactics were very similar to their WWII tactics. However as tactical nukes became more available you would no longer have such concentration of troops as before. Units were expected to engage from the move without concentration and preparation supported by divisional tactical nukes.

Yes, until 1967. After 1967, along with NATO doctrine, preparation to war both with and w/o nukes on full scale was begun (see my post above).

If you look at Cold War Soviet arty, it is designed organizationally to remedy the shortcomings of the GPW, specifically with regard to command and control and availability, especially in regards to the fluid battle. The former was achieved by heavy investment in dedicated artillery C2 platforms and radio networks while the latter was achieved by having artillery directly subordinate at every level and a hefty reserve for special employment.

Sov arty C2 was superior to the C2 of all arms combat formations but the limits of the latter and rigid doctrine meant that subordinate units were the only really reliable means of getting timely fires. They learned this the hard way in the GPW, once the battle became fluid, their C2 and ability to harness fires pretty much collapsed. Once the front coalesced, the artillery could reset and be employed at 'full' effectiveness. I don't believe they ever achieved the same level of fire direction capability of the British/US model which is still the yardstick IMO but sought to overcome the issue of massing of fires literally by mass.

Client states never achieved the highest level of artillery capabilities because they would not generally invest in the C2 required nor did they have the quality of manpower. Keep in mind the artillery branch got the brightest and best the Army could get.

It took some skill to extract the maximum performance from their arty but if properly handled, the quantity and quality of fire was devastating. Which is why NATO spent so much effort planning to neutralise this advantage.

Simon

It's notable that the USSR maintained a large number of towed guns, including modern ones right up to the end of the Cold War. Fully armoured SPs were limited to regimental and divisional units. This is not entirely consistent with nuclear operations from day one. It's also useful to remember that the Soviet definition of WMDs was nuc, chemical and incendiary. Their exercise scenarios seemed to have usually involved an assumption of NATO first use of nuclear weapons, of course various interpretations can be put on this.

In WW2 their artillery was somewhat limited once movement started, deliberate and massive fireplans could involve over 300 guns per km in a breakthru sector, firing both preparation and a barrage. There were unschedule concentrations but not huge by British standards, eg 3 arty bdes with 180 guns firing a mere 1150 rds. Once movement started guns were used in direct fire far more than was customary in the west.

Of course the great similarity between Soviet and UK arty was arty commanders being forward to control fire, Comd OPs in Soviet terminology, but in WW2 they were very limited in their ability to concentrate fire on opportunity targets.

As for comms, a feature of the Soviet system generally was the facility to skip a command level should a HQ be destroyed, eg regt could speak directly to army if div was taken out. This was radio, not waiting for a tactical trunk system to be rolled out.

Boy, you guys can sure complicate a simple thing. THey had all of that artillery because they wanted commanders at every level to have a means of directly and immediately influencing the battle. But I said taht already in the very beginning...

Okay, continue the blatherfest.

Superficial understanding is a wonderful thing. Unfortunately it's not quite that simple. One of the things the Red Army really understood was the concentration of force. This means grouping in accordance with the task. It does not mean every commander having his 'own 'artillery to use as he thinks fit. Commanders were assigned the amount of artillery the planners consdered that they needed for the task. In WW2 the scale of organic artillery at regt and div level was relatively limited. However, for operations the game changed.

Eg at Petsamo Kirkeness in Oct 1944, 10 GRD had 440 guns, mors and RLs on a breakthru frontage of 2 km. A few months earlier 302 RD at L'vov Sanvomir and the followingyear 147 RD at Berlin had slightly more on a slightly smaller breakthru front. Just a tad more than a normal divisional artillery I'd suggest. Most of these were over 76mm in all cases. Typically breakthru corps had 700-1000 and breakthru armies 2000+, and there is no double counting in all this. These concentraions were acheived by concentrating forces, it was not organic.

It's not a superficial understanding at all. It's entirely the opposite. The more you have to say to explain something, the more superficial it is, not less. Yes, in World War II they had to do a lot of concentration of effort to get stuff done. Guess what? They learned from that. Remember, the subject is why Cold War forces were organized the way they were. During that period, the Soviets gave every commander at every level artillery -- so that the battle or even the operation wouldn't get bogged down because resources were lacking at the decisive point.

Which is of course true, but doesn't change the fact that there were really lots of independent arty units, both SP and conventional, to achieve concentration of forces plus strengthen certain units (or perform independent tasks, whatever needed)

Not sure when it started but during the Cold War they formed RAGs, DAGs and AAGs. These were resourced according to their task, based on their planning norms, they were not limited to organic units. (remember the Sovs were quite heavily into mathamatactics).

To quote Bellamy, about Cold War arty tactics - "there is no set pattern or amount: artillery from all levels would be used in any way the Soviets felt appropriate" - eminently sound military thinking. And in essence no different to WW2.

As in WW2 formations assigned breakthru missions would have a lot more arty than others. During the CW assigning a lead MR bns with an arty bttn seems to have been fairly common, this could be from an arty regt (ie not the MRR's arty bttn, in fact assigning 2 div arty bttns to the lead regt seems fairly normal).

There are some interesting figues, in the 1970s the Sovs estimated that 55-60% of fire missions would be bttn size, 25% arty groups of various sizes and 15-20% battery. Interestingly when they were using 'curtain fire' (ie rolling barrage) the lifts were generally not scheduled but ordered by the supported commander, the arty commander did the planning.

Sov arty is an interesting subject, and true to the principles of scientific socialism everything was carefully defined, but in the end commanders made decisions, used the doctrinal norms and orchestrated the organisational building blocks, techniques and methods to achieve their assigned mission. The simplistic notion that each commander had his organic arty and that was it is nonsense. In fact the assignment of arty to lower levels caused logistic problems, they had to change their doctrine to keep ammo resup responsibility with the parent regt, expecting an MRR to be able to handle ammo resup for additional arty bttns on mobile operations was unrealistic. Of course the Sovs recognised that arty ammo consumption is inversely proportional to the speed of advance, but even so it's a big load.

Isn't anything post-Cold War available? The opportunities for research should have multiplied in the past years.
Maybe a translated version of a Russian book (I know the WP military literature is torture, I've seen some Eastern German examples...)?

Yes -- those were the Front and Army commanders' artillery, and were assigned to them so that they could influence the battle. Same principle, different place, and slightly different application (in that there was no standard Front or Army artillery allocation).

Entirely different from WW II -- artillery allocation scales were enourmous at division level, compared to the Second World War. And while assignemtn of assets wasn't prescribed, there was an almost invariable tendency to assign support down the chain of command to build large concentrations, not converge assets from below, as was the practice in most Western armies.

The USSR had a huge amount of artillery, this was the result of policies after the Civil War, and they maintained this into the Cold War. How they organised it doesn't really matter, its how they employed it that counts and in essence this was unchanged although C2 arangements did evolve, centralisation increased in WW2 (by 1945 35% of arty was STAVKA reserve) so that breakthru sectors could be assigned what they needed. In the Cold War military strategic planning was with the newly introduced TVDs not STAVKA, and a higher operational tempo than WW2, this meant de-centralisation of assets with improved materiel. That said, it does seem that in the earlier part of the Cold War there was greater emphasis on nuc firepower and conventuional arty was reduced, but started increasing again in the late 1960s.

As to size of divisional arty in WW2, a quote from Bellamy about the summer of 1941: "The Soviet artillery like all arms suffered catastrophic losses, as the German forces pentrated into Soviet territory, sometimes as fast as 100 km in one day. In order to preserve the valuable heavy and super heavy artillery, and to increase the manoeuvrability of Soviet formations, the amount of artillery in an infantry division was reduced from 280 pieces (including mortars) to 132, and the equipment thus released was formed into units of the Artillery Reserve of the High Command. The number of such artillery units rose from 110 in June 1941 to 255 on 1 December." This makes the shrinking of div arty clear and the reason for it, it was an expedient for the circumstances of WW2.

On my arithmetic a late CW MRD had 33 btys of MRLs (3), guns (21) and mors (9) each with 6 platforms = 198, (+ 4 SSM lnchrs) - still far less than the figure for June 1941. However, the big number here is the 12 btys in the TR and MRRs, IIRC this was an increase circa 1975 from a single bty in each (I've a vague idea TRs didn't have any before this). This being the case and equating the MRDs to WW2 divs by removing the TR the actual numbers of guns, etc, is not much different to the lower WW2 divisional figure, although 'average' calibre was undoubtedly larger.

Obviously post WW2 they reckoned that the improved mobility of heavier guns no longer hampered manouevrability so they could revert to their preferred practices. Difficult to see how reverting to pre WW2 practice of a large div arty is a positive lesson of WW2! The lesson of WW2 (actually they knew it anyway) was that massed arty won battles, how this arty was best organised is a matter of circumstances, and WW2 centralisation was forced by circumstances.

The interesting thing is that a basic norm has been consistent since the 1920s - in offensive ops an inf battn at the front needs an arty battn to support it.

A centralized artillery pool seems to be suitable for a rather offensive strategy in which artillery is being assigned to breakthrough sectors.

German WW2 experience was that most successful defensive battles were successful in stopping the enemy attack either by firing very effectively on the troop concentrations before the attack or by stopping the attack around the forward positions.
That requires artillery (+mortars) that are immediately available - or a very good prediction of enemy attacks (one day or more in advance).

Soviet regimental mortar batteries had (or should have had) eight (not six) tubes for period 1967-88.

Divisional and regimental artillery batteries were expanding to eight tubes, at a varying pace. Rocket battalions were expanded to 24 MRLs.

So MRD might total 264 guns, MRLs and mortars.

Not sure about that. My memory (and I'm going back to the classified sources) from the early 1980s is that it was the arty bdes at army level where btys were expanding to 8. I don't think there were regimental mortar btys once regt arty battns were formed, I think they were in MR battns. Bellamy ('in mid 1980s') refers to 6 in everything, apart from gun btys in army and front arty bdes.

What a truly ridiculous statement. Organization prescribes employment and grows out of doctrine for employment.

Oh, the tangled web you weave, when you practice to deceive. The Soviet pre-war organization was insupportable over any amount of time with their assets. They made a whole bunch of stuff and issued it, while neglecting to build the logistics organizations and infrastructure to keep it working for more than week in the field. In that environment, the division equipment scales settled into what was actually supportable for a campaigning year. Rifle divisions quite often had no more than 12 76mm field guns, whereas Cold War MRRs had 18 122mm guns. Howthis can be construed as more of the same totally escapes me.



The difference of course is that the Cold War MRD organization was supportable with Cold War Soviet logistics assets. Also, doctrinal lessons from WW II reinforced the necessity of a commander having artillery immediately under command. I guess at the highest conceptual levels it was the same thing, but so is loading a side and overwhelming the defense on a football pitch. IOW, it's meaningless unless actually implementd.

The Eastern Front was quite different from US/UK experiences - organization on paper was indeed more often than not irrelevant.
The losses were intense, and real strengths were almost always below paper strengths - plus the matter of unequal ammunition supply which explains why employment was in general more important than organization.

Another example is that the 76mm guns were often employed in anti-tank barriers and therefore partially compromised in their ability to provide indirect fires.

It was, of course, Soviet WW2 practice to keep divisions in combat until they reached the stage that they had to be withdrawn and rebuilt, this meant equipment totals could get quite low.

One of Stalin's key directives was that all arty was to be able to engage tanks and provide anti-tank depth, this didn't stop them from their normal tasks, particularly in an offensive.

Bellamy's figures for the strength change in 1941 are clear. The exingencies of the circumstances caused div arty strength to more than halve, and remained that way for the rest of WW1. There are several possible contributing causes, eg the war starting before all the necessary beans were in place! Or Sov mobilisation plans (eg collective farms providing transport to the army?) being disrupted by the rapid German advance. However, if the Sovs had put 280 guns and mors in a rifle div it was because their doctrine identified the need for it. That's the way they worked, that's what central planning is all about.

Subsequently strength increased and most STAVKA assets were devolved. This made sense given that the Cold War battlespace was much smaller than the E Front of WW2 (less the final weeks - the Eurasian funnel effect).

Soviet arty C2 is more complicated than every commander having organic artillery, see post #6 for a summary of C2 relationship types.

And the key point is that Soviet planners were not hung up over organisations, arty was grouped as necessary for the task, eg a lead div was given army arty battns under comd (perhaps even an arty bde), a lead army would be given front level units and might further assign them. There is no practical difference to holding all non-div units under STAVKA, but it is probably more convenient from a peactime management angle because it gives lower formation HQs responsibility for readiness and training instead of leaving it all with the staff at GoF or MD level (although presumably front level arty bdes still reported to them in peacetime).

Jeepers, nigel. You've never done this for real, at any level, have you? It's exponentially easier to attach down than it is across or converge up, whether you're talking about machinegun sections or artillery regiments. Ye, lead divisions in CW war plans had large supporting artillery assignments -- because the higher echelon commanders assigned their assets under command to their foci of effort, all the way down the chain. The Front commander assigns his artillery assets to his main effort army. That Army's commander assigns his artillery brigade(s) (and probably some of the Front level assets under command) down to his main effort division, etc.

You may thin that's no different than flooding a Front with STAVKA level assets, but it is. It's a matter of control and flexibility subsequent to the initial action. With assets controlled at the national level, the Front commander is stuck asking himself, "Okay, what do I do with all this crap now? What can I do with it? When do the supporting logistics get withdrawn? How mush of this stuff can I affor to lose before Uncle Joe sends the NKVD along to take my 'resignation'?" With assets under command, assigned at various echelons within the organization, the command and control works itself out automatically and ensures that these assets are available -- at least the ones that can be moved fast enough -- in the deep battle.

My mis-type! I meant battalion mortar batteries. These were always eight tubes from the 60s (either 82mm or 120mm mortars). All Russian sources confirm this - why NATO intel thought otherwise is inexplicable (but they also missed the MG platoon in every motor rifle company for most of the Cold War).

The classified sources you read at the time re artillery must have been different from the US CIA estimates - most notably 'Reorganization of Soviet Forces in Germany' published in 1983 and now available free to all at the CIA FOIA archive (http://www.foia.cia.gov/). Also, the 1985 National Intelligence Estimate 'TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES, 1985-2000'.

I'm not saying all artillery battalions in divisional units were converted to 24-guns, but that process was underway throughout the 1980s, especially in SP (as opposed to towed) units.

It does depend on when, all reorganisations of units happen progressively over some years. There being a trend and something being completed is not the same thing. Given the number of line crossers coming from the east (I believe the only type of unit not represented were the nuc comms units) I seriously doubt that NATO missed very much at all in terms of what units had. Given that there were MR units within the UK's allowed flying distance around Berlin, I think you can be sure that if MR units really did have 8 tube btys the pics would have been taken. Similarly if GSFG bttns had extra platoons the vehicle counting by guys like BRIXMIS would have found the anomally and that bone would have been well chewed over.

Soviet commanders were given the assets they required to successfully complete the mission they were assigned, this was based on agreed planning norms. This meant that comds couldn't complain they didn't have enough when they failed! It really doesn't matter which HQ has peacetime comd of which arty bde. Once operations start it doesn't matter providing you are sensible and don't try to rapidly switch assets from one exteme of your front to the other (and fail to adjust your logistics). Sound planning is always to minimise the extent of redeployment when regrouping occurs. The other constraint that probably didn't affect the Sovs was if there is a wide disparity in operating procedures, this can lead to a well less than smoothe regrouping.

Unfortunately information about low level regrouping for Sov forces in WW2 seems to be a bit sparse. During the CW the TVDs were clear, and their missions probably were as well, so it made sense to group arty assets somewhat in line with plans, recognising that plans are subject to periodic review and operational grouping may change. Of course what STAVKA gave in peacetime it could also take away in war, as in 1941!

Turning your point on its head - why would the Russians possibly lie about this after the end of the Cold War. What possible reason could there be for maintaining that MR Bns were allocated 8 mortars from the 1960s until the Gorbachev downsizing of 1988? (except for it being correct)

I am touched by your faith in us green-slime types and in collection and analysis free from pre-conceptions, bias, and mental ruts. Sadly I don't share your faith, and simply note that we are the people who brought you Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

It's fairly clear that the 'definite' existence of WMDs originated well up the food chain with all sorts of caveats stripped away.

My problem is the as far as GSFG is concerned there was a substantial and competant collection effort, and IIRC 120mm mors were towed, it makes them very difficult to miss, particularly when they are supposed to be in the most common types of unit. Perhaps it was all a fiendishly cunning deception plan sustained over decades, always carrying Nos 7 & 8 in the back of a truck and never bringing them into action during training, the CIA might believe that but I don't. If someone said they started changing some bttns in some Mil Districts in 1980, I'd have no problem.

I'm far from an expert, and only theorising, but perhaps this is a difference between peacetime and mobilised strength? ie in peace the batteries are limited to 6 tubes (and thus are seen as such by UJK/US intel) on mobilisation theu are expanded to 8

Quite possible for units in the low readiness divisions deep inside the Soviet Union. However, my understanding is that units in GSFG (and other GoF) and most of those in the western MDs were maintained at full strength and did not rely on mobilisation to bring them up to strength.

The other thing is that the Soviet professional military journals were readily available in Moscow (western attaches shopped for them regularly) and these would also have provided indicators to something as mainstream as the capabilities of the MR bns.

Stupid question to follow. After doing some reading about the level of artillery the Soviet Army had in the late Cold War how was a for example US heavy corps supposed to stand up to it? The amount of artillery organic to a Soviet MRD was awesome!

Hope that the supply system breaks down under the strain of having to move all that ammo forward.

Counter-battery and CAS.

I think they were supposed to cross their fingers and pray that it didn't come to that. Which seems to have been the foundation for NATO planning from the outset from what I can see.

BillB

Drop a nuke on the guns, lined up wheel to wheel?

Artillery available in a US field corps was substantial. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V_Corps_Artil...(United_States)

Unless I had misunderstood airland battle 2000, I think the idea was that the Corps was to engage the follow on echelon with deep fires and air support, isolating the first line divisions to be destroyed from prepared positions and using a flexible defense and aggressive counterattacks.

Of such slim hopes are made the plans the men or something like that.

http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1989/APR_19...PAGES_10_14.pdf
http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1989/JUN_19..._PAGES_7_11.pdf

As for counter battery it sounds like you're asking for a significantly smaller amout of artillery to silence a much larger force. As for CAS, you might be onto something assuming that NATO can handle WarPac ground air defenses and fighter patrols. Maybe?

Well division for division I think US heavy divs were at least a match for their Soviet counterparts in the direct fire contest. As for indirect fire.... NATO air forces and new weapons like ATACMS would have been working overtime. I just don't understand why the US if no other NATO country didn't lavish more arty in their units?

I just question who was to take out the Soviet artillery in the first echelon fight.

BTW, there were discussions during the division restructuring studies to substantially increase arty allotments if I quick read this article
http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1980/MAR_AP...PAGES_22_25.pdf

I wonder what happened? Likely, budget/personnel inadequacies.

NATO air superiority is going to be the foundation of any successful NTAO effort. If air succeeds it will be able to neutralize Soviet artillery and numbers. If it fails it's already over. My impression is that the only time NATO was not sure it'd own the air was the seventies with Soviet advances in SAMs. NATO artillery is a component of the Air-Land battle doctrine and NATO did not expect their artillery to do the things Soviets made their artillery do. Warsaw Pack forces killed enemy reserves with the artillery, NATO artillery focused on line units.

[edit]
... And its time for the Cold Warriors to come over and whoop this thread.

Ref the first part, how many US heavy divs were in place compared with the number of Sov divs. Ref the last bit, can't speak for the US side but the rest simply didn't want to put up the money, a tendency that goes back to NATO's very beginnings. Which is why if the Sovs had decided to come across the IGB it would have gone nuclear pretty quickly as a matter of necessity.

BillB

At risk of getting my arse handed to me, as I understand it Air-Land battle doctrine was merely Soviet Deep Battle Lite, with compromises like the arty one you mention because the NATO side were not willing to provide the requisite resources to do it properly. As for NATO owning the air, I'd put your date forward into the 80s, and I don't think it would have been a NATO push over at any time due to quantity having a quality all of its own, and the sheer numbers and coverage of Sov battlefield AA resources.

BillB

Comparing numbers, the US sector had some field artillery brigades with a high number of (mainly) M110 battalions. Each US division should field 72 SP guns(kinda NATO standard number) and 9 MLRS. The British and Dutch were artillery heavy as well, Belgians and Germans a bit weaker.

All thats true. But dont forget the war stocks. The British army had to use the Nato stockpile to go to war in 1991, which was great, except everyone else would have been plundering it in wartime as well. Britain only ever had 6-7 days of ammunition, so advantages in artillery must be regarded with that disadvantage in mind.

As for who was going to destroy the first echelon artillery, I really think it ought to be considered that this is one of the tasks that Lance would have been put aside for, that and divisional headquarters.