Various sources I found for WW2 state basic loads for bolt-action rifle to be 60 rounds. From what I have found, basic combat load for M-16/M4 is considered to be 7x30=210 rounds.

How long do these loads last in a battle? How long would say 1000 rounds last for a LMG, how long for HMG, in normal engagements?

Well, there basic loads and then there are basic loads;)

From a 1941 U.S. publication. "the Infantry Mailing list." the ammuniton load for an infantry regiment was given as follows;

For riflemen with either M-1 or 1903/1917 rifles 40 rounds per man. with 192 rounds of M-1 ammo and 120 rounds of bolt-action rifle ammo held on unit ammunition train. A further 96 rounds of M-1 ammo was held on the ammunition train of a a higher echelon unit while only 60 rounds oaff addition al bolt action rifle ammo was carried. total was 328 rounds ofor M-1s and 220 rounds for bolt action rifles.
96 rounds were to be issued to the M-1 riflemen prior to combat in 48 round bandoleers with the remaining 96 rounds staying with the train as a reserve. Bolt action riflemen were issued two 60 round badoleers prior to combat with no reserve in unit ammuntion train.

Ammo for the Browning 1919A4 (aircooled) is given as 3000rounds on the prime mover or Am truck, 2000 rounds on the unit Am Tn and a further 1000 rounds with the train of a higher unit for a total of 6000rounds per 1919A4 in the Regiment.

Melvin Johnsons book (with Charles Haven) "Automatic Arms" gives the following times for a soldier to "burn up" 200 rounds.

Bow= 10-12 minutes
Muzzleloading rifle= 60-80 minutes
Muzzleloading smoothbore= 50 minutes
S.S. breechloader= 20 minutes
Springfield '03 single loading= 10-12 minutes
Springfield '03 clip loading= 6-10 minutes
Semi-automatic rifle= 4-5 minutes

Fire discipline is the key to making the ammo last with any weapon (excempt maybe the rifled muzzle loader;)

also note that if the soldier is causing enemy casualties he/she is not "burning up ammo" and the enemy might run out of troops before the friendlies run out of ammo.

It kind of depends on available transportation more than anything else. In ODS, because our battalion was assigned AAVs, but not very many trucks, we had small arms ammo coming out our ears at the lowest level. On operations where we would have been foot mobile, I doubt we would have carried much more than the 200 or so rounds per rifle and 800 per SAW/machinegun.

That's why did I ask about real combat, not theoretical rate of fire

(Btw out of curiosity, OT as I see the muzzleloaders in that list... Was there a difference in speed between say flintlock and percussion weapons?)

Those are based on theoretical cyclic rates. No human could keep up those rates of fire. And, as mentioned, one id likely to either be dead, run away, or run out of enemies before one hits 200 rounds with most of those weapons. Heck, 40 rounds per soldier plus resupply available in trains was considered sufficient in the US Civil War, which was a conflict notorious for small arms volume of fire and lathality.

I remember a part of a book where the author describes the difference in Prussian army motivation of 1806 and 1813 by recounting how the Prussian troops yelled for ammunition resupply after expending their 60 shot basic load in battles (that wouldn't have happened in 1806).
60 shots was apparently not sufficient at all for motivated troops with smoothbore muzzle-loaders and good loading drill.

Well obviously if you decide to stand rather than run after you use up your basic load, you'll call for more ammo. The basic load was generally enough to get a man through a single tactical engagement. If you fight all day, like they were doing in the big battles of 1813, you would need resupply.

I have heard that soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan and Iraq usually carry more than the typical ammo load, usually 10-12 magazines.

I recall reading somewhere a Vietnam vet account... About 500 rounds of .223 (not all in mags) and 100 rounds of 7.62 for the machinegunner.

Sounds about right. It caused mobility issues, however. That's approximately 25 pounds of ammo, and you still haven't picked up your grenades, pyros, LAW round, claymore, and maybe a 60mm mortar round or two. Then you've got food, water, any extra clothing (at least a rain suit and a couple of changes of socks), body armor, helmet, first aid kit...

Probably me. SOP in my aerorifle troop was 600 rounds of .223 (most or all of it in mags) plus 200 rounds of linked 7.62 for the M60 gunner(s). Latter was usually carried in canvas canteen covers. I was exempt from that one as I had my own burden (PRC-77 plus spare battery). Then as pointed out, M26 grenades, water, rations, etc.

I also had a one of those 40mm vests for M203, but didn't fill it. Carried maybe eight rounds. Total loadout was typically ~70 lbs.

I doubt this was usual for a straight-leg infantry unit (though they would have probably carried other stuff to equal weight, like mortar rounds, more LAWS, stuff like that). Our unit was much smaller and issues of timely resupply were a consideration. Rainy season in northern "I" Corps could mean no-fly for quite some time.

SAS in Borneo during Confrontation carried no more than 3 spare mags for their SLRs.

Of course the nature of their missions were usually to avoid big contacts or drawn out firefights.

...

Web gears normally has room for 8 x 30rd mags plus the one in your weapon. If you load 28rds per mag that would give you 9 x 28 = 252 rds. If you are carrying a rucksack, you can carry even more ammo.

In Vietnam, Aussie troops leave behind some rations in preference of carrying more ammo in the pack.

...

Pen pushers and other non-combat people often criticise the low bodycount vs bullet expenditure in Vietnam. They saw footages of troops firing over their heads without aiming and decide this was poor training, no guts, poor morale, conscripts etc.

But even among experienced, well-trained, well-disciplined and more professional troops like the Australians in Vietnam, much more ammo is expended in jungle contacts for less bodycount as compared to other battlefield terrain. Their studies also quoted figures (similar to US) of hundreds rounds of small arms ammo per enemy KIA.

Sometimes the troops didn't aim because there was nothing they could aim at as the enemy is behind cover/concealed, poor visibility etc.

But when being shot at, men had to shoot back even when they can't see the enemy. Volume of return fire help discourage the enemy from taking more aggressive initiatives.

...

There is also the practice of "recce by fire".

And then there is the ritual of "mad minute" where during "stand to" at dawn and dusk. I don't know how often "mad minutes" were conducted.

In general, individual ability to give automatic fire was preferred over semi auto. So even among more professional troops like the Aussies in Vietnam, the little 5.56mm fullauto Armalite was eventually preferred over the more powerful but semiauto SLR. For all the 5.56's poorer performance compared to the 7.62, the troops found they could carry much more 5.56 ammo and also each man can put out a higher volume of fire on FA.

(While some want to see a return to larger calibres, people forget that the Soviets abandoned the 7.62 x 39 used by the Commie side in favour of the 5.45 after the Vietnam War.)

Reading Vietnam War books I got the impression that the 200 - 300 rounds carried by the infantryman was usually enough for one decent contact (as opposed to harrassment or "shoot n scoot") before needing resupply.

Doug, I carried a PRC-77 too, plus one spare battery and long antenna, as a reservist platoon radioman - in the 90's. I assume your time was Vietnam?

What's your opinion of the PRC-77?

As a radio, it makes a pretty good paperweight.

Hehe, I'd like to meet the guy who can fire 200 aimed arrow shots in 10-12 minutes.

I believe Capt. Johnson was trying to answer critics who claimed that troops SHOULD NOT be issued semi-automatic rifles because they would burn up their ammo too quickly.

The point being that if any soldier just loaded and fired as fast as he could that even an ammo supply of 200 rds would not last more than a half hour unless the weapon was a muzzle loader.

I believe the difference in time between the Muzzle-loading rifle and the smoothbore was the difficulty in ramming the bullet in the rifle, especially after the weapon became fouled from use. Pre minie ball English riflemen being issued mallets to ease loading;)

Most army's in WW II were foot army's. the basic issue of ammunition might be what the soldier was expected to carry on the march. Additional ammo being issued just before attacking or after a defensive posotion was reached. Some marches might last days if not weeks. Modern Army's rarely march for long periods of time. Even a patrol of several days ends either with a return to base on foot or return by vehicle. In either case the soldier does not have to carry ALL of his kit with him. There are of course exceptions but in WW II divisions marched on foot with with only few trucks or horse drawn wagons to make up the ammuntion and supply train. Few as opposed to the modern "EVERYBODY RIDES". THE US and maybe the British did achieve the "EVERYBODY RIDES" in WW II but some times it was by using tanks as transport. Many US divisions did not have enough organic transport. Truck battalions would be assigned for large movements or operatons and then the truck battalion/s would be assigned elsewhere.

They weren't aimed. that being sort of the point. If they were aimed they would be causing casualties and thus not be wasted or burned up. It goes back to the fire discipline. How long the ammo supply lasts depends on the troops aiming their fire (which slows things down a bit) and inflecting damage on the enemy. If they enemy is taken causlities they are less likly to expose themselves and thus give the "shooters" fewer opertunities per minute to fire aimed shots which will also strech out the ammo supply.

Don't get wrapped around the axle by a single word. The real point is that no man, firing shots of any description, is physically capable of firing 20 shots a minute for ten minutes. The cyclic rate of a perfect robot might be that much, but a human fatigues too quickly. That's why we distinguish between cyclic (1), rapid (2), and sustained (3) rates of fire. Trying to make a point based on the cyclic rate alone may impress the naive, but it just makes the knowledgable professional snicker.

1. theoretical maximum
2. what one can keep up for a minute or two at most
3. what is practical over an indefinite amount of time

It didn't have range for sh!t in northern "I" Corps. Get in the mountains, could be less than a mile. Radio relay was a frequent mission for numerous units operating up there.

Other than that, it was reliable. Those old batteries weighed....a lot. I understand these came to be replaced later with something more reasonable and can be used as retrofit on ones still in service (usually by hobbyists, enthusiasts over here).

And we couldn't talk directly to the Fox Mike system in the aircraft.

Actually, I beleve that " cyclic (1), rapid (2), and sustained (3) rates of fire." apply to the weapon it self, at least in small arms, and not the rate of fire achieved by the operator/crew.

1. cyclic--the rate at which the action cycles. For however briefly the ammunition suppy in the weapon holds out.
2. Rapid--what the weapon can deliever for 1 or more minutes (several) without damaging the weapon, or causing operational problems. Like cook offs.
3. Sustained-- the number of rounds per minute the weapon can deliever for extended periods of time, also without damaging the weapon, or causing operational problems.

Note that in cases 2 and 3 many magazine fed weapons, let alone belt fed, could be over-heated well before the crews endurance runs out if the operator/crews did not restrict the firing rate.

There are also some artillery pieces and mortars were heat build up can be faster than the crews endurance wears down.

Practical rates of fire or planned rates of fire may or may not coincide with "Rapid" or "Sustained" rates of fire.

'Deliverable rate of fire' may be a better term in some cases if you want to take operator fatigue or weapon ergonimics into account.

I do believe a "knowledgable professional" should have gotten the original point.

The question started at 60 rounds for a bolt action rifle in WW II or perhaps a 210 rounds for an M-16. How long would they last in battle?

The point being that any soldier could exhaust his basic load in minutes ( perhaps 5 in cases above) if fire discipline was not used.
The point of using the Figures from Johnsons book was to show that IF fire discipline was not used the time to ammo exhaustion didn't realy vary that much from weapon to weapon.
5 or 10 minutes difference in a several hour (or even day long) battle.

When talking of muscle powered weapons (and even firearms are muscle powered for cycling purposes if they are manually loaded) you have to take into account the durability of the human in the system.

Why? Saying that a bow could be fired at twenty rounds a minute for ten minutes is preposterous. Or that musket could be fired at four rounds a minute for fifty. (In what universe, for even one minute, could a musket be fired at four rounds a minute, except with the first shot pre-loaded and a crack soldier doing the rest?) We haven't even discussed how fouling would slow down or even stop the firing of a muzzle loading black powder weapon long beofre 200 rounds were fired. And I seriously doubt even a strong man could get off 200 rounds in ten minutes with the smoothest operating bolt action rifle ever made. It's just too much repetitive motion.

But firing 200 rpm for twenty seconds is perfectly achievable with any modern machinegun. And I supposed anybody that doesn't mind a moderate case of trigger finger could get off 200 rounds from a semi auto rifle in five minutes. Comparing rates of fire of muzzle loading weapons and ones involving significant muscular input from the shooter just isn't reasonable or rational, and suggests the author has nothing but contempt for the reader.



The answer, in the real world, depends on too many factors. Heck, in the age of muskets, the idea wasn't to conserve ammo particularly, but to achieve escalation dominance by firing faster than the enemy. Discipline was in shooting as quickly as possible and not giving up just because everyone around you is getting hit. Later, after mechanical and chemical invention had rendered rate of fire an academic question (who really cares if my assault rifle fires at 550 rpm while your's fires at 600?) the point became achieving escalation dominance without pouring a limited commodity down the spout to quickly.

As for specific figures, they're arrived at through a combination of guess and experience. If 60 rounds or 600 is considered sufficient for a given weapon for a single engagement, well people have their reasons for believing that, and resupply is built into the unit and higher formation logistics effort, because a single engagementcan happen more than one a day, or go longer than expected.



Horse manure. A musket armed soldier would likely never fire 200 rounds in a single engagement, or even in a day long series of engagements, and if he did, something would definitely have been decided. A soldier armed with a modern assault rifle could easily fire 200 rounds in five minutes, and the likelihood of something being decided would not be all that high. I can see burning that much ammo providing a base of fire for a moderate squad or platoon enveloping maneuver.

"The point being that if any soldier just loaded and fired as fast as he could that even an ammo supply of 200 rds would not last more than a half hour unless the weapon was a muzzle loader." From post #16

The half hour figure is from the book.

My appoligies for not retyping the entire 9 page chapter.

taking into account "the durability of the human" would be the deliverable rate of fire.

"And I seriously doubt even a strong man could get off 200 rounds in ten minutes with the smoothest operating bolt action rifle ever made. It's just too much repetitive motion."

Quite possiably true, but again the figures offer a comparison of rates of fire and ammo consumption vrs time to refute the idea that soldiers SHOULD NOT be issued Semi-automatic rifles before WW II because they would burn up their ammo much faster than if they had bolt action rifles. This was not a new idea as the same reason had been used to oppose breechloading rifles in the Civil War. In the Civil War the idea may have had a little more validity seeing as how slow the muzzle loaders were. This, of course, ignores the increased effectiveness of the soldier with the faster firing gun if it is used with fire discipline.

"Comparing rates of fire of muzzle loading weapons and ones involving significant muscular input from the shooter just isn't reasonable or rational, and suggests the author has nothing but contempt for the reader."

I did change the wording from the original but in both cases the muzzle loaders were exempted from the comparison time limit of under 1/2 hour. I would note also that NO FULL AUTO weapon was listed.

But if you are having such a hard time with 200 rounds try 100 rounds, or 60 rounds and see if the time to get rid of 'X' number of rounds really varies that much from human powered weapon to human powered weapon (muzzle loaders and cross-bows excepted) and a semi-auto. Significant number of minutes, Not 1-2 minutes or seconds out of a day long battle.

Human endurance might surprise you. Didn't a British Sergeant obtain over 30 hits in one minute on a 12inch target at 300yds with an Enfield before WW I? Not ten minutes I know but aimed fire vrs simply blasting.
And as far as human endurance and/or battle panic goes, I believe the record "double loading" for a muzzle loader picked up from Gettysburg is 23 rounds stuffed in the barrel. Now if a soldier could load his rifled muzzle loader 23 times without noticing A, it wasn't discharging and B, the ramrod wasn't going very far into the barrel.

" Horse manure. A musket armed soldier would likely never fire 200 rounds in a single engagement, or even in a day long series of engagements, and if he did, something would definitely have been decided. A soldier armed with a modern assault rifle could easily fire 200 rounds in five minutes, and the likelihood of something being decided would not be all that high. I can see burning that much ammo providing a base of fire for a moderate squad or platoon enveloping maneuver."

I would say MOO-POO yourself. As has been noted the Muzzle loaders were exempted from the comparison as taking several TIMES longer to exhaust their ammo. AND full auto weapons were never mentioned in the list I provided. If taking things out of context and adding units that were never listed to begin with is mark of a "knowledgable professional" I think I will perfer the opinions of amateurs.

I'm beginning to see where the misunderstanding is here. You actually accept the received wisdom that breech loading and repeating arms were deprecated during the ACW and after. It has been estimated that by the end of the Civil War, 5-10% of the soldiers were armed with repeaters, and nothing short of metal cartridge breech loaders were considered acceptable for US Army issue in the future. The experience of Wilder's "Lightning" Brigade in 1863, especially at Chickamauga, demonstrated the utility of these repeaters in general issue. And the only thing that limited the ability of Wilder to arm his unit with repeaters prior to that was availability. Once the weapons (Spencer repeaters) were available, his unit subscribed their own pay for several months in order to buy them. Several state and even the Federal ordnace departments woke up to the utility of the weapons, especially after Spencer competitively priced them. (Old Montgomery Meigs was probably more concerned about the original $40 purchase price of a Spencer rifle -- when rifled muskets cost $18 apiece -- than the cost of ammunition.)

As far as semiautomatic rifles are concerned, the cost of individual articles likewise probably had more effect than any supposed urge of the troops to burn up ammo. The expected scale of ammunition use by machineguns and automatic rifles (the BAR was already in the inventory if we're talking about any time after 1918) dwarfed any possible abuse of ammo supply by riflemen.

So, whatever the stated purpose of the comparison being made, the quoted work was attacking a shallow and easily refutable excuse. While that in itself is the option of the authors, doing so in the facile and inaccurate way in which they did earns all the ridicule that can be heaped upon it.

Is there a point here?



23? I've heard six and sven were common in a lot of recovered weapons, and eight wasn't unkown, but 23? I suppose it's possible if one puts no powder in, but otherwise? And even if true, what does that have to say about anything? how long did it take for the soldier to load all of those rounds? I bet nowhere close to three or four rounds a minute.

As for your British sergeant, one minute of concentrated effort (probably after weeks of practice for the specific task) is not the same as ten minutes of sustained work.



So? Even if you exclude automatic and muzzle loading weapons, you still have a list with preposterous rates of fire for several weapons, from bows to bolt action repeaters. It's a dishonest argument.

The Standard Ammunition Allotment (SAA) for a Commonwealth rifleman in WW2 was 100 rds in stripper clips (2 bandoliers) plus 2 magazines for his section's Bren, in addition to whatever grenades etc he might have been handed. One bandolier was worn cross-shoulder and the other carried in his ammunition pouch. Depending on the battlefield, he might carry a lot more, including satchels of grenades, more Bren mags etc; oftimes (at least until late autumn '44), it was not uncommon to see additional Brens and even enemy weapons such as MP-40s carried in the field in order to supplement firepower. It is well-documented that there was hell to pay (in the Canadian Army at least) when the brass-hats put a stop to all of that, especially confiscating all the enemy weapons (no doubt to send home for themselves) during the winter of '44-'45.

Basically, front-line soldiers in NW Europe carried whatever they thought they needed and to hell with the manuals...

I should add that we were also notorious for scrounging .30 and .50 calibre machineguns off the battlefield, welding up rudimentary mounts and using them on everything that moved under its own steam (Universal Carriers, Scout Cars etc)...

I recognize paintball and combat are completely different things. That said, most paintball fields do not charge an entry fee but charge an inflated price per paintball, as well you must buy all paintballs used from the field.

Paintball encounters (games) last about 20 minutes, assuming 10 people per side on a 15 acre field.

Rate of fire is similar to modern semi automatic rifles, however, expect to fix a jam every 20 or so rounds.

Maximun range is about 100 m (a 100 m shot would be a lucky shot). Effective range is about 30 m.

Shots generally cost 10 to 15 cents each, so there is a strong incentive to conserve ammo.

I have found that in a game, in order to be effective, you generally expend at least 50 rounds. It is quite easy (but expensive) to expend 200 rounds in a game. Above 200 rounds you are generally firing at shadows and are no longer particularily effective.

A day would consist of 5 to 8 games.

Keeping in mind the behaviour of paintballers and combat troops are different (a paintballer is more likely to return fire and less likely to use suppressive fire) I think going through 200 rounds in a 20 minute engagement is quite likely, even for combat troops.

I was interested in the first reply in this thread that gave the authorized ammo load for a US rifleman as 60 rounds on the soldier. Somebody didn't tell the Quartermaster Corps - the M1910 web ammo belt has ten pockets, each set to hold two 5rd stripper clips = 100 rds for an M1903. The later versions of the belt (M1923, etc) still had ten pockets, so but each would only hold one 8rd clip for the M1, giving you 80 rds on the belt, plus 48rds per bandoleer if those were carried also.

Does anybody know the basic issue for the M1 carbine? Since it was supposed to replace the pistol as a secondary arm, was the basic load the same as a pistol (one magazine in the weapons and two on the belt)?

Gary

That probably depended on who it was issued to. A relatively rear area type like an artillery crewman might not fire 100 rounds in a year. A Marine squad leader might fire that many in an average day of combat.

For the carbine, M1, I always assumed that one 2-mag pouch was issued with the gun. This would indicate a basic load of 3 magazines, or 45 rounds.

Yes, I know what "assume" often means.

The two mag pouch that attaches to the buttstock was a common accessory, but I don't think it was 100% standard.

Being the rifle platoon radioman, I hardly fire a shot during missions because I have my hands full, literally, with the radio, trying to co-ordinate shxt when all around people are shooting and shouting.

But I still carry the rifleman's basic ammo load - which I think is OK. What I would have really appreciated is if they had given me a short and handy carbine instead of a full length M16.

I have a carbine and pouch; I'm pretty sure the pouch was intended to slip onto a pistol belt and the ability to slip it on the buttstock was an unintended benefit, much as the M4 collapsible stock's adjustability to accommodate body armor.

Then you wouldn't have appreciated this RTO's M16A1/M203 at all.

I found that the reception was OK from what I can remember as we have no mountains and few hills.

But then, the thing was that the way we operated, we only needed to talk to other platoons and Coy HQ, which in little Singapore means we are all within a few klicks of each other. Which made it silly to carry a 15kg radio package.

We were, after all, just puffy reservists nearing 30's (then).

The Coy HQ Landrover had more radios so that took care of comms beyond of Bravo Company.

So what does doing "relay" means? And how does the PRC-77 work in that role? And what kind of unit/role were you?

The battery I used weighed 2 kg. Is that considered light? And then there's the long antenna.

The PRC-77 is one tough radio. I once threw it on the ground and kicked it across the room after we returned to barracks. It continued working...






I would imagine in a ordinary unit there would be enough other folks to do the M203 job?

And to think I complained constantly about having to carry the radio and a rifle.

Beaucoup mountains in Thua Thien and Quang Tri province, small and close together, more like Appalachians, or even smaller.

Radio relay means setting up multiple outposts to relay radio messages where the range of the individual element(s) is limited, so traffic has to be "relayed" by passing on messages from point-to-point. Some relay stations were permanent/semi-permanent outposts (typically on a peaky mountain top) with some defensive capability (though still vulnerable), others were just 4-6 guys inserted for ad hoc relay to support an operation. (more vulnerable still)

PRC 77 needs relay in hilly/mountainous terrain, preferably to someone with a system with more range, to cut down on the number of relays required.

Our unit was the Scout Section of an Aerorifle Troop of an Air Cav Sqdn. We didn't have a lot of folks.

Ah.. I see. Just like our Coy Signals Landrover was the relay for us.

...

Scouts! Must be one of the slightly better combat jobs in infantry? Did your job still require a lot of footwork, being aerorifle and all...? What do you ride most of the time?

My friend was also a scout in our heliborne infantry. But they also ride dirt bikes and jeeps for the scouting role.

I don't remember what the infantry carried for a basic load with the M-1 in the early '60s but when the conversion to the M-14 and ALICE pack happened the pouches included the ability to carry 80 rounds or 4 mags of 7.62 plus I suppose 1 in the rifle.

There always seemed to be boxes of bandoleers available as that was how the ammo was issued for rifle training in basic trng.

Not infantry, but cavalry. Primary was 11E (Armor Crewman) but was assigned secondary of 11D (Armored Recon) when arrived in-country. When I arrived at unit, I asked where armored vehicles were, was advised "at the end of my ankles, mine looked to be about size eleven". Most was done by foot, but we did some heli insertion (then proceeded on foot, operational area was huge) and we had some gunjeeps and a small 106mm RR section (on M151A1C, originally, but in an "unauthorized" move, put two on M37 3/4 ton trucks, which were better).

So you are armoured crewman, assigned to armoured recon... everything's all f***ed-up in armies everywhere. But, I thought aerorifle meant you rode in a helicopter.

OTOH I started out as foot infantry but near the end of our reservist cycle we were switched to riding in ancient V200 (like the V150) armoured cars.

I always thought completely retiring the 106 RR was a waste. Now the heaviest thing we have on a jeep is an ATGM, which is a waste of money if what you want to whack isn't an MBT. And 106 has those famous anti-personnel rounds.

A few times during exercise we rode to the drop-off point in civi buses some with aircon. Needless to say it was very comfortable and quite novel to be fully armed inside a bus with heavy weapons on the floor etc. At first we thought it was because the army was running out of 3-tonners. But in retrospect, I think they were trying out the feasibility of requisitioning civi assets in case of all-out war. Not to mention that a bus is a less tempting target for enemy aircraft than an army truck.

Of course, a convoy of buses heading toward the fighting just might draw an inquisitive eye...

Sometimes. Air Cav Sqdns., Vietnam style, usually had a "Blues Platoon" (ARP, aerorifle "platoon") attached to their line Aviation Troops, but more like a reinforced rifle squad in strength, to give each Troop some ground capability. We had three line Air Cav Troops, plus a flight platoon for HHT (mostly UH-1 "slicks", who did most of the lift...Aviation Troops had OH-6A scouts, AH-1G Cobras, and some UH-1's for C&C and light lift). In addition, there was one Troop (Company sized unit), "Dirty Delta" that was a full Troop Aero-rifle capable (foot, wheeled, heli-insertion and rappelling). It consisted of an Infantry Section, Scout Section, Mortar Section, and a Recoiless Rifle Section. This was also the "Ready Reaction Force" (Rapid Deployment in today's terminology, I think) for the 101st Abn. Div. This is not typical organization today. My former "Dirty Delta" still exists, but it's the maintenence section for an OH-59D Sqdn.

Downside: ARP's are small units with no immediate backup, if any at all.

Upside: ARP's have substantial Scout and Gunship support available....

Downside: .....IF they can fly (it was rarely VFR in the Fall/Winter in "I" Corps and aviation did not have NVD's for the flight crew.

This tranlates into, "if the weather sucks, so does your situation, once inserted" We'll get back to you when the weather permits. Hence, heavier loadouts for ammo than are considered customary in these enlightened times.

The PRC-77 was useful in that, if someone aboard an approaching aircraft with zero visibility needed guidance, and if he had someone on board with PRC-25 or 77, we could talk them in indirectly (since we could not communicate with the secure FM system the bird was flying on) with sophisticated language like "I can hear your blades approching/retreating as an indication of where they were relative to our postion. This is an iffy game in rough terrain, and aircraft were occasionally lost to "controlled flight into terrain". It was seldom attempted for obvious reasons in the north. Ceiling could be zero, mountains to 3,000 feet, and nothing but pea soup in front of the pilot. Usually, you could expect to be on you own until the weather improved, unless your supporting flight element was willing to put all on the line. They didn't have to be taking fire to "put all on the line". When you fly blind in the mountains, it's already on the line. These were days of "dead reckoning" and the aviation maps crude (I have a few).

It's difficult to describe to those that weren't there, just how "low the sky" could be, by which I mean clouds that you could "reach up and touch". My perception of meterology and cloud cover was for some time skewed by those conditions. Never seen anything like it anywhere since...and I've been around, globally. This was reinforced when I went back in 2005. Lot's had changed, but not the weather in Thua Thien Province.

As a medic in the 82abn I had a m1911 but when alerted to go to Baruit, we did not go in the end, I put 560 rounds of 5.56 in the bottom of my ruck sack. At 130 lbs the added weight was not that much more but I had seen in training that the 11b's always ran out of ammo and I like some protection. Afterwards talking with platoon sargent of platoon that I saported he thought that was a great idea. If we had gotton to my reserve he would have seen that it lasted.

All I can say is: respect.

Combat experience is something I wished I had. I know I;d be scared to death but you never really live until you come very close to danger.

In Hong Kong where I lived for 6 years, the cloud is also very low. There are no mountains, only very tall hills. On peaks of one of my favourite climbing hills, there are spots where you walk amongst the clouds. So I do have an idea of the "pea soup" visibility thing.