I am aware that there are ongoing discussions whether mortars and howitzers should co-exist side-by-side in the age of radio networking.
I'm usually not decided in favour of preferring an all-artillery approach, even not in flat terrain for non-airborne troops.

But I DO wonder why the FCS family of vehicles includes both a FCS NLOS-C SPH and a FCS NLOS-M SP mortar.

I see no significant advantage of the latter over the first. The basic advantage of the mortar - cheap & light are absent in a SP approach anyway.
Modern SP mortars have turned into smoothbore (sometimes even rifled) automated howitzers.
105mm gave way to 155mm, why should an army add a system that's similar to a 105mm SPH next to a 155mm on the same platform?

Once again, the doctrinal difference between the mortar and the field artilley piece is one of possession and control. Field artillery is possessed by the division commander and generally controlled by the brigade commander. Mortars are possessed and controlled by battalion and company commanders.

Also, even in the mechanized environment, there is a considerably smaller logistics commitment in the use of mortars. Much of the field artillery battalion's equipment and manpower is dedicated to ammunition supply and gun equipment maintenance. A small minority of the infantry or tank battalion is dedicated to mortar ammunition and maintenance.

Yeah, thanks. I know the orthodox answer.

But the mortar team won't fire much without supply either and is much less survivable due to shorter range.
SPH don't need to be organized as they are. That's a decision by choice.
Brigade commanders could have SPH instead of SP mortars. What they have is due to a decision, not due to a nature's law.
There's also no nature's law telling us that units are not allowed to have indirect fire ranges beyond their area of responsibility.
The unavoidable difference is basically one between a 155mm shell + modular charges and a 120mm bomb + auxiliary charges (or even no aux charges, as in some automated mortar systems!).
The difference in volume and weight is counter-balanced by the difference in effect (,dispersion and range).

To keep the parallel 120mm and 155mm systems even in very expensive, complex SP mounts seems to me like adherence to tradition instead of dominance of reasoning.

Don't waste your time telling us how it's like today. We know that. And it's off-topic.
The question is why they want to keep the separation even though they ruin the classic advantages of mortars.

If it ain't broken, don't fix it?

In the case of the FCS mortar I believe it is also to function as a low pressure direct fire gun as well. Basically an assault gun mode--I believe its even to have a LRF/direct fire FCS. Also I think its fair to say that even heavy calibre mortars tend to have hirer ROF than large calibre howizters. Point taken that Howizters could be assigned to lower levels doctrinally if so desired, but practically I wonder if the minimum ranges might be too large for opperation at the battlion or company level. I'm not sure what the minimum ranges are for weapons in this class but I suspect the mortar can cover much short ranges that would be dead zones for 155.

I'd like to see what E5 has to say on the subject.

That doesn't apply to new procurement, or else we'd still use hand axes.

More survivable than most other elements in the maneuver battalion, usually staying in the rear of the column or at least one terrain feature behind the main body.

But not arbitrary. The combination fo firepower and logistics commitment represented by field artillery suggests that long practice is also best practice.



Brigades generally have a field artillery battalion attached or in direct support. So where's the beef?

There's no doctrinal practice to that effect either. The effective use of the combined artillery of several division and corps assets has been practiced sine WW II.

Also, the increased range and responsiveness of field artillery suggests that deployment and control will become more centralized in the future, not less.



You do know about field artillery ammunition tactical resupply vehicles and supply columns, don't you?

Also, a 120mm mortar HE round with a maximum propellant charge masses roughly 14kg; a 155mm field artillery HE projectile alone masses approximatel 47kg.

I don't agree that a 120mm mortar should have an equally complex mount, in terms ofa fully stabilized turret w/ autoloader and all of that. A mobility system matching the general automotive capabilities of the rest of the battle group only makes sense, however.



I am talking about the future. It just isn't that different from the past. Mortars will continue to be less logistically demanding and deployable/controlable oat lower command levels. Doctrinally and practically they will continue to be more available than field artillery. (Just because it's easier to talk to the fire control center doesn't mean they're necessarily going to assign you assets for your requested mission.) Field artillery on the other hand will continue to be logistics intensive and improved communications and gun range will continue to drive centralization of control and distribution of physical assets.

Aevans, you're too much talking about status quo and not enough looking at what was meant by others. Your reply is very unimaginative, although you assert you're talking about future conditions.

The support requirements of a NLOS-M and NLOS-C would not be very different, and the ability to call for their fire does not need to be different at all.

I know about resupply vehicles, and I know your annoying 'teacher' attitude here. But resupply vehicles and similar stuff are not necessities and not directly related to "mortar or howitzer" anyway. An army can (and some did!) assign resupply vehicles to SP mortars just like to SPHs. The greater distance of mortar units to logistical supply points in comparison to a typical SPH even suggests that they need resupply vehicles more than SPH units do.

There's a lot of "orthodox" doctrine, tradition and "we always did it like this" at work imho.
And you're not answering the thread question, but instead just telling us about the status quo, although we know about it. It's just annoying - and I write this because you behave like that very, very often.

I am answering your question, very directly and completely. You just don't like the answer. That's a you problem, not a me problem, okay?

Quite frankly, you're asserting the existence of a magic bullet that doesn't exist, and not listening when somebody tells you it doesn't exist. Talk about annoying...

Hand axes kept for a looong time, until the widespread use of firearms. I see no such radically new weapon technology in the fire support area in the foreseeable future.

Not addressing your question in context of current or future applications, but there is a historical precedant for such an arrangement. 2/11th ACR in Vietnam (after Rgt. stood down) retained six M109's (SP 155mm's) at Sqdn. level in How Battery which serviced the three troops that operated within the range fan of whatever FSB they were currently calling "home", and also typically had three mortar squads (in mortar tracks, M106) per Troop for local high angle support in their immediate sectors. M551 Sheridan's were the direct fire weapon over .50cal.

Artillery gives you range, which gives you firepower mobility including the ability to concentrate fire from all fire units in range (close fire and depth fire, and rear fire if that becomes necessary) if you want and the control arrangements can enable it. It's also 24 x 365, btys don't go into reserve. However, all this comes at a price, it potentially means higher ammo expenditure, particularly today as non-divisional artillery shrinks, more logistic effort and larger detachments. Longer range and higher velocity ammo is inherently more expensive, and the firing forces involved mean that the firing platforms have to be suitably robust and have recoil systems.

Mortars, operated by inf and armd are different. Basically they're a comfort blanket of 'guaranteed' fire support to a battalion (this is a state of mind not a significant reality, arty can provide it to all practical intents and purposes). They offer minimal firepower mobility (because the control arrangements don't exist, never mind limited range) which means they only fire if their battalion wants them to and if the battalion goes somewhere quiet they may not fire for days. In more practical terms mortars offer a cheap way of locally thickening up fire support and keeping inf and armd battalion comds happy.

Of course historically (and currently in some armies) mortars can be operated by artillery. However, limited range limits their utility as artillery, and if you're serious about using them as arty then you need the arty overhead of comd and control, ammo supply and suitable manning levels.

Incidentally the minimum high angle range is another bit of nonsense. It's useful for mortars because it means they can engage target close to their battailion with indirect fire. Guns are further away and can engage the same targets just as close. If the enemy are really close to mortars or guns themselve then guns have the option of direct fire, something that isn't usually available to mortars so they are forced into close fire with high angle, with all its disadvantages compared to direct fire.

Well, the army pledges to go into a networking mode with FCS.
It would make sense to re-think the allocation of firepower, so old-style organization like "arty for division/brigade and mortar for regiment/battalion/company" could be re-thought for a more efficient system. An army must be disciplined anyway, so it shouldn't need hard-wired system limitations to enforce rules like "battalions shall always have some minimum indirect firepower".

Another problem is that FCS NLOS-M is no mortar of the old kind anymore. It's a breech-loaded rifled or smoothbore system with autoloader (and therefore possibly no auxiliary charges or artillery-like charge modules). It has probably a recoiling system to reduce the shock on electronics and suspension whereas traditional mortars simply have a baseplate. FCS NLOS-M will most likely become 90% short-ranged SPH and 10% mortar.
That's why I consider the traditional mortar arguments "it's like this and has been and there are good reasons..." as not applicable.
NLOS-C and NLOS-M will pretty much be two different SPHs, like M109 and Abbott.

I've seen such an automated mortar system at the Eurosatory (and that SRAMS was much less complex than a turreted solution as usually depicted for NLOS-M) - the smoothbore barrel was the only thing that was mortar-like. All else was either howitzer-like or had nothing to do with traditional mortars or howitzers.
It had a fixed ammo, no modular or auxiliary charges. It was a automatic smoothbore cannon for the upper elevation group and with rounds that could be fired in traditional 120mm mortars.

Btw, the ranges of modern mortar ammunition is the same as that of most 105mm howitzers and about the same as that of 122mm D-30 howitzers or 2S1 122mm SPH. We're not talking about the old 6 km HE-frag PD mortar bombs anymore.

Hey, that might help; consider the FCS NLOS-M as an automated 2S1 122mm SPH. The differences are small.
Now you know why I don't accept the "mortars are used like this" replies.

Deleted

ROTFLMFAO!!!

I have yet to see a mortar at a disadvantage just because it's firing close in. At the very least, the mortar can be kept in defilade, even if the enemy is only 100m away. This means not only is the gun and gun crew under cover from enemy small arms fire, but it is can also use standard HE ammo without fear of own fragmentation. Field artillery crews have to almost completely expose themselves to fire direct at close in enemies, and they have to use specialized ammunition for really close in work, or else score a kill on themselves.

To reiterate, just because you can communicate better and in more directions doesn't mean you'll have the assets assigned to your mission. I'm kind of mystified why one would think that this basic principle would somehow cahnge just because people use a computer network to talk to each other.



I'm not in love with some of this stuff either, but just because you've seen one system that went too far in a certain direction doesn't mean the FCS model will. Also, even given a non-optimal system, it still has less of a logistics requirement than field artillery simply because it does, in real practical terms. That's a real difference.

Oh, come on. SRAMS is still smoothbore muzzle-loader.
The U.S. was looking a lot at automated French rifled mortars with breech-loading.
The NLOS-M will almost certainly be even more complex than SRAMS.

And? The ammo will still create much less of a logistics burden because it's lighter and simpler. The gun will be less of a maintenance burden because even with all the bells and whistles it's not a high pressure precision machine designed to hit withn 50 meters at a distance of 40 km.

Also, you're still missing the point about the command and control issues inherent in the use of field artillery vs mortars. You simply ignore them or apply "well, they'll be networked" handwavium.

C2 issues exist as much or as little as the army allows it. Both systems throw an object from A to B. All C2 around that is by choice, no commandment and no nature's law. Your conservative orthodox attitude, independent thought-free attitude is seriously annoying to me.

A turreted mortar has a lot of precision requirements involved, I do not expect the most likely gold-plated NLOS-M to be simple or cheap at all. You ignore persistently that NLOS-M will not have much (if anything) in common with traditional mortars. As I said before - think of a 120mm SPH.

120mm mortar bombs weigh less than 155mm shells. Great observation.
155mm shells have more effect and can carry much more effective submunitions.
So what?

Is that the whole point? To have different sized munitions? Munition commonality and some other "simplicity" arguments would strongly favour a single calibre, as was the original reason why 105mm SPH disappeared, after all.


And now I'd like to add something particularly interesting:


You don't seem to have any clue about howitzers, as such a system doesn't exist. No gun shoots with a 50m CEP at 40 km. Some munitions can do that, but their dispersion is 99.9% independent of the gun.
Well, maybe you know something about guns, but in that case you'd be a brickhead who argues for the argument's sake, just to disagree and annoy. A troll.
Or it was a typo.

I as a CO have always liked mortars because if you need fire, its lot more easier to get fire from BN Mortar Co (9x120mm), than from Artillery when you operate in Comppany level. In BN there is only 3 to 4 units whit whom I must divide the asset, but in BDE there is 12 to 15 units competing about the artillery assets and if you are not in the center of gravity of BDEs fight you will end up to last in line of fire calls! I am not even mentioning counter artillery missions, recce troops needs and other non-tactical level fire missions that will go in front of your call!
But the best thing in FDF new organizations is the Comppany's organic Mortar Team (2x 81mm). It has two advantages: you always have mortar support when you needed it and with 81's you can really shoot close if needed. C2 issues aren't going to be issue in Co level, but sometimes these will have affect even in BN level and even more in the BDE level with Artillery.

More handwavium. You still can't answer why C2 issues are as totally artificial as you assert that they are.

As far as my annoying you, tough. It's not my problem you are so upset by straight, logical answers.

BTW, hotshot, I can think for myself. I just don't have the delusion that thinking for oneself automatically rules out accepting current practice as practical and useful.

Why should I think of a 120mm SPH? That ain't what it's gonna be, no matter how much they gold plate it. It's still going to be a low pressure, high angle, relatively short range gun system.



Different missions. The difference in ammunition mass and handling requirements does affect serviceability and maintainability, independent of any goldplating that may or may not be included.

Within the realm of field artillery. That has nothing to do with mortars.



Ummm...hotshot -- 50 meters CEP at 40,000 meters implies 1.25 mil precision (assuming of course you define "precision" as achieving a given CEP value). Since most modern artillery systems aim for 1 mil precision -- even if they don't always achieve it -- I don't see what your argument is.



Neither a troll nor a typo. Just not what you want to hear. Once again, that's a you problem, not a me problem. Get. Over. It.

But that's a matter of discipline and competence of the responsible officers. There's no nature's law for the priority list, it's a decision.
It needs a significant distrust in leadership to call for hardware-defined limitations that (seem to) guarantee fire support for a battalion.
A general could easily order that a combat team's SPH respond with priority to their combat team's requests.

About the 81mm; we should remember that we never ever faced a competent opponent with significant counter-mortar or counter-artillery capability post 1945.

It might as well be a safer guarantee of indirect fire support to call for fires from a large pool of SPHs (some with highest and some with low priority) instead of from a smaller pool of SPHs (with low priority) and mortars (lower survivability against counterfire, highest priority).

OK, that's the principal arty vs mortar decision. Your post hits another subject, though.
Would a battalion really have the priority it's been accustomed to when the mortar is
* no simple towed 7 km range piece
but
* a high-tech, networked, expensive medium AFV automated turret with 15+ km range?
Would such a "mortar" system still be used like older mortars? Would the battalion decide about its use or probably the brigade?

Neither one of you have tried doing this "military" thing for real, have you? S/F....Ken M

I am not a artillery man - just stupid tanker so I try to answer from my point of view.



That is true what you say. Anyhow I think that it is great to have artillery assets in use all the time, but can I trust to have those? No. Of course if my BN is in the center of BDE's fight and my CO is the lead unit - then it is yes. BN mortars in other hand are surely in my use if I am in heat so to say even if I have rear area / flank security mission. That is also one of the reason why FDF BN have quite strong indirect support capacity on their own in TOE. But in BDE level the BDE artillery at least in FDF has quite much other tasks than pure INF support. We don't have luxury of CAS, so artillery is the tool to be used instead (counter fires, operational fires, mid range recce forces support, BDE rear area support missions and so on).



81's very mobile asset and they are used inside comppany perimeter so I would presume that it is very hard to acquire 2 fast moving (in to position, fire mission and out in 3 minutes... ) pieces that has small trajectory trace from the middle of mech inf coimppany's 20 or so shooting vehicles... More I am worried about regular 120's as they are not so mobile if not installed to APC's and also their ability to support whole BN requests more preparations that takes time and gives greater demands to C2 system. 81's don't really need no C2 "system", simple commpanys radio network is more than sufficient to serve as C2 for 81's as long as they are used just to support their own unit, not neighboring units.

Besides BN attacks on very narrow area and if enemy has time to consentrate their radars on attacking BN's 81's they most surely will miss 120's or at least BDE artillery. And what would be the most important target for them...? It is quite easy in COIN enviroment to identified couple of mortars from BN AOR if you have in use division level counter artillery capacity (like in IRAQ today). Read for example Conroy-Martz "Heavy Metal" and you will notice that even during OIF a single TK CO never during the ground war got in use counter artillery radar units although they were the lead unit!




That would be ideal situation, though I think that we still have use for mortars. But one thing to be considered is also the money issue...mortar tube is quite much cheaper and has a lot smaller logistic foot print than SPH.



In FDF system of use of AMOS yes it still has. Only difference is that BN level mortar comppany has now lot more shorter response time from the move than the regular ones had and it is betterly protected than regular ones were. Also with smaler amount of units we can cover bigger are and achieve bigger amount of ammos in target simultaneously. In FDF AMOS is replacing 120mm's fro BN, not BDE artillery.

Really? You're assuming that the government would alot say 48 cannon systems (6 per maneuver battalion) and no mortar systems, because that's what blows dingo's hair back. Why would any army agree to that, when just working from the standard current system alotment, it could get 54 cannon systems (3 battalions x 18 guns) and 48 mortar systems (one six gun platoon per maneuver battalion)? Or, if you're suggesting maybe the same alotment of systems as today, but cannons all around, where is all of the extra logistics assets for the ammo and maintenance going to come from, not to mention the cost of more complex and thus expensive systems?

See it's not all about unimagintative and incompetent generalship. Sometimes officers can actually add.

Now that's a specious argument if I ever heard one -- you're going on about what's the point of exposing mortars to counterbattery fire, but your solution is expose more expensive cannon systems instead, along with their logistics assets?



Actually, the decision you suggest would never be made, because it doesn't adequately answer any of the questions asked above.



You know, I've googled around and I can't find any range calims for the NLOS-M gun system. Are you sure you're just not pluggin in your own numbers here?

Aside from that, even if the range was in the neighborhood you suggest, when compared to cannon systems at the division/brigade level with designed ranges of 40,000m, it doesn't seem unreasonable to give a battalion commander control over such a system.

Well, my memory could be faulty, but dingo I think has at least once claimed to be or have been a German tanker. And nigel constantly goes on about his involvement with NATO and US artillery as if he was the super gunner of the last decade. I'd love for either or both to lay out what their real credentials are.

When push comes to shove it’s a lot simpler to manpack a mortar than a field gun. There have been times when the only fire support that a Bn can use is its mortars.

It's a case of horses for courses. It's also a mistake to assume that all armies operate the same way, or want to.

Artillery is in the business of firepower mobility, ie moving the fire around a large area, not moving the guns to achieve that effect. This requires two main things, range, although this depends to some extent on battlefield density and how much artillery you have. The long standing trend has been to reduce battlefield density, units and formations spread across far larger areas that they did 60 yrs ago. The amount of artillery is also decreasing, although it has become much more capable. Most notably in it's average calibre (which has increased average range due to 'carrying power' and lethality). Of course larger calibres have in some cases, but by no means all, reduced the average rate of fire.

The second thing that enables firepower mobility is the C2 arrangements. Artillery is somewhat similar airpower in this respect, and totally unlike land based direct fire systems. The key is that artillery is commanded at the highest level able to do it effectively and controlled at the lowest able to do so effectively. In a good system it should also be possible to move control priorities around to wherever it's needed. This is a fundamental aspect of 'combined arms operations'.

It's also important to remember that 'networks' are not control systems, they are merely communications bearers with automated connectivity. The control systems can be facilitated, perhaps even improved by networks, but from an artillery C2 point of view networks are merely a matter of better comms efficiency in terms of reliability, speed (probably but perhaps not always), and the the quality of information available (although that's underpinned by data processing) it's not new, radical, or anything else.

The thing about range is that it's increasing for all indirect fire weapons. 40 years ago 155mm H was some 18km, it's now 40 or so. Mortars are no different. However, additional range has a price. First it means more propellant energy (to increase muzzle velocity) and this increases barrel wear, which negatively affects consistency and accuracy. Traditionally mortars have never worried about this, not least because predicted fire has never been their thing in any significant way, so mortars have been happy to adjust. Of course, short range has meant time of flights are short so that fire mission can progress with reasonble speed. Acknowledging that at max range the difference in times of flight between high and low angle fire are small (about 10 secs at 15km), at 12 km for 105mm LA is 32 secs, HA is 79 sec (best charge). This adds to the time taken to hit the target, and slows the response to effective rounds on the ground. It also increases the mission cycle time which reduces the number of targets that can be engaged.

Second even without barrel wear consistency decreases with time of flight, just look at any Firing Tables. Next if you use assisted munitions (eg RAP or BB) this again increases dispersion. Constency (lack of) is important because it affects the amount of ammo you need to fire to achieve a particular effect (unless the target area is very large).

The simplicty of mortars is what endears them to inf, etc. And their traditional range limitations are even seen as an advantage because their fire can't be demanded by others. They don't have any obvious benefits for arty, to get a projectile of a particular weight to a particular distance you still need roughly the same amount of propellant too give roughly the same MV, and roughly the recoil forces have to be dealt with, and the moment you move in low angle fire some sort of recoil system is needed. Finned bombs are also more susceptable to cross winds. which is liable to increase lateral dispersion compared to a shell, and provide better radar reflectivity, which is good news for the country-battery folk (and permanent high angle fire is more good news for them).

You sound like a preacher. So you think you've discovered a great new way of thinking, and anyone who disagrees with your reasoning for any reason must be an unthinking orthodox traditionalist -- as if the 'truth' you are preaching would depend on everyone accepting it as truth. I have no credentials to discuss the use of indirect fires either way so this is not to be taken as a comment on the subject matter, but if you can't stand your arguments being criticized why post at all?

Actually, the question posed at the beginning of the threat may have some validity.
So, a dumb quesiton: would it be a good idea to buy an NLOS-M, if it cost just as much as, and was just as complex as, an NLOS-C? Or if an NLOS-M were 10 times as much as an NLOS-C ?

(Now, the latter may be fantasy, but the former assertion may prove close to reality, given the track record for procurement).

To mis-apply a quote "So, we've already established what you are ma'am, now we are just haggling over the price."

IF the NLOS-M is just as expensive as, and just as complex as, the NLOS-C, then what is the advantage of the mortar?

Cheaper ammo? Not by much - precision munitions will cost ALOT, regardless of calibre, and "dumb" munitions are almost chump-change in comparison (on a "wartime" budget

Ease of supply? 120mm shells are smaller than 155mm, and can have thinner casings, and have less propellant, but I could just supply the howitzers substituted for mortars with only the "green bag" MACS, and achieve nearly the same weight of fire to "supply load" ratio (however you wish to measure it) over a sufficiently large scale.

Accuracy? The battalion commander can accept the same level of accuracy as mortars are currently capable of, and so I need to worry less about meteorological data, muzzle velocity variance, square weight, propellant lots, etc, and don't need to replace the barrel as often, and don't care as much if everything is aligned as well as it is in the FA battalions.

So, how much more complex is an SP Howitzer, over a (turret-mounted, direct fire capable) SP mortar? Both will have hydraulics, bore-evac's, probably some automated ammo handling, and finally comms and fire control gear. I think that the last piece, the comms and fire control (+situation awareness, etc - i.e., the computers) are coming to the point where they are a major portion of the expense of any new platform. So while yes, the howitzer will have more "heavy metal", that will be a somewhat more likely to break, and much more strenuous to repair, I'm not entirely sure that the historical advantages of a mortar over a howitzer will continue to exist, in those particular (self-propelled, networked) instantiations.

It is worth noting that there are probably brigades where the "new" M109A6's have much better uptime than the M1064 SP mortars, since some of the M113's in the fleet are junk, effectively negating what is supposed to be the maintenance advantage of the mortar. The FCS vehicles were supposed to have a common chassis, in any case.

Thus, I can field an SP Howitzer at the battalion level in place of an SP mortar, not worry as much about ammo, not worry about accuracy and fire direction, and end up with something equivalent to an SP mortar in combat effectiveness - except that I have much longer range, and possibly a greater variety of ammunition in the supply system. In the Cav at least, the front-line trace units could outrun the Howitzers pretty quick, if you let 'em, nevermind the mortar tracks - which is why those mortars were at Troop-level asset (that, and their range-fans barely covered the troop).

Sometimes when you need a big round, you *really* need it. When you need a bunch of small rounds, you are sometimes in a supply-rich environment and can afford to send big rounds instead, but if you don't have a big round when you need it...
Of course, the air force will sweep away all enemies, just you watch. We won't need any arty, at all.

As someone who has actually fired a mortar direct-lay, and a howitzer direct-fire, I think that I will take the howitzer direct-fire (w/ killer junior), when engaging targets at 100m, instead of trying high-angle out of a mortar (assuming that the target is in my LOS, and if not, then who exactly is observing for me, if the target is out of my LOS, but only 100m away? He had better'd be good!) ...although for me to do that, something has gone terribly, terribly wrong in the plan.

Now, if the NLOS-M has direct-fire capability (I think that it will) and a cannister round, then I will take that for then 100m work...

Personally, I think that an SP mortar can still be made so that it is sufficiently cheaper and mechanically simpler than an SP Howitzer, and can carry a ton (perhaps literally) of smaller shells that I can use all day for suppression and smoke screens, so it will be advantageous to retain them at battalion or company level (note that I say *can* be, not will be, FCS costs are spiraling out of control...

Well, that's the entire point, isn't it? We can't rationally talk about what the procurement system wilol produce, just what they could in theory produce. In that context, it seems pretty obvious that one could field a turreted mortar vehicle -- even a breech loading, automatically loaded one -- for much less than a cannon vehicle. Just don't go voerboard.

Also, I think you seriously underestimate the difference in logistics impact between a 120mm mortar and a 155mm howitzer.



Depends on the moratrmen. One can accurately fire a mortar from defilade and spot for oneself from the mortar position by the simple expedient of using an alternate aiming point, even a pebble in the gun pit. (Not at all accurate for normal usage, but at 100 m, you can be off by ten mils on deflection and only miss your impact point by a meter -- the nature of the HE round will take care of the rest.) With a field artillery piece you have to expose the crew to shoot, just by the fundamental nature of the gun's design.

If inf and armd want their comfort blanket of unit mortars, let them have them. Although it fires indirectly their control thinking is it's direct fire with fancy sights to see over the hill.

Just don't confuse this with artillery which is qualitatively different and is in a different business. And for arty mortars offer nothing useful (always agreeing that there might be some strange circumstances some time, some where, which I have actually experienced (operationally) but fortunately we had (man) pack howitzers so it wasn't a problem). That said the French dual equip their towed 155mm btys with 120mm mors, which is at least an honest recognition that 155mm is less than satisfactory for light forces and a sensible army would have used 105mm light guns, but we're talking the French here!

Might as well try to control the weather.

Uhhh...no.

<<snicker-snort-guffaw>>

Uhhh...yes.

LOL

Inf and armd are in the direct fire business. The concept of firepower mobility is alien hence in part their desire for their own mortars (or whatever, infantry guns were another form of this). In this thinking the observer is merely a direct fire 'weapon' who happens to fire from elsewhere in the local area, it's rather like the handful of atk msls that can be fired from behind cover (where the en won't see their launch signature) with the controller 50m or whatever away at the end of a cable where he has good vis of his killing area. To artillery this notion is nonsense because it doesn't recognise that the observer is the gateway to concentrated mobile firepower that originates well away from the direct fire battle that he or she can orchestrate.

It's also worth noting that many if not most armies don't equip their tank units with mortars. I could hypothesise on why tank units in some armies seem to think its a good idea.

You don't know what you're talking about.

Yes, infantry is oriented towards engaging the enemy with direct fire, but that doesn't mean that they necessarily use direct fire thinking when employing mortars. Just like artillery, well trained infantry mortarmen use aiming stakes, plotting boards and firing tables (nowdays as a backupt to mortar ballistic computers), truncated but real FDC procedures, and even an aiming circle w/ 81mm+ guns. They don't do met, target altitude, and earth rotation adjustments, but that's a matter of what's acceptable technical precision, not philosophical outlook.

Tactically, they pre-plot targets, use the same adjustment methods, and shift fires to targets within range rather than move the weapons.



To deal with dismounts in defilade, provide smoke and illumination, etc. IOW, same reasons as infantry mortars. Many armies armor types indeed don't seem to care about those things. That doesn't mean they're thinking straight.

We retained the same in 2/2 ACR when I was there in the mid80s. Each of the 3 troops (E,F,G) had a section of M106s (4.2-aka four-deuce) and our squadron also had a battery of 6 M109s.

Frank

Hand axes are still available...

http://www.rmjforge.com/eagle_talon.htm


I WANT one.


okay, sorry for the derail.

The spread of breach loading rifled 120mm mortars has me wondering, would the old 4.2" have been a good candidate for such a conversion?

I know it has less capability for ICM, etc, but I remember being told when I was a pup that it was more accurate.

Interesting, our arrangement was not an anomaly. Am collaborating (with others) with last Sqdn. CO of Blackhorse in VN on history of unit there. Very enlightening project (since his perspective is considerably broader than mine was).

Actually, I wondered what's the english translation for "Faustkeil" and it turned out to be hand axes.
"Faustkeil" is the flintstone tool/weapon, the first one known...

The English language either lacks an important word or the translation website needs an improvement.

When considering the relative merits of guns and mortars there are several dimensions to think about. The most obvious is the technical characteristics and their consequences as guns and mortars. Including whether a breach loading rifled mortar is a mortar or a gun!

Then there are the closely related issues of technical gunnery (and mortary?), ie the methods used to orient equipment and produce firing data, you could include techical procedures between observer and firing position in this. Traditionally mortars have been pretty rudimentary in this regard although once handheld ballistic calculators started appearing about 25 yrs ago with basically the same device used by both guns and mortars theen some minor difference disappered, and of course fire control procedures became the same well before this although inf mortars don't use the full suite. Of course it may well be that 'predicted fire' is still a term of abuse among mortarman. However, this is merely noise in the greater scheme of things.

Then there is the tactical employment dimension, and most importantly the concepts and usually unstated assumptions (prejudices?) that underpin them. This is not a difference between guns and mortars, it is a difference between artillery (overwhelmingly in the indirect fire business) and inf/armd who are in the direct fire business, this is their focus and it limits their expectations and requirements for their organic weapons, incuding those that can be aimed over the hill. Another analogy is the difference between a company in the services sector and one in manufacturing. While they both have a bottom line they are in different businesses.

High angle of fire, low pressure gun -- still a mortar.

Is there a point here?



Once again, you are simply talking out your ass.

ARRRRRRRRRRRGHHH!

Army loses bureaucratic mortar skirmish
Must give up 60mm weapon to buy launchers By David Pugliese

The Ottawa Citizen


Friday, July 04, 2008


Canada's army will get rid of its smaller mortars starting next year after losing a bureaucratic battle with Treasury Board, which required the military to dump one type of weapon before it could buy a new one.

Although phasing the mortars out of service won't save money, the army was told by government beancounters that if it wanted to spend $90 million on a new automatic grenade launcher, it had to get rid of a similar weapon, according to defence insiders. That weapon is the venerable 60mm mortar, which has been in the army's inventory since the Second World War.

The problem, say some officers, is that it's doubtful the automatic grenade launcher, which fires its explosive projectiles directly at its target, can be used as effectively as a mortar that lobs its shells down on the enemy in a high arc. That allows mortars to be used against individuals who could be taking cover behind walls or in trenches, or snipers hiding on rooftops.

Military officials have, in the past, acknowledged that some troops aren't happy they will be required to give up their 60mm mortars. They are seen as more easy to transport than the bulkier tripod-mounted grenade launchers. In the hands of a skilled soldier, mortars can also be used to bring down devastating fire on the enemy. They are also used to fire illumination flares and smoke grenades to provide cover for troops.

While the issue may seem like a internal bureaucratic dispute, some officers say the decision removes an important piece of equipment that could save the lives of Canadian soldiers.

Pat Stogran, a retired colonel who led the first Canadian mission to Afghanistan, echoed what others in the defence community are saying about the decision; the mortar and the automatic grenade launcher are two entirely different pieces of equipment that perform different roles. Each is valuable in its own right, he added.

"The 40mm grenade launcher does not fire indirect (at the enemy) which is so useful on the battlefield," he explained. "You have to have the mortars in your inventory. It's about having a variety of equipment to deal with situations as they arise."

Mr. Stogran called the 60mm mortar a "brilliant piece of kit."

Another senior officer in the army, who asked not to be named, said his unit sees the mortars as so valuable that it will try to convince headquarters to keep a number of them in the inventory.

Keeping the mortars in the inventory would not cost that much -- about several million dollars a year, according to supporters of the weapon.

Military officials said Treasury Board representatives were worried that the army had too many different types of equipment and the central agency didn't want to spend money on maintaining the mortars.

The army's plan now is to buy what it is calling a Close Area Suppression Weapon, or CASW.

That program will see the purchase of 304 tripod-mounted automatic grenade launchers, with the first to be fielded in early 2010.

The army is hoping that technological improvements in the type of ammunition used as well as computer targeting systems will allow the grenade launchers to be used like mortars if need be.

Other militaries do not use automatic grenade launchers in the role of mortars, so the Canadian army will be breaking new ground if the program is successful, according to soldiers.

The army declined to provide a specialist in mortars to discuss the use of the weapons. Officials with the Close Area Suppression Weapon program declined to be interviewed , as they have on a number of occasions.

But in an e-mail, the army said the grenade launchers will soon take over the role of the mortars. "As the 60mm mortar is nearing the end of its life-cycle, it doesn't make sense to keep it while the CASW will be meeting the same requirement," the e-mail said.

"The phasing out will neither save nor cost more money as the current funding will be spent on the improved CASW and its ammunition."

Units will have to give up their 60mm mortars starting at the end of 2009 or early 2010.

Not everyone in the army believes the mortars are indispensable.

Other soldiers say they aren't used that often in Afghanistan, a signal that the weapon's time has come and gone.

But Mr. Stogran said older equipment, once seen as outdated, is now considered essential as different situations arise on modern battlefields.

He pointed out that the army had been getting rid of its .50-calibre machine-guns only to discover that such equipment was highly useful in Afghanistan.

The U.S. military discovered the same thing. It has contracted armament firms to produce new versions of the gun first fielded in the late 1930s.

The army plans to keep larger 81mm mortars in its inventory.

© The Ottawa Citizen 2008

Once Treasuries get in on the act you can expect military nonsense to result. It was always thus.

Chamber pressure is always relative. Whatever you do you have to create enough pressure behind the projectile to give it sufficient velocity to achieve whatever range you want while keeping the position of all-burnt in the barrel. You'll also have some wear from the heat and chemical reactions. Mortars have minimised wear by being being smoothebore and minimising abrasion from the projectile. Rifled mortars have all the wear 'problems' of guns, including the build up of pressure to achieve shot start. Range is determined by elevation and MV, to achieve the same MV a rifled mortar needs the same sort of pressure as a gun and it needs the same order of MV to achieve the same sort of range. There are no freebies.

Interestingly mortars are proving a bit flawed in Afg, Taliban hear them pop and this gives them time to take cover (eg 4km range, speed of sound 330 m/s, 12 secs for sound to reach target, time of flight - I'll leave an exact figure to someone else but well over 12 secs. 105mm at 12 km, sound travel 36 secs (if they can hear it) time of flight 32 - 40 secs depending on charge, basically shells and sound arrive at the same time, little or no opportunity to take cover, might even catch they upright and moving with the slowest.

I just found a NLOS-C related article in nationaldefensemagazine:

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/iss...May/Armyina.htm

I didn't find a the pure NLOS-C related thread, so I dumped the link here.

Btw, as I already raised the question whether some mortars are still mortars; why do they call NLOS-C a "cannon"? Don't modular charges determine that it's a howitzer, not a cannon?


@Nigelfe;
I wouldn't insist so much on direct vs. indirect. The differences were in missions, separate or organic and in range.
As range becomes greater (with just a small step more to double it) and NCW ideas justifying the question whether organic weapons need to be used as before network implementation, missions deserve scrutinity because of changed environment as well.


@Aevans:
"High angle of fire, low pressure gun -- still a mortar."

Actually, the classic mortar definition is different and doesn't apply anymore.
It requires the weapon to directly transfer recoil energy into the earth (or into a vehicles' chassis) and to only shoot at upper elevation group (commando mortars are always accepted as exception). NLOS-M seems not to fit this description.

"low pressure gun"
Howitzers have often been rather low pressure and were generally accepted as being able to fire at high angle group since the 50's at least.

"High angle of fire"
We're writing here about NLOS-C, which is (judging by official graphics) intended as a turreted system. This turret will certainly fire in both angle groups, so it's not a "high angle", but a "low and high angle" system. That fits the howitzer definition very well.

As I previously said, organic weapons with indirect fire capability in units that are primarily direct fire are a comfort blanket to provide 'guaranteed' fire support. In essence its internal mutual support, like siting one coys atk msls (or GPMGs) where they can support another coy as well as their own, ie normal coordination. Additional indirect fire range for these units is only significant if the direct fire unit is deployed over a greater space.

While there is no technical reason why these organic weapons cannot be integrated into the wider fire support system (and in practice they are in at least some armies and this does not depend on NCW/NEC), there are constraints. These come down to C&C and logistics. Command gives full authority over resources, including ammo, however direct fire units are not equipped to handle large quantities of indirect fire ammo. This means that direct fire unit comds will always be reticent about placing control of fire from their indirect capability outside their unit.

155mm shells do have more effect if compared shot to shot. But if you compare ton of each ammo, then you may change your mind. On the otherhand 155mm loses hands down to 8" shell if you insist comparing individual shells. Not to mention how much more powerfull JDAM would be.

AAAAAAAAAAAAAARGH!!!!!

You could seriously piss them off by providing your mortar teams with something cheap that simulates a mortar's report, then, once in a while putting a live round down the tube.

Old, old problem. What you are doing in the above statement is exactly the same as asserting "the sky is blue" as some kind of epiphany. And it doesn't always apply. Mortars just aren't that loud. There has to be almost no sound ambient and the wind blowing in the right direction.