In the FFZ where angels fear to tread a poster related an interesting theory which I am surely misunderstanding. That being that Chamberlain was the better man than Churchill. After picking up my jaw off of the floor and rechecking the post I am still sure that I am just confused. To be on the safe side, here is the quote:
"The adoration for Churchill continues to amaze, for he is certainly the posterboy for the right in the US. Curiously, he gave fits to serious military professionals in WWII [as well as WWI] and as a backbencher in the early 1930s opined on many occasions that no increase in armaments could be likely justified. In 1938, Chamberlain was working with the knowledge that his own armed forces chiefs had concluded that his country was not prepared for war and that nothing could be done to aid the Czechs. You are all such admirers of the French? Consider who would have done the fighting in 1938...not the British Army."
So I put it to Gen Mil where the political bull is less prevalent, was Churchill the man of the hour or not? I submit that Winston Churchill was a great man. A man of his time and the savior of England. The man wasn't perfect, who is? But he was there and got the job done.
Chamberlain on the other hand was a spineless POS.
Full Version: Chamberlain or Churchill
Yes, he wasn't perfect, but he was the perfect man for that point in time.
To be honest, I've never researched Chamberlain's career or his thinking and policy. I would be suprised if were really the clueless boob his small part in history portrays him as. But in the end, he was wrong and nearly led the world to disaster.
Might be something to look into when time permits...
To be honest, I've never researched Chamberlain's career or his thinking and policy. I would be suprised if were really the clueless boob his small part in history portrays him as. But in the end, he was wrong and nearly led the world to disaster.
Might be something to look into when time permits...
Churchill War Time Speeches.
Upon the death of
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
House of Commons.
12th November 1940.
Since we last met, the House has suffered a very grievous loss in the death of one of its most distinguished Members, and of a statesman and public servant who, during the best part of three memorable years, was first Minister of the Crown.
The fierce and bitter controversies which hung around him in recent times were hushed by the news of his illness and are silenced by his death. In paying a tribute of respect and of regard to an eminent man who has been taken from us, no one is obliged to alter the opinions which he has formed or expressed upon issues which have become a part of history; but at the Lychgate we may all pass our own conduct and our own judgments under a searching review. It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise life would be intolerable, to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of events. In one phase men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values. History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days. What is the worth of all this? The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however the fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour.
It fell to Neville Chamberlain in one of the supreme crises of the world to be contradicted by events, to be disappointed in his hopes, and to be deceived and cheated by a wicked man. But what were these hopes in which he was disappointed? What were these wishes in which he was frustrated? What was that faith that was abused? They were surely among the most noble and benevolent instincts of the human heart-the love of peace, the toil for peace, the strife for peace, the pursuit of peace, even at great peril, and certainly to the utter disdain of popularity or clamour. Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged. This alone will stand him in good stead as far as what is called the verdict of history is concerned.
But it is also a help to our country and to our whole Empire, and to our decent faithful way of living that, however long the struggle may last, or however dark may be the clouds which overhang our path, no future generation of English-speaking folks-for that is the tribunal to which we appeal-will doubt that, even at a great cost to ourselves in technical preparation, we were guiltless of the bloodshed, terror and misery which have engulfed so many lands and peoples, and yet seek new victims still. Herr Hitler protests
with frantic words and gestures that he has only desired peace. What do these ravings and outpourings count before the silence of Neville Chamberlain's tomb? Long, hard, and hazardous years lie before us, but at least we entered upon them united and with clean hearts.
I do not propose to give an appreciation of Neville Chamberlain's life and character, but there were certain qualities always admired in these Islands which he possessed in an altogether exceptional degree. He had a physical and moral toughness of fibre which enabled him all through his varied career to endure misfortune and disappointment without being unduly discouraged or wearied. He had a precision of mind and an aptitude for business which raised him far above the ordinary levels of our generation. He had a firmness of spirit which was not often elated by success, seldom downcast by failure, and never swayed by panic. When, contrary to all his hopes, beliefs and exertions, the war came upon him, and when, as he himself said, all that he had worked for was shattered, there was no man more resolved to pursue the unsought quarrel to the death. The same qualities which made him one of the last to enter the war, made him one of the last who would quit it before the full victory of a righteous cause was won.
I had the singular experience of passing in a day from being one of his most prominent opponents and critics to being one of his principal lieutenants, and on another day of passing from serving under him to become the head of a Government of which, with perfect loyalty, he was content to be a member. Such relationships are unusual in our public life. I have before told the House how on the morrow of the Debate which in the early days of May challenged his position, he declared to me and a few other friends that only a National Government could face the storm about to break upon us, and that if he were an obstacle to the formation of such a Government, he would instantly retire. Thereafter, he acted with that singleness of purpose and simplicity of conduct which at all times, and especially in great times, ought to be the ideal of us all.
When he returned to duty a few weeks after a most severe operation, the bombardment of London and of the seat of Government had begun. I was a witness during that fortnight of his fortitude under the most grievous and painful bodily afflictions, and I can testify that, although physically only the wreck of a man, his nerve was unshaken and his remarkable mental faculties unimpaired.
After he left the Government he refused all honours. He would die like his father, plain Mr. Chamberlain. I sought permission of the King, however, to have him supplied with the Cabinet papers, and until a few days of his death he followed our affairs with keenness, interest and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. If he grieved at all, it was that he could not be a spectator of our victory; but I think he died with the comfort of knowing that his country had, at least, turned the corner.
At this time our thoughts must pass to the gracious and charming lady who shared his days of triumph and adversity with a courage and quality the equal of his own. He was, like his father and his brother Austen before him, a famous Member of the House of Commons, and we here assembled this morning, Members of all parties, without a single exception, feel that we do ourselves and our country honour in saluting the memory of one whom Disraeli
would have called an "English worthy."
[Edited by Colin Williams (25 Oct 2004).]
Upon the death of
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
House of Commons.
12th November 1940.
Since we last met, the House has suffered a very grievous loss in the death of one of its most distinguished Members, and of a statesman and public servant who, during the best part of three memorable years, was first Minister of the Crown.
The fierce and bitter controversies which hung around him in recent times were hushed by the news of his illness and are silenced by his death. In paying a tribute of respect and of regard to an eminent man who has been taken from us, no one is obliged to alter the opinions which he has formed or expressed upon issues which have become a part of history; but at the Lychgate we may all pass our own conduct and our own judgments under a searching review. It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise life would be intolerable, to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of events. In one phase men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values. History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days. What is the worth of all this? The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however the fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour.
It fell to Neville Chamberlain in one of the supreme crises of the world to be contradicted by events, to be disappointed in his hopes, and to be deceived and cheated by a wicked man. But what were these hopes in which he was disappointed? What were these wishes in which he was frustrated? What was that faith that was abused? They were surely among the most noble and benevolent instincts of the human heart-the love of peace, the toil for peace, the strife for peace, the pursuit of peace, even at great peril, and certainly to the utter disdain of popularity or clamour. Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged. This alone will stand him in good stead as far as what is called the verdict of history is concerned.
But it is also a help to our country and to our whole Empire, and to our decent faithful way of living that, however long the struggle may last, or however dark may be the clouds which overhang our path, no future generation of English-speaking folks-for that is the tribunal to which we appeal-will doubt that, even at a great cost to ourselves in technical preparation, we were guiltless of the bloodshed, terror and misery which have engulfed so many lands and peoples, and yet seek new victims still. Herr Hitler protests
with frantic words and gestures that he has only desired peace. What do these ravings and outpourings count before the silence of Neville Chamberlain's tomb? Long, hard, and hazardous years lie before us, but at least we entered upon them united and with clean hearts.
I do not propose to give an appreciation of Neville Chamberlain's life and character, but there were certain qualities always admired in these Islands which he possessed in an altogether exceptional degree. He had a physical and moral toughness of fibre which enabled him all through his varied career to endure misfortune and disappointment without being unduly discouraged or wearied. He had a precision of mind and an aptitude for business which raised him far above the ordinary levels of our generation. He had a firmness of spirit which was not often elated by success, seldom downcast by failure, and never swayed by panic. When, contrary to all his hopes, beliefs and exertions, the war came upon him, and when, as he himself said, all that he had worked for was shattered, there was no man more resolved to pursue the unsought quarrel to the death. The same qualities which made him one of the last to enter the war, made him one of the last who would quit it before the full victory of a righteous cause was won.
I had the singular experience of passing in a day from being one of his most prominent opponents and critics to being one of his principal lieutenants, and on another day of passing from serving under him to become the head of a Government of which, with perfect loyalty, he was content to be a member. Such relationships are unusual in our public life. I have before told the House how on the morrow of the Debate which in the early days of May challenged his position, he declared to me and a few other friends that only a National Government could face the storm about to break upon us, and that if he were an obstacle to the formation of such a Government, he would instantly retire. Thereafter, he acted with that singleness of purpose and simplicity of conduct which at all times, and especially in great times, ought to be the ideal of us all.
When he returned to duty a few weeks after a most severe operation, the bombardment of London and of the seat of Government had begun. I was a witness during that fortnight of his fortitude under the most grievous and painful bodily afflictions, and I can testify that, although physically only the wreck of a man, his nerve was unshaken and his remarkable mental faculties unimpaired.
After he left the Government he refused all honours. He would die like his father, plain Mr. Chamberlain. I sought permission of the King, however, to have him supplied with the Cabinet papers, and until a few days of his death he followed our affairs with keenness, interest and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. If he grieved at all, it was that he could not be a spectator of our victory; but I think he died with the comfort of knowing that his country had, at least, turned the corner.
At this time our thoughts must pass to the gracious and charming lady who shared his days of triumph and adversity with a courage and quality the equal of his own. He was, like his father and his brother Austen before him, a famous Member of the House of Commons, and we here assembled this morning, Members of all parties, without a single exception, feel that we do ourselves and our country honour in saluting the memory of one whom Disraeli
would have called an "English worthy."
[Edited by Colin Williams (25 Oct 2004).]
Well as I think he served as an infantry officer on the Western Front, I don't think Chamberlain can have been all that spineless. I beleive he exchanged trench maps with Hitler at one point. I suspect he is the opposite of Churchill in the sense he was perhaps the right man at the wrong time. After all, if he had been dealing with a more rational individual than the amoral proto-terrorist Hitler, we might be hailing him as a hero for saving the world from a world war with his peace in our time thing.
all the best
BillB
all the best
BillB
That Churchill would speak so well of Chamberlain shows the greatness of Churchill. Chamberlain had the chance to stand up to Hitler and did not. Churchill spoke against the dangers of Nazi Germany from the political "wilderness" all through the '30's. If he could see the danger then why couldn't the government? A recent article in MHQ points out that there was little that Chamberlain's government could do but I don't see it that way. The danger was coming and it was not disguised or hidden. The government of the UK had an obligation to protect its' people as best as it could. Chamberlain's government did not do this. The UK army may have been a wreck in '38 but the armies of Germany were not paramount as they would be in 1940. In any event a more agressive arms program may have kept England on the continent. Just a few hundred more fighters and tanks may have been enough.
I think Chamberlain had seen the run up to WW1 and did not want to be a part of the "guns of august" type disaster. The big difference being that Hitler wasn't going to stop until force or arms did it. Neville Chamberlain did back down (France gets no pass either) until it was too late. Once Germany had invaded Poland they had their final operational test and knew they could take the Western Allies with any luck at all and they did. Right up to the Channell and Churchill, and then they were turned away.
I think Chamberlain had seen the run up to WW1 and did not want to be a part of the "guns of august" type disaster. The big difference being that Hitler wasn't going to stop until force or arms did it. Neville Chamberlain did back down (France gets no pass either) until it was too late. Once Germany had invaded Poland they had their final operational test and knew they could take the Western Allies with any luck at all and they did. Right up to the Channell and Churchill, and then they were turned away.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:
[i]In the FFZ where angels fear to tread a poster related an interesting theory which I am surely misunderstanding. That being that Chamberlain was the better man than Churchill. After picking up my jaw off of the floor and rechecking the post I am still sure that I am just confused. To be on the safe side, here is the quote:
"The adoration for Churchill continues to amaze, for he is certainly the posterboy for the right in the US. Curiously, he gave fits to serious military professionals in WWII [as well as WWI] and as a backbencher in the early 1930s opined on many occasions that no increase in armaments could be likely justified. In 1938, Chamberlain was working with the knowledge that his own armed forces chiefs had concluded that his country was not prepared for war and that nothing could be done to aid the Czechs. You are all such admirers of the French? Consider who would have done the fighting in 1938...not the British Army."
------------------
Nobody said Chamberlain was "the better man" so you are confused.
The context [missing in your post/quote] is that you were saying to one of your colleagues on FFZ that he would surely have voted for Chamberlain vs. Churchill in 1938, favoring diplomacy over action. My reply is to say once again, "IN 1938" there is not an 'action' choice for Britain: the service chiefs are saying to the govt that the forces are not prepared and nothing can be done to save the Czechs. Churchill has his share in the lack of preparedness to that point. He had almost been driven out of politics in 1936 over the affair of Edward VIII, by the way. It is also a matter of record that he gave the military fits.
In 1940, after rearmament is far enough along that the Brits are building more aircraft than the Germans, the fleet is more prepared [HMS King George V commissions in December], radar and Fighter Command is in being and an expeditionary army can be sent to France [Matilda II is in production], then you want to begin crediting the leadership of Churchill? OK, he's one of the great men of the 20th Century, along with Hitler, Ghandi, Roosevelt, etc. But the Brit historians have been having their due with him for a long time, and for many the record of Churchill is less esteemed than we appreciate in the US. Voted out in '45 right? Cheers, Ken
[Edited by Ken Estes (26 Oct 2004).]
[i]In the FFZ where angels fear to tread a poster related an interesting theory which I am surely misunderstanding. That being that Chamberlain was the better man than Churchill. After picking up my jaw off of the floor and rechecking the post I am still sure that I am just confused. To be on the safe side, here is the quote:
"The adoration for Churchill continues to amaze, for he is certainly the posterboy for the right in the US. Curiously, he gave fits to serious military professionals in WWII [as well as WWI] and as a backbencher in the early 1930s opined on many occasions that no increase in armaments could be likely justified. In 1938, Chamberlain was working with the knowledge that his own armed forces chiefs had concluded that his country was not prepared for war and that nothing could be done to aid the Czechs. You are all such admirers of the French? Consider who would have done the fighting in 1938...not the British Army."
------------------
Nobody said Chamberlain was "the better man" so you are confused.
The context [missing in your post/quote] is that you were saying to one of your colleagues on FFZ that he would surely have voted for Chamberlain vs. Churchill in 1938, favoring diplomacy over action. My reply is to say once again, "IN 1938" there is not an 'action' choice for Britain: the service chiefs are saying to the govt that the forces are not prepared and nothing can be done to save the Czechs. Churchill has his share in the lack of preparedness to that point. He had almost been driven out of politics in 1936 over the affair of Edward VIII, by the way. It is also a matter of record that he gave the military fits.
In 1940, after rearmament is far enough along that the Brits are building more aircraft than the Germans, the fleet is more prepared [HMS King George V commissions in December], radar and Fighter Command is in being and an expeditionary army can be sent to France [Matilda II is in production], then you want to begin crediting the leadership of Churchill? OK, he's one of the great men of the 20th Century, along with Hitler, Ghandi, Roosevelt, etc. But the Brit historians have been having their due with him for a long time, and for many the record of Churchill is less esteemed than we appreciate in the US. Voted out in '45 right? Cheers, Ken
[Edited by Ken Estes (26 Oct 2004).]
I can to a very large degree follow the poster you quote. Chamberlain’s greatest fault was saying those silly words: “...peace in our time!”, especially as he probably knew well it would not hold for very long. As other posters has already said, his advisers had clearly stated that GB wasn’t ready for war, and the massive British rearmament carried through in the second half of the 30’s was actually carried through with Chamberlain as PM (from May 37) or Chancellor of the Excheuqer (31-37). The weapons Churchill stood up with were bought and paid for by Chamberlain. It is an open question if the allies in 1938 (when France didn’t even have the MS406 in service) could have militarily defeated Germany, but anyway allied intelligence had greatly exagerated German strength, especially in the air. You may of couse say that as PM Chamberlain was also responsible for intelligence, but that doesn’t bring us far in judging his abilities, that someone fairly well below him screwed up.
You often get the image that the allies before May 40 had no plans beyond phoney war, but it simply isn’t true. War was (had to be) declared in 39 because Hitler simply went too far, but the allies knew (or thought) they were still far from having the strength to defeat Germany in an offensive, and had no reason to believe they could be defeated themselves until then (offensive was planned for 41). It must also be remebered that it was Chamberlain that ordered the allied invasion of Norway – not exactly a spineless sissy ordering the breaking of a freindly country’s neutrality in order to relently pursue your countrys interests. That the operation in planning and execution was so thoroughly f..... up again doesn’t tell us much about Chamberlain, but perhaps about his staff.
Churchill no doubt made an important contribution to world history in keeping GB and the British up and together in 1940, his main asset being his talents as a communicator (he indeed made some good speeches). But I’ll also claim that he seriously prerequisited good and strongwilled advisers, and in the period until he got such (mainly Alanbrooke from December 41) he lost GB its Empire! He had no clue of strategy, logistics or operations and in 1941 poured resources in size comparable to the combined war production of Germany, Italy and Japan into uncoordinated and dazed operations in mainly the Mediterraean area, while insisting on neglecting the far eastern parts of the Empire. Sucessfully defending Malaya and Singapore in 41-42 would not have taken resources making at least as positive end results impossible in the Med., but perhaps a futile offensive less. In return the Japanese war scheme could effectively have been turned over in 1942, and the British Empire have had a much better chance of surviving after the war.
You can say that Churchill, paid with the Empire to fight Hitler, and whether that was intentional or not, it of course has a kind of heroic aura. But I’ll still claim that it wasn’t necessary and that in the context of British policy for centuries having one overiding theme – keeping together the Empire – Churchill was the ultimate failure!
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
BTW this is no post in any left-right debate over posterboys. Having views spanning from left of Karl to well right of Djengiz Khan, I do not fit into left-right scales
You often get the image that the allies before May 40 had no plans beyond phoney war, but it simply isn’t true. War was (had to be) declared in 39 because Hitler simply went too far, but the allies knew (or thought) they were still far from having the strength to defeat Germany in an offensive, and had no reason to believe they could be defeated themselves until then (offensive was planned for 41). It must also be remebered that it was Chamberlain that ordered the allied invasion of Norway – not exactly a spineless sissy ordering the breaking of a freindly country’s neutrality in order to relently pursue your countrys interests. That the operation in planning and execution was so thoroughly f..... up again doesn’t tell us much about Chamberlain, but perhaps about his staff.
Churchill no doubt made an important contribution to world history in keeping GB and the British up and together in 1940, his main asset being his talents as a communicator (he indeed made some good speeches). But I’ll also claim that he seriously prerequisited good and strongwilled advisers, and in the period until he got such (mainly Alanbrooke from December 41) he lost GB its Empire! He had no clue of strategy, logistics or operations and in 1941 poured resources in size comparable to the combined war production of Germany, Italy and Japan into uncoordinated and dazed operations in mainly the Mediterraean area, while insisting on neglecting the far eastern parts of the Empire. Sucessfully defending Malaya and Singapore in 41-42 would not have taken resources making at least as positive end results impossible in the Med., but perhaps a futile offensive less. In return the Japanese war scheme could effectively have been turned over in 1942, and the British Empire have had a much better chance of surviving after the war.
You can say that Churchill, paid with the Empire to fight Hitler, and whether that was intentional or not, it of course has a kind of heroic aura. But I’ll still claim that it wasn’t necessary and that in the context of British policy for centuries having one overiding theme – keeping together the Empire – Churchill was the ultimate failure!
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
BTW this is no post in any left-right debate over posterboys. Having views spanning from left of Karl to well right of Djengiz Khan, I do not fit into left-right scales
QUOTE
Originally posted by Redbeard:
But I’ll also claim that he seriously prerequisited good and strongwilled advisers, and in the period until he got such (mainly Alanbrooke from December 41) he lost GB its Empire! He had no clue of strategy, logistics or operations and in 1941 poured resources in size comparable to the combined war production of Germany, Italy and Japan into uncoordinated and dazed operations in mainly the Mediterraean area, while insisting on neglecting the far eastern parts of the Empire. Sucessfully defending Malaya and Singapore in 41-42 would not have taken resources making at least as positive end results impossible in the Med., but perhaps a futile offensive less. In return the Japanese war scheme could effectively have been turned over in 1942, and the British Empire have had a much better chance of surviving after the war.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
But I’ll also claim that he seriously prerequisited good and strongwilled advisers, and in the period until he got such (mainly Alanbrooke from December 41) he lost GB its Empire! He had no clue of strategy, logistics or operations and in 1941 poured resources in size comparable to the combined war production of Germany, Italy and Japan into uncoordinated and dazed operations in mainly the Mediterraean area, while insisting on neglecting the far eastern parts of the Empire. Sucessfully defending Malaya and Singapore in 41-42 would not have taken resources making at least as positive end results impossible in the Med., but perhaps a futile offensive less. In return the Japanese war scheme could effectively have been turned over in 1942, and the British Empire have had a much better chance of surviving after the war.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
Thus spaketh the man who has been warped by perusal of that self-serving tome of trash, Alanbrooke's diary. What Brookie-poo's diary comments (no, I haven't read the whole thing) show me is that he was an arrogant self-serving SOB with absolutely no loyalty to his superiors, and not any understanding of what Churchill was driving at throughout the war. Marshall may have disagreed with FDR during the war, but he never would have led a "staff revolt" against his nation's leader as Brooke did (see Wilmot, Grave of a Thousand Schemes - ?, I know you have it).
Churchill has been described as "having his military concepts formed as a subaltern in colonial war and never advancing." Much has been made that he "just didn't understand" the need for the massive staffs and tremendous numbers of rear area personnel required to fight a modern war.
Well, I think Churchill was right, and so do most of the soldiers here agree, that there is too much staff and tail in the services, as compared to the fighting men - and in Britain's case in WW2 sitting around with opposible digits firmly ensconced in anal sphincter*. Churchill could point to the success of the Germans and Japanese, who managed without the excessive tail, and whose troops didn't lie down and quit when they got a little tired**. Churchill wanted British troops to match the Axis, and he tended to regard explanations as excuses. The "professional soldiers" like Brooke were responsible for the mess the Army was in (at least they were in charge when it got into a mess), Churchill could see the mess - he was supposed to let the "professionals" keep f**king it up?
Accustomed to excuses and delay at home, Churchill thought that able men such as Wavell were cast in the same mold as Brooke. Wavell took his problems and solved them, even if not as fast as Churchill wanted. Brooke took problems and sat on them like a broody hen.
A lot of Churchill's strategic errors have to be seen in the context he was dealing with. He went to Greece and it proved a failure, but the UK was seen to at least try to honor its commitments (something Chamberlain did NOT do, BTW). Abandoning Greece very possibly would have pushed Turkey into the Axis - that possibility was considered highly probable at the time. An Axis Turkey could have wrecked the British position in the ME and wrecked the southern flank of the USSR. With the Axis sitting on Caucasian and Gulf oil, how long do you think the Allies would have lasted?
* No, this is not Anglophobic. The Brits weren't the only ones with problems. Jesus Christ Himself Lee is the epitome of excessive do-nothing staff and rear area overhead. However, we are dealing with Churchill and his relations with the British military, so I concentrate on the British failures here. You want Yankee failures I can come up with those too, just not in this thread.
Nor am I saying that the Brits did not have able people. But they seemed to have a lot more duds than was good for them, people who went golfing instead of training their troops, people who couldn't bother to keep salt water off equipment going 1/2-way around the world, etc. The people with ability kept the Brits "muddling through," but they had to fight the duds to do it.
** I run into countless tales of fighting where CW troops were "too exhausted to carry on" and "were too weakened by casualties to fight further" when the Axis troops facing them had been in movement and/or combat longer and had suffered as many or more casualties.
'Nuff fer now.
The "ready for war" issue in '38 is it. Sometimes you fight ready or not. Germany was not "ready for war" in '38 either. The USA wasn't "ready for war" in '41 but the hammer dropped.
Take it to fantasy terms, how ready was Rohan when the army of Saruman atacked? The deal was going down in Czechoslovakia and the Czechs had some army of their own.
You are also right about the absurdity of "peace in our time". What was that, about 5 minutes? That is an almost American Politics level of grandstanding.
I think you sell the moral value of Churchill far short. Sometimes national moral is what sustains you through dark times and Churchill was the best at that. Out in '45, the war was over and people wanted it behind them. Churchill was worn out anyway and he was about the only person who did not know it.
PS: Hitler does not qualify as a "great" man. You can argue that he had the greatest effect of any one person in the 20th century but that doesn't make him great in the normal sense of the word.
Take it to fantasy terms, how ready was Rohan when the army of Saruman atacked? The deal was going down in Czechoslovakia and the Czechs had some army of their own.
You are also right about the absurdity of "peace in our time". What was that, about 5 minutes? That is an almost American Politics level of grandstanding.
I think you sell the moral value of Churchill far short. Sometimes national moral is what sustains you through dark times and Churchill was the best at that. Out in '45, the war was over and people wanted it behind them. Churchill was worn out anyway and he was about the only person who did not know it.
PS: Hitler does not qualify as a "great" man. You can argue that he had the greatest effect of any one person in the 20th century but that doesn't make him great in the normal sense of the word.
Not to hijack the thread, but there is interesting research showing that the Czech chances for survival were better than suspected, even by the pro-war side of 1938. Assuming that the Wehrmacht cannot fight for more than 30 days, the Czech forts, 650+ tank force, trained air force, adequate munitions and already mobilized army could have perhaps held them for that time, perhaps exhausting their resources. Extra defense problems, though, come from the more undefended frontier vs. Austria [now III Reich] and the Poles and Hungarians would likely have joined in on the kill.
For what it's worth, Hitler was really angry that he could not have his war in Sept38, when he saw the best chances.
Still no change for the French and Brits, though, and they had not yet taken Belgian neutrality under study. Too many ifs. For the Anglo-French, going to war in 1938 is voluntary, not like 1941 for the Yugos, Greeks, US, Rus. The govt has an entirely different responsibility, and the outcome was hardly clear then or now. History is really bunk if we fail to take into account what the people were thinking at the time, and just import our own presentday ideas to then.
[Edited by Ken Estes (26 Oct 2004).]
For what it's worth, Hitler was really angry that he could not have his war in Sept38, when he saw the best chances.
Still no change for the French and Brits, though, and they had not yet taken Belgian neutrality under study. Too many ifs. For the Anglo-French, going to war in 1938 is voluntary, not like 1941 for the Yugos, Greeks, US, Rus. The govt has an entirely different responsibility, and the outcome was hardly clear then or now. History is really bunk if we fail to take into account what the people were thinking at the time, and just import our own presentday ideas to then.
[Edited by Ken Estes (26 Oct 2004).]
QUOTE
Originally posted by Ken Estes:
Not to hijack the thread, but there is interesting research showing that the Czech chances for survival were better than suspected, even by the pro-war side of 1938. Assuming that the Wehrmacht cannot fight for more than 30 days, the Czech forts, 650+ tank force, trained air force, adequate munitions and already mobilized army could have perhaps held them for that time, perhaps exhausting their resources. Extra defense problems, though, come from the more undefended frontier vs. Austria [now III Reich] and the Poles and Hungarians would likely have joined in on the kill.
Not to hijack the thread, but there is interesting research showing that the Czech chances for survival were better than suspected, even by the pro-war side of 1938. Assuming that the Wehrmacht cannot fight for more than 30 days, the Czech forts, 650+ tank force, trained air force, adequate munitions and already mobilized army could have perhaps held them for that time, perhaps exhausting their resources. Extra defense problems, though, come from the more undefended frontier vs. Austria [now III Reich] and the Poles and Hungarians would likely have joined in on the kill.
Technically feasible, but I wonder what the outcome would have been considering that most of the defenses were in the Sudetenland, and a large portion of the army (I presume, dunno fershure) were ethnically German.
Germany was not ready for war by a long shot, but neither were Britain and France, and while Czechoslovakia was better off in equipment and munitions, I don't know how their doctrine, training, leadership, and morale would have stood up.
I haven't been able to find any info on the state of the Czech Army in the 'soft' categories, anybody have sources?
QUOTE
Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:
The "ready for war" issue in '38 is it. Sometimes you fight ready or not. Germany was not "ready for war" in '38 either. The USA wasn't "ready for war" in '41 but the hammer dropped.
The "ready for war" issue in '38 is it. Sometimes you fight ready or not. Germany was not "ready for war" in '38 either. The USA wasn't "ready for war" in '41 but the hammer dropped.
The difference of course being that Britain could try to put off war and try to get ready for it, I'm sure that had the germans bombed Londen in '38 Chamberlain would've declared war even if he was not ready for it.
QUOTE
Take it to fantasy terms, how ready was Rohan when the army of Saruman atacked? The deal was going down in Czechoslovakia and the Czechs had some army of their own.
As stupid as selling out the Sudetenland was, it seemed a perfectly workable solution of selling land (someone else's at that) for time. And when the germans took over the rest of czechoslovakia it was too late.
It also begs the question of the feasability of fighting germany instead of bargaining with Hitler, how would a coalition work out? The weak Czechs are in an unre-enforceable position, the french are essentialy immobile and the soviets can't touch germany without invading it's neighbours. So that leaves the BEF to invade germany on it's own, either from France or by north sea invasion, at about a month after the germans have rolled up the Czechs.
QUOTE
Originally posted by Sargent:
Technically feasible, but I wonder what the outcome would have been considering that most of the defenses were in the Sudetenland, and a large portion of the army (I presume, dunno fershure) were ethnically German.
Germany was not ready for war by a long shot, but neither were Britain and France, and while Czechoslovakia was better off in equipment and munitions, I don't know how their doctrine, training, leadership, and morale would have stood up.
I haven't been able to find any info on the state of the Czech Army in the 'soft' categories, anybody have sources?
Technically feasible, but I wonder what the outcome would have been considering that most of the defenses were in the Sudetenland, and a large portion of the army (I presume, dunno fershure) were ethnically German.
Germany was not ready for war by a long shot, but neither were Britain and France, and while Czechoslovakia was better off in equipment and munitions, I don't know how their doctrine, training, leadership, and morale would have stood up.
I haven't been able to find any info on the state of the Czech Army in the 'soft' categories, anybody have sources?
Germans were kept relatively segregated in the Czech Army, and their numbers were not at all large. The gambit hinges on the Czechs stalling the Wehrmacht in front of the fortified zones [many not in the Sudeten Mts], the panzers and Luftwaffe are at least denied superiority by the Czech machines, no terror bombing of Prague, etc. occurs, hence morale soars as the German Blitz peters out. According to Guderian [not always reliable] and others, the German officers did not like the looks of Czech defensive works after they inspected them in March 1939.
As fas as what people were thinking at the time goes, Churchill was warning of the dangers of Nazi govt in the early thirties and was roundly condemned for it. There was a group of military thinkers considering war against Germany from the early time on. In fact, it would have been criminal not to plan for war as that is what militaries are supposed to do. I wish I had that MHQ article handy as it made some very concise points. I'll look around for it.
You just can't excuse Neville Chamberlains' government and the way it handled the run up to the war and the beginning of the war itself. Think of it as a comparison to the current administration. Many people look at the President as a failure for his polices in the Middle East, not waiting for history to pass judgement. That's fine, if we apply the same criteria to Chamberlain and Churchill then Churchill's moving, motivational speeches when the Germans were at the doorstep far outshine Chamberlain's "peace in our time" statement.
You just can't excuse Neville Chamberlains' government and the way it handled the run up to the war and the beginning of the war itself. Think of it as a comparison to the current administration. Many people look at the President as a failure for his polices in the Middle East, not waiting for history to pass judgement. That's fine, if we apply the same criteria to Chamberlain and Churchill then Churchill's moving, motivational speeches when the Germans were at the doorstep far outshine Chamberlain's "peace in our time" statement.
QUOTE
Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:
As fas as what people were thinking at the time goes, Churchill was warning of the dangers of Nazi govt in the early thirties and was roundly condemned for it. There was a group of military thinkers considering war against Germany from the early time on. In fact, it would have been criminal not to plan for war as that is what militaries are supposed to do. I wish I had that MHQ article handy as it made some very concise points. I'll look around for it.
You just can't excuse Neville Chamberlains' government and the way it handled the run up to the war and the beginning of the war itself. Think of it as a comparison to the current administration. Many people look at the President as a failure for his polices in the Middle East, not waiting for history to pass judgement. That's fine, if we apply the same criteria to Chamberlain and Churchill then Churchill's moving, motivational speeches when the Germans were at the doorstep far outshine Chamberlain's "peace in our time" statement.
As fas as what people were thinking at the time goes, Churchill was warning of the dangers of Nazi govt in the early thirties and was roundly condemned for it. There was a group of military thinkers considering war against Germany from the early time on. In fact, it would have been criminal not to plan for war as that is what militaries are supposed to do. I wish I had that MHQ article handy as it made some very concise points. I'll look around for it.
You just can't excuse Neville Chamberlains' government and the way it handled the run up to the war and the beginning of the war itself. Think of it as a comparison to the current administration. Many people look at the President as a failure for his polices in the Middle East, not waiting for history to pass judgement. That's fine, if we apply the same criteria to Chamberlain and Churchill then Churchill's moving, motivational speeches when the Germans were at the doorstep far outshine Chamberlain's "peace in our time" statement.
------------------------------
Well, you are evidently swallowing a lot of Churchill's own version, as well as his advocates. As to the "early 30s," Hitler is not Chancellor until Jan 33 and Fuehrer in Aug 34. The German rearmament is not underway until mid-1934, and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty is 1935, so what is being warned about? Churchill still takes time in 1936 to initially support Franco against the Spanish Republic.
In any case, exactly what are your options at the height of the Depression in England? For the govt, the doctrine was, thanks to Chancellor of the Exchechor Chamberlain, the preservation of the British economy in the event of a long war. Hitler worked on a Blitzkrieg economy and lost that gamble. Thus the British were brought gradually to a war economy by 1939, after considerable planning done in the "early 1930s" and later by defense and comptroller staffs, in which Churchill had no part or knowledge. The industrial mobilization was planned, 'test' contracts let to firms lacking expertise in armaments, electronics, airframes, etc., and all was as ready as could be by late 1939.
Your last part is why I scorn Churchill as the apparent darling of the current US right wing. The legend of Churchill's bulldog tenacity of 1940-41 [and the Germans were at the wrong bank of the Channel, not the 'doorstep' then] is somehow warped back to the 'early 30s' to make him a prophet who could have saved the world, prevented Munich, etc. just as Dubya and the NeoCons are doing for us now. Really bad history from people who ignore it.
But keep up with your reading. You will arrive. Try Andrew Gordon "British Sea Power and Procurement Between the Wars."
[Edited by Ken Estes (26 Oct 2004).]
The west coast of France and Belgium IS the doorstep to England. The Royal Navy has the key to the door. The RAF kept the Luftwaffe off the RN. A while back we had a fantastic thread about how far the RN would have gone to stop an invasion fleet if air superiority was completely lost. I think it was anear universal opinion that the King George V would have been firing broadsides at transports in the Channel until sunk, along with every other ship in the fleet.
Getting back to Churchill (who would have probably died fighting as well) I do think the bulldog tenacity is the right trait in a war for survival. Churchill was not a prophet but he was on the right track. He didn't like anything going on in Germany from 1933 on. The Nazi movement was visible and Churchill was its opponent from the beginning. I seem to recall a big blowup over Churchill having some fighter production figures that he wasn't supposed to have showing Luftwaffe rearmament.
I don't fully understand the parallel you draw with neocon. What I am saying is President Bush has the same tenacity as Winston Churchill. That is good to me but bad to you. You might say President Bush has the same tenacity as Hitler, that would be bad to me, I don't know what that would be to you. The reason I say the tenacity is good then and now is because I think both WW2 and the current terror wars both represent a fight to the finish. I think you have to draw a timeline all the way to the unification of Germany to decide the success or failure of the WW2 effort. I judge the effort a success despite the bumps in the road. I think it will take a similar effort to contain the Islamic militant threat and it takes a lot of guts to start on a fifty-seventy five year commitment. Everyone today is focusing on he next month or two and that is wrong.
Getting back to Churchill (who would have probably died fighting as well) I do think the bulldog tenacity is the right trait in a war for survival. Churchill was not a prophet but he was on the right track. He didn't like anything going on in Germany from 1933 on. The Nazi movement was visible and Churchill was its opponent from the beginning. I seem to recall a big blowup over Churchill having some fighter production figures that he wasn't supposed to have showing Luftwaffe rearmament.
I don't fully understand the parallel you draw with neocon. What I am saying is President Bush has the same tenacity as Winston Churchill. That is good to me but bad to you. You might say President Bush has the same tenacity as Hitler, that would be bad to me, I don't know what that would be to you. The reason I say the tenacity is good then and now is because I think both WW2 and the current terror wars both represent a fight to the finish. I think you have to draw a timeline all the way to the unification of Germany to decide the success or failure of the WW2 effort. I judge the effort a success despite the bumps in the road. I think it will take a similar effort to contain the Islamic militant threat and it takes a lot of guts to start on a fifty-seventy five year commitment. Everyone today is focusing on he next month or two and that is wrong.
Interesting that one of our residents leftists is the first to compare President Bush to Mr Churchill (a great man).
Yes, they were/are both LEADERS. In contrast to the "loyal" opposition.
Rightwing/conservative is a badge of honor. Now why do the the leftists have a fit liberal/leftwing description is used?
Yes, they were/are both LEADERS. In contrast to the "loyal" opposition.
Rightwing/conservative is a badge of honor. Now why do the the leftists have a fit liberal/leftwing description is used?
QUOTE
Originally posted by SILL:
Interesting that one of our residents leftists is the first to compare President Bush to Mr Churchill (a great man).
Interesting that one of our residents leftists is the first to compare President Bush to Mr Churchill (a great man).
Are you insane or just a poor reader? It is the current Dubya crowd that invokes Churchill, as I confirm.
As to resident liberals, what's this:
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/3857...searchdiff=1141
Those who are determined to revise history to suit their own version of reality are on the path to relearning the lessons of history the hard way.
Winston Churchill's record during the 1930s -
1932 -
December 23 WSC spoke in House of his fears about what was happening in Germany
1933 -
January 30 Hitler became Chancellor of Germany
March 16 WSC attacked the "folly of disarmament" in the House of Commons
April 7 WSC warned the House of a militarized Germany
May 10 Nazi's burned the books in Berlin
October 6 WSC supported rearmament at the Conservative Party Conference in Birmingham.
October 23 Government decides to seek reduction of world armaments
November 7 WSC spoke in House on the need to unite small and threatened states in Europe
1934 -
March 14 WSC spoke in the House against arms limitation
March 21 WSC urged the creation of a Ministry of Defense
June 30 Night of the Long Knives in Germany
July WSC increased his public attacks on the weakness of Britain's air defenses
July 30 House debated Britain's air policy
August 2 Hitler became Chancellor and President of Germany
November 16 WSC made a BBC broadcast on the causes of war arguing that disarmament encourages a potential aggressor. Desmond Morton frequently visited Chartwell to provide WSC with secret intelligence reports
November 28 WSC speech to the House marked a climax in his campaign against Government defense policy
1935 -
February 14 WSC, Lindemann and Austen Chamberlain prevailed upon Ramsay MacDonald to consider setting up a committee to deal with air defense
March 4 Government published Defense White Paper
March 19 WSC spoke in the House on comparisons of British and German air strength
April 4 In the Daily Mail, WSC argued that the Government should regard rearmament as the first priority
April 7 Ralph Wigram visited Chartwell for the first time to tell WSC of Foreign Office concerns about German air strength
May 2 WSC criticized Government defense policy in the House.
May 22 In a major defense debate in the House, WSC said that the Government had no excuses for not acting
May 31 WSC told House that Britain should not trust Hitler's promises
June 7 Baldwin became Prime Minister. WSC spoke to House on slow pace of air defense research
July 6 WSC agreed to join Air Defense Research subcommittee of Committee of Imperial Defense but insisted on remaining free to debate all general issues of defense
July 11 WSC denounced Anglo-German Naval Agreement
July 23 WSC completed a detailed memorandum on air strategy for subcommittee
July 25 WSC attended first meeting on Air Defense Research subcommittee
August 24 Britain warned Mussolini not to attack Abyssinia
October 4 Italy attacked Abyssinia.
October 24 In House, WSC called Germany 'an armed camp'
November 17 Nancy Astor to Baldwin: "Don't put Winston in the Government - It will mean war at home and abroad". WSC was not included in Cabinet appointments
1936 -
February WSC's informants provided him with information of defense issues
March 10 WSC spoke of the need for industry to prepare for war production
March 14 Sir Thomas Inskip was appointed Minister for Coordination of Defense, a move which Lindemann called 'the most cynical thing since Caligula appointed his horse as consul'
March 26 WSC spoke in the House on the strength of German propaganda
March 31 WSC addressed backbench MP's on the need to support France
May 4 In the House WSC urged that the Admiralty have full control of the Fleet Air Arm
May 13 In a letter to The Times, WSC challenged those who wanted Russia excluded from anti-German alliances
May 21 WSC told the House that it was essential to set up a Ministry of Supply
July 7 At Birmingham, WSC said that England had only reached the planning stage which Germany had reached three years ago
July 20 WSC attacked the Minister of Coordination of Defense in the House
July 23 At Horsham, WSC warned the Labour Party of the folly of its refusal to support rearmament
October 19 WSC spoke at Chingford warning it was the last chance for collective security
October 27 WSC met Brig. Hobart, an expert on tanks, at Morpeth Mansions
November 8 WSC spoke in the House on the need for a precise plan in foreign policy
November 11 WSC participated in a debate on defense in the House
November 13 The usually hostile, The Times, called WSC's House performance 'brilliant'
November 25 Freddie Guest told WSC that Clement Attlee would support him on any rearmament program
1937 -
October 14 England's 'No' Man (Neville Chamberlain) was published in Collier's
1938 -
Early in January he left for a month's vacation in the south of France. While there working on Volume IV of Marlborough (Woods A40), he heard that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was requesting a total reduction of £12 million in Service estimates.
On 12 March Austria was incorporated into the German Reich, an event Churchill called a dastardly outrage. "Finally," he noted, "the scales of illusion have fallen from many eyes, especially in high quarters." He called on Britain and France to rally the second rank powers of Europe to collective defence. He predicted that the next state to be threatened by Germany would be Czechoslovakia.
Distressed by proGerman and anti-French propaganda in Britain, he flew to France to advocate an Anglo-French alliance. When he was received with full honours by the French, the Cabinet let it be known that he spoke only for himself and not the Government. He believed that "if France broke then everything would break, and the Nazi domination of Europe, and potentially of a large part of the world, would seem to be inevitable."
On 7 August the British Attaché in Berlin informed the Foreign Office that Hitler had decided to attack Czechoslovakia whatever concessions were made to the Sudetens. A critical Cabinet meeting on 30 August decided that no threats should be made and no attempts at international cooperation against Germany should be begun. The main objective was to deny Hitler any excuse for an attack on Czechoslovakia by persuading the President of Czechoslovakia to make enough concessions.
Chamberlain returned to inform his Cabinet colleagues that Hitler's objective was only the Sudetenland. When French Prime Minister Daladier arrived to explore the possibility of a united front against Germany, he was told by his British colleague that Britain had no army to march to Czechoslovakia and it was a long way to send an air force.
On 20 September Churchill flew to Paris with General Spears to converse with Paul Reynaud and Georges Mandel, members of the French Cabinet who wanted to resist Hitler. On his return to England, Churchill issued a press statement which charged that a surrender to the Nazi threat of force would bring, not peace or safety, but ever-increasing weakness and danger.
In the debate on the terms of the Munich Agreement Churchill noted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would have to make the best terms they could with Nazi Germany.He also attacked Chamberlain's cherished dream of influencing Hitler because "there can never be a friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi Power."
1939 -
Churchill was frustrated by the Government's reluctance to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union. He was also disturbed by the apparent desire of Chamberlain and Halifax to come to some accommodation with Hitler.
Clement Attlee spoke for many when he said: "It must be a melancholy satisfaction to see how right you were. "
Chamberlain, believed that Churchill's inclusion in the Cabinet would frustrate his efforts to appease Hitler. Chamberlain was still determined to reach some agreement with the German leader. He wrote his sister: "It is very difficult to see the way out of Danzig but I don't believe it is impossible to find, provided we are given a little time and also provided that Hitler doesn't really want war."
General Ironside recorded Chamberlain's views in his diary. "Neville Chamberlain is not a war Prime Minister. He is a pacifist at heart. He has a firm belief that God has chosen him as an instrument to prevent this threatened war. He can never get this out of his mind. He is not against Winston, but he believes that chances may still arrive for averting war, and he thinks that Winston might be so strong in a Cabinet that he would be prevented from acting."
After a bitter political battle in early August, Chamberlain invoked party discipline and forced a parliamentary adjournment for two months.
At 8:30 AM on 1 September he was awakened by telephone to be told that German armies had entered Poland. Later in the day he drove to London to meet the Prime Minister, who advised him that he would now like Churchill to enter the Government.
But the call did not come immediately. Despite his comments that "the die is cast, " Chamberlain still hoped for a peaceful settlement. Churchill thought the general mood was otherwise: "There was no doubt that the temper of the House was for war. I deemed it even more resolute and united then in a similar scene on August 3, 1914, in which I had also taken part."
Many politicians from all parties gathered at Churchill's home at Morpeth Mansions to express dismay at Chambelain's hesitation. Finally, at 11:15 AM on 3 September, Chamberlain broadcast that Britain was at war with Germany.
Winston Churchill's record during the 1930s -
1932 -
December 23 WSC spoke in House of his fears about what was happening in Germany
1933 -
January 30 Hitler became Chancellor of Germany
March 16 WSC attacked the "folly of disarmament" in the House of Commons
April 7 WSC warned the House of a militarized Germany
May 10 Nazi's burned the books in Berlin
October 6 WSC supported rearmament at the Conservative Party Conference in Birmingham.
October 23 Government decides to seek reduction of world armaments
November 7 WSC spoke in House on the need to unite small and threatened states in Europe
1934 -
March 14 WSC spoke in the House against arms limitation
March 21 WSC urged the creation of a Ministry of Defense
June 30 Night of the Long Knives in Germany
July WSC increased his public attacks on the weakness of Britain's air defenses
July 30 House debated Britain's air policy
August 2 Hitler became Chancellor and President of Germany
November 16 WSC made a BBC broadcast on the causes of war arguing that disarmament encourages a potential aggressor. Desmond Morton frequently visited Chartwell to provide WSC with secret intelligence reports
November 28 WSC speech to the House marked a climax in his campaign against Government defense policy
1935 -
February 14 WSC, Lindemann and Austen Chamberlain prevailed upon Ramsay MacDonald to consider setting up a committee to deal with air defense
March 4 Government published Defense White Paper
March 19 WSC spoke in the House on comparisons of British and German air strength
April 4 In the Daily Mail, WSC argued that the Government should regard rearmament as the first priority
April 7 Ralph Wigram visited Chartwell for the first time to tell WSC of Foreign Office concerns about German air strength
May 2 WSC criticized Government defense policy in the House.
May 22 In a major defense debate in the House, WSC said that the Government had no excuses for not acting
May 31 WSC told House that Britain should not trust Hitler's promises
June 7 Baldwin became Prime Minister. WSC spoke to House on slow pace of air defense research
July 6 WSC agreed to join Air Defense Research subcommittee of Committee of Imperial Defense but insisted on remaining free to debate all general issues of defense
July 11 WSC denounced Anglo-German Naval Agreement
July 23 WSC completed a detailed memorandum on air strategy for subcommittee
July 25 WSC attended first meeting on Air Defense Research subcommittee
August 24 Britain warned Mussolini not to attack Abyssinia
October 4 Italy attacked Abyssinia.
October 24 In House, WSC called Germany 'an armed camp'
November 17 Nancy Astor to Baldwin: "Don't put Winston in the Government - It will mean war at home and abroad". WSC was not included in Cabinet appointments
1936 -
February WSC's informants provided him with information of defense issues
March 10 WSC spoke of the need for industry to prepare for war production
March 14 Sir Thomas Inskip was appointed Minister for Coordination of Defense, a move which Lindemann called 'the most cynical thing since Caligula appointed his horse as consul'
March 26 WSC spoke in the House on the strength of German propaganda
March 31 WSC addressed backbench MP's on the need to support France
May 4 In the House WSC urged that the Admiralty have full control of the Fleet Air Arm
May 13 In a letter to The Times, WSC challenged those who wanted Russia excluded from anti-German alliances
May 21 WSC told the House that it was essential to set up a Ministry of Supply
July 7 At Birmingham, WSC said that England had only reached the planning stage which Germany had reached three years ago
July 20 WSC attacked the Minister of Coordination of Defense in the House
July 23 At Horsham, WSC warned the Labour Party of the folly of its refusal to support rearmament
October 19 WSC spoke at Chingford warning it was the last chance for collective security
October 27 WSC met Brig. Hobart, an expert on tanks, at Morpeth Mansions
November 8 WSC spoke in the House on the need for a precise plan in foreign policy
November 11 WSC participated in a debate on defense in the House
November 13 The usually hostile, The Times, called WSC's House performance 'brilliant'
November 25 Freddie Guest told WSC that Clement Attlee would support him on any rearmament program
1937 -
October 14 England's 'No' Man (Neville Chamberlain) was published in Collier's
1938 -
Early in January he left for a month's vacation in the south of France. While there working on Volume IV of Marlborough (Woods A40), he heard that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was requesting a total reduction of £12 million in Service estimates.
On 12 March Austria was incorporated into the German Reich, an event Churchill called a dastardly outrage. "Finally," he noted, "the scales of illusion have fallen from many eyes, especially in high quarters." He called on Britain and France to rally the second rank powers of Europe to collective defence. He predicted that the next state to be threatened by Germany would be Czechoslovakia.
Distressed by proGerman and anti-French propaganda in Britain, he flew to France to advocate an Anglo-French alliance. When he was received with full honours by the French, the Cabinet let it be known that he spoke only for himself and not the Government. He believed that "if France broke then everything would break, and the Nazi domination of Europe, and potentially of a large part of the world, would seem to be inevitable."
On 7 August the British Attaché in Berlin informed the Foreign Office that Hitler had decided to attack Czechoslovakia whatever concessions were made to the Sudetens. A critical Cabinet meeting on 30 August decided that no threats should be made and no attempts at international cooperation against Germany should be begun. The main objective was to deny Hitler any excuse for an attack on Czechoslovakia by persuading the President of Czechoslovakia to make enough concessions.
Chamberlain returned to inform his Cabinet colleagues that Hitler's objective was only the Sudetenland. When French Prime Minister Daladier arrived to explore the possibility of a united front against Germany, he was told by his British colleague that Britain had no army to march to Czechoslovakia and it was a long way to send an air force.
On 20 September Churchill flew to Paris with General Spears to converse with Paul Reynaud and Georges Mandel, members of the French Cabinet who wanted to resist Hitler. On his return to England, Churchill issued a press statement which charged that a surrender to the Nazi threat of force would bring, not peace or safety, but ever-increasing weakness and danger.
In the debate on the terms of the Munich Agreement Churchill noted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would have to make the best terms they could with Nazi Germany.He also attacked Chamberlain's cherished dream of influencing Hitler because "there can never be a friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi Power."
1939 -
Churchill was frustrated by the Government's reluctance to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union. He was also disturbed by the apparent desire of Chamberlain and Halifax to come to some accommodation with Hitler.
Clement Attlee spoke for many when he said: "It must be a melancholy satisfaction to see how right you were. "
Chamberlain, believed that Churchill's inclusion in the Cabinet would frustrate his efforts to appease Hitler. Chamberlain was still determined to reach some agreement with the German leader. He wrote his sister: "It is very difficult to see the way out of Danzig but I don't believe it is impossible to find, provided we are given a little time and also provided that Hitler doesn't really want war."
General Ironside recorded Chamberlain's views in his diary. "Neville Chamberlain is not a war Prime Minister. He is a pacifist at heart. He has a firm belief that God has chosen him as an instrument to prevent this threatened war. He can never get this out of his mind. He is not against Winston, but he believes that chances may still arrive for averting war, and he thinks that Winston might be so strong in a Cabinet that he would be prevented from acting."
After a bitter political battle in early August, Chamberlain invoked party discipline and forced a parliamentary adjournment for two months.
At 8:30 AM on 1 September he was awakened by telephone to be told that German armies had entered Poland. Later in the day he drove to London to meet the Prime Minister, who advised him that he would now like Churchill to enter the Government.
But the call did not come immediately. Despite his comments that "the die is cast, " Chamberlain still hoped for a peaceful settlement. Churchill thought the general mood was otherwise: "There was no doubt that the temper of the House was for war. I deemed it even more resolute and united then in a similar scene on August 3, 1914, in which I had also taken part."
Many politicians from all parties gathered at Churchill's home at Morpeth Mansions to express dismay at Chambelain's hesitation. Finally, at 11:15 AM on 3 September, Chamberlain broadcast that Britain was at war with Germany.
I just thought that Churchill's problem with his military "professionals" was that he want them to tell him HOW they could match Axis performance, not give him excuses as to why they couldn't do it.
The "pros" never understood that.
Churchill came up with some zany off-the-wall plans, but he was coming up with something when all the "pros" came up with were whines and excuses.
If Churchill had waited on Brooke & Co., the war would now be in its 65th year...
The "pros" never understood that.
Churchill came up with some zany off-the-wall plans, but he was coming up with something when all the "pros" came up with were whines and excuses.
If Churchill had waited on Brooke & Co., the war would now be in its 65th year...
Here is the Master at work with the pros:
Meeting on standardization of arms, 1951 --
PM (Churchill): "When I was at Omdurman, I rode with a sabre in one hand and a pistol in the other."
CIGS (FM Slim): "Not much standardization there, Prime Minister"
R.Lewin, Slim (1999), p.272.
-----------------
As to the early 30s, the British policy since 1920 was that no war was in the offing for 10 years, thus no new projects would be funded. This was extended in 1930 [economic crisis, you know], the London Conferences extended the naval holiday to 1935 and hopes continued for further restraints, at the Geneva continuations. As a backbencher, Churchill could make all kinds of speeches, which he did, variously warning of Germans, Italians, colonies, [not Japan], and also the contrary, confirming in committee various times that no new defense expenditures would be needed in the forseeable future. [Andrew Gordon is particularly critical of this 'variable' record of Churchill]
Indeed, what would have been the air defenses of 1932? None existed in terms of technology, but neither had the low-wing, all-metal bomber emerged as the new danger.
Not all visionaries are right, and not all conservatives [not Tories here] are wrong.
[Edited by Ken Estes (27 Oct 2004).]
Meeting on standardization of arms, 1951 --
PM (Churchill): "When I was at Omdurman, I rode with a sabre in one hand and a pistol in the other."
CIGS (FM Slim): "Not much standardization there, Prime Minister"
R.Lewin, Slim (1999), p.272.
-----------------
As to the early 30s, the British policy since 1920 was that no war was in the offing for 10 years, thus no new projects would be funded. This was extended in 1930 [economic crisis, you know], the London Conferences extended the naval holiday to 1935 and hopes continued for further restraints, at the Geneva continuations. As a backbencher, Churchill could make all kinds of speeches, which he did, variously warning of Germans, Italians, colonies, [not Japan], and also the contrary, confirming in committee various times that no new defense expenditures would be needed in the forseeable future. [Andrew Gordon is particularly critical of this 'variable' record of Churchill]
Indeed, what would have been the air defenses of 1932? None existed in terms of technology, but neither had the low-wing, all-metal bomber emerged as the new danger.
Not all visionaries are right, and not all conservatives [not Tories here] are wrong.
[Edited by Ken Estes (27 Oct 2004).]
Re Ken:
I am well aware of the budget constraints and the Ten-Year Rule.
However that should not have prevented the "pros" from thinking and training their men. Hobart showed what training could be accomplished with zippo budget by turning out the very professional 7th Armoured Division. A British general named Burnett-Stuart (retired in 1938) managed a lot of good training and inspired a lot of thought in junior officers. The General Staff loathed him, and the feeling was reciprocated.
The Bomber Barons of the RAF put all their eggs in Douhet's basket. Coastal Command was almost totally neglected, and Fighter Command and the Radar Direction network was almost the single-handed creation of Hugh Dowding - who was loathed by the Air Staff and retired after won the BoB.
Seemingly the only Brits who did good work were 'mavericks,' which leads to the conclusion that the mainstream system was flawed.
I am well aware of the budget constraints and the Ten-Year Rule.
However that should not have prevented the "pros" from thinking and training their men. Hobart showed what training could be accomplished with zippo budget by turning out the very professional 7th Armoured Division. A British general named Burnett-Stuart (retired in 1938) managed a lot of good training and inspired a lot of thought in junior officers. The General Staff loathed him, and the feeling was reciprocated.
The Bomber Barons of the RAF put all their eggs in Douhet's basket. Coastal Command was almost totally neglected, and Fighter Command and the Radar Direction network was almost the single-handed creation of Hugh Dowding - who was loathed by the Air Staff and retired after won the BoB.
Seemingly the only Brits who did good work were 'mavericks,' which leads to the conclusion that the mainstream system was flawed.
QUOTE
Originally posted by Sargent:
Re Ken:
I am well aware of the budget constraints and the Ten-Year Rule.
However that should not have prevented the "pros" from [i]thinking and training their men. Hobart showed what training could be accomplished with zippo budget by turning out the very professional 7th Armoured Division. A British general named Burnett-Stuart (retired in 1938) managed a lot of good training and inspired a lot of thought in junior officers. The General Staff loathed him, and the feeling was reciprocated.
The Bomber Barons of the RAF put all their eggs in Douhet's basket. Coastal Command was almost totally neglected, and Fighter Command and the Radar Direction network was almost the single-handed creation of Hugh Dowding - who was loathed by the Air Staff and retired after won the BoB.
Seemingly the only Brits who did good work were 'mavericks,' which leads to the conclusion that the mainstream system was flawed. [/i]
Re Ken:
I am well aware of the budget constraints and the Ten-Year Rule.
However that should not have prevented the "pros" from [i]thinking and training their men. Hobart showed what training could be accomplished with zippo budget by turning out the very professional 7th Armoured Division. A British general named Burnett-Stuart (retired in 1938) managed a lot of good training and inspired a lot of thought in junior officers. The General Staff loathed him, and the feeling was reciprocated.
The Bomber Barons of the RAF put all their eggs in Douhet's basket. Coastal Command was almost totally neglected, and Fighter Command and the Radar Direction network was almost the single-handed creation of Hugh Dowding - who was loathed by the Air Staff and retired after won the BoB.
Seemingly the only Brits who did good work were 'mavericks,' which leads to the conclusion that the mainstream system was flawed. [/i]
But several Mavericks have been outed for many years. Only looking at armor icons, Fuller's reputation is now far reduced, and his wackiness more highlighted; Hobart has been correctly praised and criticized as dogmatic and less original, respectively. He is responsible for training the Mobile Div/7th Armored to fire on the move, a most inadvised technique, especially if you have been inside those Limey tanks of the period, yoked like the US M2A4/M3 series. They had to learn the hard way, from the Afrika Korps about firing from the short halt. Just a sample of what we now know.
JP Harris, "Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military
Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939" is a good counter to the hagiography Macksey did on Hobart.
[Edited by Ken Estes (27 Oct 2004).]
QUOTE
Originally posted by Sargent:
Churchill could point to the success of the Germans and Japanese, who managed without the excessive tail, and whose troops didn't lie down and quit when they got a little tired**. Churchill wanted British troops to match the Axis, and he tended to regard explanations as excuses.
Churchill could point to the success of the Germans and Japanese, who managed without the excessive tail, and whose troops didn't lie down and quit when they got a little tired**. Churchill wanted British troops to match the Axis, and he tended to regard explanations as excuses.
I've really heard it now, are you seriously suggesting the British should have imitated the Axis approach to logistics?
QUOTE
Originally posted by Sargent:
Churchill came up with some zany off-the-wall plans, but he was coming up with something when all the "pros" came up with were whines and excuses.
If Churchill had waited on Brooke & Co., the war would now be in its 65th year...
Churchill came up with some zany off-the-wall plans, but he was coming up with something when all the "pros" came up with were whines and excuses.
If Churchill had waited on Brooke & Co., the war would now be in its 65th year...
If anything Brooke didn't do enough to rein Churchills fertile mind - the Dieppe disaster, the Aegean adventure and the Arakan abortion come to mind.
I presume your opinion of pusillanimity on the part of Brooke is related to the 43/44 invasion controversy, again.
Well, that's an argument I just can't top. Since Churchill traded banter with Slim regarding his Obdurman experiences then clearly he was a substandard wartime leader.
It seems to me that the timeline post here lists Winston Churchill's efforts to be fairly consistent. It says a lot about how Churchill thought of the Nazis. In particulaer Churchill's frustration regarding Chamberlain's desire to reach an "agreement" with Hitler.
In most militaries leadership is a key trait. For better or worse Chuchill had motivational leadership skills that Chamberlain did not and never would have.
I have tried to figure out Brooke and can only come to the conclusion that he wrote only to improve himself compared to others. His constant, scathing criticisms only go so far. After all, if he was a military genius why did it take so long to win the war. Brooke was NOT a team player. I think Montgomery carried Brooke a lot more than the other way around.
It seems to me that the timeline post here lists Winston Churchill's efforts to be fairly consistent. It says a lot about how Churchill thought of the Nazis. In particulaer Churchill's frustration regarding Chamberlain's desire to reach an "agreement" with Hitler.
In most militaries leadership is a key trait. For better or worse Chuchill had motivational leadership skills that Chamberlain did not and never would have.
I have tried to figure out Brooke and can only come to the conclusion that he wrote only to improve himself compared to others. His constant, scathing criticisms only go so far. After all, if he was a military genius why did it take so long to win the war. Brooke was NOT a team player. I think Montgomery carried Brooke a lot more than the other way around.
Well, don't get sore, just because nobody swallows your start line:
Since that went nowhere, why can't we at least have some fun?
QUOTE
Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:
In the FFZ where angels fear to tread a poster related an interesting theory which I am surely misunderstanding. That being that Chamberlain was the better man than Churchill.
<snip>
Chamberlain on the other hand was a spineless POS.
In the FFZ where angels fear to tread a poster related an interesting theory which I am surely misunderstanding. That being that Chamberlain was the better man than Churchill.
<snip>
Chamberlain on the other hand was a spineless POS.
Since that went nowhere, why can't we at least have some fun?
Chamberlain was the Jimmy Carter of Britain. As a man he was a noble and virtuous person, but as a politician and a national leader, he was a catastrophe.
Few would compare Reagan with Carter as a politician, but both were good men on an individual level.
Few would compare Reagan with Carter as a politician, but both were good men on an individual level.
In any case it wouldn't have mattered wether the allies had gone to war vs. Germany in 1938, overawed as they were by the Wehrmacht. Check 1939. Nothing done on Germany's passive front for 7 months.
Alright, you got me on that one fair and square. I have put way to much FFZ in my Gen Mil this time around.
QUOTE
Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:
It seems to me that the timeline post here lists Winston Churchill's efforts to be fairly consistent.
He was very consistent, he always proposed (or supported) a seaborne invasion as a quick fix for the overall strategic situation.It seems to me that the timeline post here lists Winston Churchill's efforts to be fairly consistent.
QUOTE
In most militaries leadership is a key trait. For better or worse Chuchill had motivational leadership skills that Chamberlain did not and never would have.
I don't think anyone would argue with that.
QUOTE
Originally posted by JohnB:
I've really heard it now, are you seriously suggesting the British should have imitated the Axis approach to logistics?
I've really heard it now, are you seriously suggesting the British should have imitated the Axis approach to logistics?
I would have to agree with JohnB that suggesting an imitation of the Axis approach to logistics is pretty amazing...
I have just finished reading "Flyboys" (by Bradley). I picked this book up at the airport on my way to Japan, as I am always interested in the stories of individuals in wartime, and it seemed on first look to have a good summary history of Japan's emergence as an industrial power.
And then I read the book... it was ... "illuminating" to me.
I am very familiar with the whole topic of attrocities in Europe and the Soviet Union. I've read dozens of books, seen movies and documentaries, visited various locations in Western Europe, spoken with Holocaust survivors, engaged in debates, etc. etc.
But I guess I have never really understood nor appreciated the level of attrocities in the Pacific war.
I'd be interested in any other opinions of the veracity of some of the claims made in this particular book. It follows the stories of 8 airmen shot down and captured at Chichi Jima (where George Bush the elder would have been the 9th, but for his good fortune to be rescued offshore by a US sub). All 8 were eventually killed, and at the post-war war crimes trials it was revealed that cannibalism was involved. The author wrote the book after being contacted by a witness of those trials, who in that role was sworn to secrecy, but who, after the records of the trials had been made public, thought that the story of those flyboys should be told.
The book tries very hard to give a "both-sides" view of how the environment developed in which such gruesome events could have transpired. In doing so, the book tosses about some "facts" that surprised me.
For example:
-Japanese swords killed more civilians during WWII than American A-bombs. By a factor of maybe 10-to-1.
-About 250,000 Chinese civilians died in the Imperial Army's reaction to the Doolittle raids. Most were beheaded.
-Japanese Imperial Army units were often issued a "ration" of POWs for bayonet training of new recruits. It was viewed as a valuable part of toughening up troops to have them bayonet a live subject. Generally, a chalk circle was drawn on the chest around the area of the heart. This was a "no-stab" zone, so that the subject would not be killed too quickly, and so more recruits could be trained on fewer POWs.
-It was pretty much SOP for Imperial Army units in China to kill all inhabitants of villages in which they planned to sleep. No survivers were permitted, as that would mean someone knew WHERE the Japanese soldiers were sleeping, and so put them at risk. Villages that the soldiers marched through would be left unmolested (except the women, see below), but wherever they stopped for the night everyone had to be killed before sack time.
-It was also SOP to kill all women that were raped. Simple expedience. Japanese who participated in post-war interviews described it in very practical terms. They expected more angry relatives, thus more insurgents, if the women survived to tell the story. So SOP was to kill them.
-As civilian populations became denuded of interesting women, the Army began providing "comfort women" as a resource. This story is perhaps well known. Generally, 13 to 16 year-old Korean girls were taken for this role. They were imprisonned in Army brothels near the front lines, and "serviced" an average of 50 to 70 soldiers PER DAY. After their usefullness was used up they were generally killed, usually after several months due to visible signs of pregnancy. This was seen as a very satisfactory approach, as it kept the soldiers from wandering about looking for women, kept VD under control, AND provided for more sword-practice for the officers.
-At one point during the war, a popular newspaper in Japan (I confess that I have read it often
) ran a "regular" feature on two young Imperial Army lieutenants who were having a contest to see who could behead 100 people first! After one of them got to that "lofty" result within a few weeks, the paper said that in good spirits they agreed to continue their competition indefinetly.-The Imperial Army regularly sent troops to distant areas with no thought to logistics beyond supplying ammo. All else was stated as "local provisioning". In New Guinea, where the land barely supported a very thin native population, this resulted in extremes. Post-war studies document how several units kept POWs and civilian prisoners as "feed stock". Units developed the skill of carving off meat in stages, so the subject would not die for two or three days, as meat (and corpses) tended to spoil quickly in the tropics. Post war there were several survivors, particularly of commonwealth (Indian) units, who attested to this. Japanese soldiers even developed names for the native populations (black cows) to reflect their value as food sources. Rape was not common of native women, as they were seen as too useful as a source of food.
-Eating the internal organs, particularly the heart or liver, of enemy POWs was considered very "macho" by some members of the Imperial Army's officer corps. Army surgeons attested post-war to being called by CO's to remove these organs from executed POWs.
So yeah, I would suggest that emulating the Japanese approach to a log-light tail would not be exactly appropriate.
-Mark
QUOTE
Originally posted by JohnB:
I've really heard it now, are you seriously suggesting the British should have imitated the Axis approach to logistics?
I've really heard it now, are you seriously suggesting the British should have imitated the Axis approach to logistics?
No, I'm suggesting the CW forces could have displayed the gumption of the Axis. Aussies on Timor fell back before an inferior number of Japanese, retreated for a while, then surrendered when they were "too exhausted" to retreat further. The Japanese chasing them weren't exhausted enough to quit.
Except for two or three CW leaders in Malaya, the Japanese routinely turned out CW forces less than the strength of the attacking Japanese, and improvised a supply line that got them to Singapore. I have pictures of Japanese Engineers who didn't get their bridge done in time standing bent over in water with boards across their backs making a human bridge that the infantry double-timed over. Show me a British (or American FTM) Engineer unit with that dedication.
Monty's pursuit after Alamein lost the Germans because "rains made the ground muddy." The Axis managed to retreat through the mud. Mud only affects the pursuers, not the pursued?
Need more examples?
QUOTE
Originally posted by JohnB:
If anything Brooke didn't do enough to rein Churchills fertile mind - the Dieppe disaster, the Aegean adventure and the Arakan abortion come to mind.
If anything Brooke didn't do enough to rein Churchills fertile mind - the Dieppe disaster, the Aegean adventure and the Arakan abortion come to mind.
He could have reined in "Churchill's fertile mind" by producing results instead of excuses. That he (from his own words) spent the war "reining in" Churchill indicates to me that he didn't have anything to offer in the way of ideas except "it can't be done."
QUOTE
I presume your opinion of pusillanimity on the part of Brooke is related to the 43/44 invasion controversy, again.
1) I didn't say (this time) anything about Brooke's "pusillanmity."
2) Yes, that's part of it.
3) Among many other things.
QUOTE
Originally posted by Mk 1:
I would have to agree with JohnB that suggesting an imitation of the Axis approach to logistics is pretty amazing...
I would have to agree with JohnB that suggesting an imitation of the Axis approach to logistics is pretty amazing...
Please note that I did NOT suggest the British copy the Axis approach to logistics.
What I SAID (or at least what I MEANT) was that even with their poor approach to logistics the Axis accomplished more than the CW forces did with a much longer logistics tail.
BTW, the length of the CW (and US) tail I have no problem with. It is the BLOAT in the tail of people sitting on the thumbs that I (and WSC and a whole BUNCH of other people) deplore.
From MHQ Winter 2002, Vol 14 Number 2
Article: Churchill's Lonely Campaign by Williamson Murray
"In 1934 Churchill wrote in the Daily Mail:' I marvel at the complacency of ministers in the face of the frightful esperiences through which we have all so newly passed. I look with wonder upon the thoughtless crowds disporting themselves in the summer sunshine and upon this unheeding House of Commons, which seems to have no higher function than to cheer a Minister; {and all the while across the North Sea}, a terrible process is astir. Germany is arming'."
"Churchill's writing and his recognition that we must see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be."
After the Czech crises was resolved in Germany's favor: "And do not suppose this is the end. This is the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first fortaste of a bitter cup..."
"What was particularly disastrous for Britain's prospects in the coming war was that Chamberlain had done vitually nothing to accelerate British military preparations between September, 1938 and March 1939... his government refused to address any of the substantial weaknesses that had appeared during the mobilization occasioned by the Czech crisis."
"Chamberlain...warned the cabinet...that he 'could not accept the services request for increased defense spending as being a purely military matter'."
Of course, we may simply dismiss Mr Murray as some sort of historical hack but that seems unrealistic. Mr Murray is a respected author and historian with a good track record. His many books include A WAR TO BE WON: FIGHTING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. The fact is Mr Murray's analysis (and my own) are dead on. Churchill was the right man for the job and Neville Chamberlain was not. His vision of the future of Nazi Germany was clear from the onset. Neville Chamberlain's personal goodness and his desire to prevent war are not the issue here. War was coming to England, choose it or not.
Ken's personal politics preclude him from giving Churchill his due simply because he is a "darling of the right". This, coupled with the notions that Hitler was a great man (see earlier post) and the idea that Germany on France's west coast was not a threat to England (see earlier post) lead me to the unescapable conclusion that this is a "Belarius Syndrome".
Article: Churchill's Lonely Campaign by Williamson Murray
"In 1934 Churchill wrote in the Daily Mail:' I marvel at the complacency of ministers in the face of the frightful esperiences through which we have all so newly passed. I look with wonder upon the thoughtless crowds disporting themselves in the summer sunshine and upon this unheeding House of Commons, which seems to have no higher function than to cheer a Minister; {and all the while across the North Sea}, a terrible process is astir. Germany is arming'."
"Churchill's writing and his recognition that we must see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be."
After the Czech crises was resolved in Germany's favor: "And do not suppose this is the end. This is the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first fortaste of a bitter cup..."
"What was particularly disastrous for Britain's prospects in the coming war was that Chamberlain had done vitually nothing to accelerate British military preparations between September, 1938 and March 1939... his government refused to address any of the substantial weaknesses that had appeared during the mobilization occasioned by the Czech crisis."
"Chamberlain...warned the cabinet...that he 'could not accept the services request for increased defense spending as being a purely military matter'."
Of course, we may simply dismiss Mr Murray as some sort of historical hack but that seems unrealistic. Mr Murray is a respected author and historian with a good track record. His many books include A WAR TO BE WON: FIGHTING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. The fact is Mr Murray's analysis (and my own) are dead on. Churchill was the right man for the job and Neville Chamberlain was not. His vision of the future of Nazi Germany was clear from the onset. Neville Chamberlain's personal goodness and his desire to prevent war are not the issue here. War was coming to England, choose it or not.
Ken's personal politics preclude him from giving Churchill his due simply because he is a "darling of the right". This, coupled with the notions that Hitler was a great man (see earlier post) and the idea that Germany on France's west coast was not a threat to England (see earlier post) lead me to the unescapable conclusion that this is a "Belarius Syndrome".
On the logistics issue, Sargent's point is correct. The Allies certainly could have used what they had more effectively. The rub is that totalitarian governments tend to get a little more out of their soldiers than democracies. Particularly democracies where the military is stifled by weak-kneed politicains in the years leading up to war. The Allies' material abundance did not preclude them from fighting the Axis to the end. It just made them seem a little wasteful.
Another quote from the article that shows the value of the man:
"To a young Brigadier General from the Middle East HQ who asked him if he could speak freely, he replied 'Of course. We are not here to pay each other compliments'."
And a few lines from the article again:
"Churchill himself accurately remarked that the strategic decision making system under his predecessors had represented the maximum of study and the minimum of action. It was all very well to say that everything had been thought of. The crux of the matter was-had anything been done?"
See that IS leadership. Do something, as opposed to discussing it indefinitely. Left up to many politicains we would still be discussing the viability of invading Normandy and responding to the threats by current day regimes as well. Oh for Chuchill and Patton in today's world (and a touch of Stalin for those who would idolize him from their cells).
"To a young Brigadier General from the Middle East HQ who asked him if he could speak freely, he replied 'Of course. We are not here to pay each other compliments'."
And a few lines from the article again:
"Churchill himself accurately remarked that the strategic decision making system under his predecessors had represented the maximum of study and the minimum of action. It was all very well to say that everything had been thought of. The crux of the matter was-had anything been done?"
See that IS leadership. Do something, as opposed to discussing it indefinitely. Left up to many politicains we would still be discussing the viability of invading Normandy and responding to the threats by current day regimes as well. Oh for Chuchill and Patton in today's world (and a touch of Stalin for those who would idolize him from their cells).
QUOTE
Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:
The rub is that totalitarian governments tend to get a little more out of their soldiers than democracies.
The rub is that totalitarian governments tend to get a little more out of their soldiers than democracies.
I wouldn't say that's true generally. Far from being a run of the mill dictatorship, Germany was in the throes of an immensely popular revolution. By contrast, the US was at an ideological nadir in the 30s.
QUOTE
Particularly democracies where the military is stifled by weak-kneed politicains in the years leading up to war. The Allies' material abundance did not preclude them from fighting the Axis to the end. It just made them seem a little wasteful.[/i]
In the case of the US, wasn't it the populace, rather than the politicans, who caused that? FDR was all for doing as much as he could from the get go- it was the public who didn't come around until much later. You've also got to consider that both the US and Britain had a long tradition of not maintaining large standing military forces. To do so was seen as antithetical to democracy, an attitude that's shamefully gone out of style.
QUOTE
Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:
From MHQ Winter 2002, Vol 14 Number 2
Article: Churchill's Lonely Campaign by Williamson Murray
The fact is Mr Murray's analysis (and my own) are dead on. Churchill was the right man for the job and Neville Chamberlain was not. His vision of the future of Nazi Germany was clear from the onset. Neville Chamberlain's personal goodness and his desire to prevent war are not the issue here. War was coming to England, choose it or not.
Ken's personal politics preclude him from giving Churchill his due simply because he is a "darling of the right". This, coupled with the notions that Hitler was a great man (see earlier post) and the idea that Germany on France's west coast was not a threat to England (see earlier post) lead me to the unescapable conclusion that this is a "Belarius Syndrome".
From MHQ Winter 2002, Vol 14 Number 2
Article: Churchill's Lonely Campaign by Williamson Murray
The fact is Mr Murray's analysis (and my own) are dead on. Churchill was the right man for the job and Neville Chamberlain was not. His vision of the future of Nazi Germany was clear from the onset. Neville Chamberlain's personal goodness and his desire to prevent war are not the issue here. War was coming to England, choose it or not.
Ken's personal politics preclude him from giving Churchill his due simply because he is a "darling of the right". This, coupled with the notions that Hitler was a great man (see earlier post) and the idea that Germany on France's west coast was not a threat to England (see earlier post) lead me to the unescapable conclusion that this is a "Belarius Syndrome".
Tim, Kinda loosing it aren't you? at 12:26 "Log: Alright, you got me on that one fair and square. I have put way to much FFZ in my Gen Mil this time around." Yet by 21:34 you are at it again?
You are the one who invoked Churchill in a political fashion telling one of your FFZ colleagues that he would have voted for Chaimberlain in 1938 vice Churchill, since he was for diplomacy and not action, with reference to the present US problems. This is why I related what other sources have commented upon, that Churchill is the [unintended] darling of the NeoCons. Of course, we all know that you do not vote for PM in the Brit system, but for MPs. Anyway you are not qualified to rate me as unfit to write on Churchill because my "personal politics" preclude me. My 1984 PhD. in Modern European History makes me equally qualified as Wick Murray to comment on Churchill. Murray is not a Churchill scholar [neither am I] and he writes an iconography in MHQ using no primary source material, I would wager. MHQ is the upper tier of the three Cowles Publications in their pop history offerings [Mil Hist, SWW in declining order], and he is writing for a pop audience.
But I digress, you chose 1938 for your instance, and I was offering a healthy historical skepticism, based on years of study of the period, that it was unfair to claim Churchill was somehow the man of the hour in 1938, when circumstances dictated the govt actions.
You can offer all the lists of select Churchill speeches you want[your so-called 'timeline'], and I am telling you that the man is not so hailed as omniscient in his homeland by Brit historians, and his well-cooked 6 volume Hist of the war is considered highly self-serving. That's all.
Don't you dare to lump me with Belisarius, I never knew the man. Get a grip. This is not FFZ, as you observed above. Ken
"Far from being a run of the mill dictatorship, Germany was in the throes of an immensely popular revolution. "
Define "immensely popular". The Nazis peak vote was 37%. With that, they started showing how they'd behave if they actually controlled the country, & in Germanys last free election their vote declined to 33%. The final election (with Hitler as Chancellor) was a farce, with several parties banned from taking part, the apparatus of the state turned over to getting out the vote for the Nazis, immense voter intimidation & as much fraud as they could manage. With all that, they got 44%. In a free election they'd have been trounced. Hitler launched a constitutional coup on the back of a large minority vote. If the democratic parties had realised how dangerous he was & stopped fighting each other, he wouldn't have stood a chance.
Define "immensely popular". The Nazis peak vote was 37%. With that, they started showing how they'd behave if they actually controlled the country, & in Germanys last free election their vote declined to 33%. The final election (with Hitler as Chancellor) was a farce, with several parties banned from taking part, the apparatus of the state turned over to getting out the vote for the Nazis, immense voter intimidation & as much fraud as they could manage. With all that, they got 44%. In a free election they'd have been trounced. Hitler launched a constitutional coup on the back of a large minority vote. If the democratic parties had realised how dangerous he was & stopped fighting each other, he wouldn't have stood a chance.
QUOTE
Originally posted by Tim the Tank Nut:
"What was particularly disastrous for Britain's prospects in the coming war was that Chamberlain had done vitually nothing to accelerate British military preparations between September, 1938 and March 1939... his government refused to address any of the substantial weaknesses that had appeared during the mobilization occasioned by the Czech crisis."
"What was particularly disastrous for Britain's prospects in the coming war was that Chamberlain had done vitually nothing to accelerate British military preparations between September, 1938 and March 1939... his government refused to address any of the substantial weaknesses that had appeared during the mobilization occasioned by the Czech crisis."
Not quite. The Government DID inform the Army in Feb 1939 that it would be required to cough up a British Expeditionary Force for Continental warfare - after 20 years of assuring "There will never be another BEF."
Of course they didn't give the Army any more MONEY, just increased responsibilities....
QUOTE
Originally posted by Mk 1:
I am very familiar with the whole topic of attrocities in Europe and the Soviet Union. I've read dozens of books, seen movies and documentaries, visited various locations in Western Europe, spoken with Holocaust survivors, engaged in debates, etc. etc.
But I guess I have never really understood nor appreciated the level of attrocities in the Pacific war.
-Mark
I am very familiar with the whole topic of attrocities in Europe and the Soviet Union. I've read dozens of books, seen movies and documentaries, visited various locations in Western Europe, spoken with Holocaust survivors, engaged in debates, etc. etc.
But I guess I have never really understood nor appreciated the level of attrocities in the Pacific war.
-Mark
NOT FOR THE QUEASY:
In 1999, I was in Manchuria visiting a daughter studying Chinese at Changchung, site of Emperor Pu Yi's palace [the "Last Chinese Emperor] and the adjacent "Museum of the National resistance in NE China." Like you, I thought I had a strong stomach for atrocities, having read docs of the Wehrmacht, SS etc. But the Chinese have a 'never forget' doctrine well demonstrated in their museums: wall sized mural photos [to the 15' ceiling] of piles of infants, a brilliant stop-action sequence of a beheading/execution, showing the moment of lift-off, etc. I never thought of how the sword stroke can vary and take a good portion of one or more shoulders as well....Grim.
Also adjacent is the Museum of Special Unit 738 [number?], the one that did CW, BW and conventional weapons testing/other 'experiments' on live prisoners, mostly Chinese but a few westerners also. One official diary was open to the page showing "XX logs [JA term for Chinese prisoners] expended in YY experiment...."
[Edited by Ken Estes (28 Oct 2004).]
QUOTE
Originally posted by Sargent:
He could have reined in "Churchill's fertile mind" by producing results instead of excuses. That he (from his own words) spent the war "reining in" Churchill indicates to me that he didn't have anything to offer in the way of ideas except "it can't be done."
Producing results - How, where and what exactly? I gave three examples of British/CW operations which all failed because of inadequate resources and preparation how many more would you like to see? One of Churchill's favourite ideas through the war was for a landing in Norway - do you think that would have been a success or worth trying anyway? With 400,000 German troops in the country and at the limit of Spitfire range that would have been Churchills biggest disaster yet.He could have reined in "Churchill's fertile mind" by producing results instead of excuses. That he (from his own words) spent the war "reining in" Churchill indicates to me that he didn't have anything to offer in the way of ideas except "it can't be done."
Alan Brooke's ideas were to clear Africa, invade Italy and make the Med an Allied lake before the invasion of France.
QUOTE
1) I didn't say (this time) anything about Brooke's "pusillanmity."
2) Yes, that's part of it.
3) Among many other things.
2) Yes, that's part of it.
3) Among many other things.
And how much experience did Brooke's US counterpart, George Marshall have of war? A brief stint as a staff officer at 1st US Division in 1918.
Remember the first time US forces fought the Germans on a large scale, they got their arses soundly kicked only being saved by Rommel's bungling.
Ken, my frustration with your posting style just keeps me coming back. For a trained historian with impeccable credentials you make unsupportable statements. The quickest two I can come up with are the great Hitler and Germany was just on the coast, no big deal. Even after I called you on both of those you breezily jetted along to other, less controversial topics. Since you discredit MHQ as pop history that confirms another of my reasons that your posting style is frustrating. You are an elitist historian. That means if it isn't primary it doesn' count and history you don't agree with is "inaccurate" or "revisionist". In fact we just had a thread a while back that covered the value of continuing research and the "big picture" information that comes with it. Quoting an MHQ article does not discredit me or my position. In fact, your assertion that I am "losing it" seems to come after your positions in this thread have been eroded pretty completely. While I regret the tone of the discussion to a degree I also won't run from a good honest argument.
To reiterate my position so it will be clear to you:
Winston Churchill was a better man than Neville Chamberlain. Churchill's service to his nation assisted in the survival of Britain during WW2. Chamberlain held the same position before Churchill and left Britain "naked in the dark". Churchill's determination and tenacity became the spark which kept Britain in the war. His unwillingness to compromise with Adolf Hitler's Germany almost certainly was THE reason Germany's Nazis were destroyed by war as opposed to being "contained" by a political settlement. Chamberlain supported diplomacy with no threat of war to back it up. Churchill supported any means necessary including war to deal with the threat. Winston Churchill's tenacity was the key. That same type of tenacity is what is required to end the Islamic terror threat.
Footnote:
This is note a backtrack of my position. This is as clear as I can make it. It is what I think, therefore an opinion. I believe the weight of fact sides completely with my opinion. Certainly, history does (pop or otherwise). The fact that I have to add a footnote to insure your understanding of what I am saying and prevent my words from being twisted is unfortunate. Perhaps you could post in a short paragraph your assertion that Churchill was NOT a substantial factor in the outcome of the war, or clarify how history was wrong in its condemnation of Chamberlain as a leader.
To reiterate my position so it will be clear to you:
Winston Churchill was a better man than Neville Chamberlain. Churchill's service to his nation assisted in the survival of Britain during WW2. Chamberlain held the same position before Churchill and left Britain "naked in the dark". Churchill's determination and tenacity became the spark which kept Britain in the war. His unwillingness to compromise with Adolf Hitler's Germany almost certainly was THE reason Germany's Nazis were destroyed by war as opposed to being "contained" by a political settlement. Chamberlain supported diplomacy with no threat of war to back it up. Churchill supported any means necessary including war to deal with the threat. Winston Churchill's tenacity was the key. That same type of tenacity is what is required to end the Islamic terror threat.
Footnote:
This is note a backtrack of my position. This is as clear as I can make it. It is what I think, therefore an opinion. I believe the weight of fact sides completely with my opinion. Certainly, history does (pop or otherwise). The fact that I have to add a footnote to insure your understanding of what I am saying and prevent my words from being twisted is unfortunate. Perhaps you could post in a short paragraph your assertion that Churchill was NOT a substantial factor in the outcome of the war, or clarify how history was wrong in its condemnation of Chamberlain as a leader.
QUOTE
Originally posted by Sargent:
Monty's pursuit after Alamein lost the Germans because "rains made the ground muddy." The Axis managed to retreat through the mud. Mud only affects the pursuers, not the pursued?
Need more examples?
Monty's pursuit after Alamein lost the Germans because "rains made the ground muddy." The Axis managed to retreat through the mud. Mud only affects the pursuers, not the pursued?
Need more examples?
Mud only affected those driving through the desert. The Axis reteated along a metalled road
QUOTE
Originally posted by Ken Estes:
NOT FOR THE QUEASY:SNIPAlso adjacent is the Museum of Special Unit 738 [number?], the one that did CW, BW and conventional weapons testing/other 'experiments' on live prisoners, mostly Chinese but a few westerners also. One official diary was open to the page showing "XX logs [JA term for Chinese prisoners] expended in YY experiment...."
<font size=1>[Edited by Ken Estes (28 Oct 2004).]
NOT FOR THE QUEASY:SNIPAlso adjacent is the Museum of Special Unit 738 [number?], the one that did CW, BW and conventional weapons testing/other 'experiments' on live prisoners, mostly Chinese but a few westerners also. One official diary was open to the page showing "XX logs [JA term for Chinese prisoners] expended in YY experiment...."
<font size=1>[Edited by Ken Estes (28 Oct 2004).]
Ken, the correct designation is Unit 731. There may be more up to date stuff out now, but two journalists put out a very good book on Unit 731 back in 1989. IIRC it was a spin off from a Brtiish TV documentary.
Mk 1, if you want a really disturbing view on Japanese atrocities during WW2 take a look at a Japanese documentary called "Devil Soldiers" that came out a few years back. It is very long, c.4 hours IIRC, but consists mainly of testimony from the perpertators of atrocities backed up with contemporary footage. What makes it especially chilling is these people are talking quite candidly about mind boggling cruelty for which they have never been brought to book. One that particularly sticks in mind was a high ranking medical consultant of some kind chatting away in his office about how his unit in Manchuria routinely trained new combat surgeons by having them dissect living Chinese prisoners. Apparently this gave them a better idea of what the human body's internal organs looked like in a functioning, undamaged state...
all the best
BillB
QUOTE
Originally posted by Sargent:
Please note that I did NOT suggest the British copy the Axis approach to logistics.
What I SAID (or at least what I MEANT) was that even with their poor approach to logistics the Axis accomplished more than the CW forces did with a much longer logistics tail.
BTW, the length of the CW (and US) tail I have no problem with. It is the BLOAT in the tail of people sitting on the thumbs that I (and WSC and a whole BUNCH of other people) deplore.
Please note that I did NOT suggest the British copy the Axis approach to logistics.
What I SAID (or at least what I MEANT) was that even with their poor approach to logistics the Axis accomplished more than the CW forces did with a much longer logistics tail.
BTW, the length of the CW (and US) tail I have no problem with. It is the BLOAT in the tail of people sitting on the thumbs that I (and WSC and a whole BUNCH of other people) deplore.
In 1944 the proportion of the BLA regarded as fighting troops was 56%. In 1918 the proportion of the BEF regarded as fighting troops was 63%.
The Axis accomplished more?
The Eighth Army got from Alamein to Austria via Tripoli, Tunis and Rome. 21st AG got from Normandy to the Baltic.In the Far East, the British put the locals on the ration strength - the Japanese regarded them as the rations.
QUOTE
Originally posted by BillB:
Ken, the correct designation is Unit 731. There may be more up to date stuff out now, but two journalists put out a very good book on Unit 731 back in 1989. IIRC it was a spin off from a Brtiish TV documentary.
Ken, the correct designation is Unit 731. There may be more up to date stuff out now, but two journalists put out a very good book on Unit 731 back in 1989. IIRC it was a spin off from a Brtiish TV documentary.
It was by Paxman and the other bloke who wrote A hihger Form of Killing but the book's and the coauthor's name escape me just now.
I saw an interesting programme on one of the satellite tely channes about German soldiers who were caught by the Japanese inWW1. They were treated very much as guests in Japan and a number settled in Japan after the war. this was due to a edict by the emporer in 1870 something telling Imperial forces to treat enemies with respect. I missed about half the programme looking at why the change post war
[Edited by Ox (28 Oct 2004).]
QUOTE
Originally posted by JohnB:
Mud only affected those driving through the desert. The Axis reteated along a metalled road
Mud only affected those driving through the desert. The Axis reteated along a metalled road
Dumb question but why didn't the CW forces advance along it?
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