All the VJ news made me wonder, in an alternate history, i.e. the U.S. loses the naval battles in the Pacific and say Japan takes over Hawaii, how much further could they reallt have gone? Was it even possible for Japan to make any serious type of land invasion of the West Coast? Even if they did attempt a West Coast landing, wouldn't it have been nearly impossible for Japan to hold that ground given the industrial might of the US Northeast? What do you think?

Japan had no real chance of achieving their goals. Their entire war effort, unlike the German, was futile from the start. While the Germans, if better led or with more modest aims, *might* have had some chance of success, Japan was just too insignificant industrially to compete with the world’s global economies.

Some statistics:
-At the start of WWII, Japan's GDP was 7% of the US.
-During WWII, 85% of US war effort went to the European theater. 15% went to the Pacific.

I think just taking Hawaii would have been beneficial to the Japanese and quite difficult for the US to kick them out, but they also had vast amounts of their military tied down in China and Manchuria. If it wasn't for that, the war would have lasted much longer. Remember - Japan was fighting a three-front war (Burma, China, Pacific islands).

If the Japanese took Hawaii and were able to free up some soldiers from China, I think they best they could have hoped for was the Panama Canal. I really don't think they'd ever have been capable of taking anything in the mainland US.

Jappan's big mistake was attacking the US. It was after all tangental to their real goals which was gaining the raw mwterials necessary to build an empire in Continenttal Asia. Therefor they attacked the British, Vichy French and Dutch posessions. The Phillipines did not really have the oil and rubber that they deperately needed. But given that they thought that the US would enter the war when they made their big push, Yamamoto insisted that the US Pac fleet be eliminated to provide breathing room (6 months was his estimate and 6 mnths was what they got). However he was only given the minimum number of carriers, the rest went south. This necessitated the invasion of the Phillipines and the Islands of the western pacific to provide airfields to protect and nourash their fleet.
Their only hope having miscalculated the need to attack the US and its possessions would be invaded Hawai at the same time or soon after the aerial attack. This would have bought them more time. Ulimately though it was folly they should have mved much more slowly. Obviosly the Atomic bomb could not have been part of the process. Lastly dictatorships rarely act in rational ways. Our democratic system ensures that the political leadership in times of crisis can turn to every one at the conferance table, a dictator must always calculate that everyone in his government is an enemy.

They knew it wasn't a good long-term game. The hope was the sinking of CINCUSPAC (say it out loud...) and getting a settlement at the table.

"If you tell me that it is necessary that we fight, then in the first six months to a year I will run wild, and I will show you an uninterrupted succession of victories. Should the war be prolonged for two or three years....I have no confidence in our ultimate victory" - Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

Probably the dumbest thing the Japanese could have done would have been to attepmt to take the Hawaiian Islands. The logistics, the amount of land to take and the Japanese ability to invade against minor opposition was poor, let alone trying to do over the beach support. The Japanese were not prepared for a conquest of the Pacific. They had the ability to sieze a few ill defended Islands, but not something as large as the Hawaiian Islands. The Japanese may have had the ability to grab Midway in early January '42 but they didn't attempt taking Midway until it was way too late.


Vichy Indochina was pretty easy to take. Better and more imaginative British Commanders may have saved Singapore. Not having MacArthur or his staff may have saved the Philippines I am not sure what the Dutch could have done to have saved their possessions, too much of the natives were supporting the Japanese.

Japan taking Hawaii is pretty much a non-starter. They didn't have the landing and transport craft to do it, even if they shut down all of their other invasions. Too far away, quite well defended, and incredibly difficult to supply after the initial invasion.

Which is really the problem for them. If they call off the invasions of other islands to target Hawaii, then absolute best case they now hold an island with a large population far away from Japan without conquering the islands along their new, extended supply route. That's giving them a big hand wave and assuming that they could take Hawaii. It's that old problem, they were stretched as it was in the real world, so to do something beyond what they did they need to curtail something to provide sources.

I've often thought that the best thing that they could do would have been impossible for them. Had they launched the invasion of China and done everything that they could to minimize atrocities, they might have been able to parlay that into less outrage over their invasion. If they'd played it correctly, they might have been able to survive the diplomatic consequences, especially as a nasty war was starting in Europe. As a wild card, have Japan drop the whole Axis bit (which didn't seem to do diddly for them) and offer whatever assistance needed to the UK in 39/40. probably not much of real value, but if the offer wasn't rejected out of hand they might be able to pull off being seen as a pseudo-ally, especially pre-Barbarossa when they could make the case of hindering Soviet expansion by providing a threat on their East coast.

It's a long shot, but as soon as they declared war on the US/UK, they were doomed. They need to avoid that at all costs.

Matt

According to Angus Maddison (The World Economy: Historical Statistics, & The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective)

GDP (1990 billion USD)

1938 1940 1941
Japan 176 210 213
Korea 37.8 38.0 38.5
Taiwan 7.4 8.1 8.9
Total 221 256 260

USA 799 930 1099

UK 298 331 361
Germany 342 377 401
USSR 405 420 334
France 187 166 131
Italy 144 155 154

Maddisons & his collaborators estimates are as good as you'll get (that doesn't mean they're perfect). I make Japanese GDP at the start of WW2 somewhere between 19 & 28% of the USAs, depending on what you include (empire or not) & which year you choose as the start. However, it doesn't affect the fact that it wasn't enough, especially as a smaller proportion of it was potentially mobilisable for the war effort, & the gap widened rapidly as the war went on.

PS. The Commonwealth added quite a bit to the UK. Adding Canada, Australia & New Zealand made a combined total comfortably ahead of Germany.

Well, if the Japanese managed to knock out the Pacific fleet, including the carriers (CINCUSPAC is the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, which is a man, not a fleet FormerBlue ), it would have been a lot closer to reality as it would have freed their hand to run amok in Western Pacific until the US could rebuild their strength. The Japanese still couldn't touch Hawai'i, as (1) they pretty much tapped their reserves out in the strike on Pearl Harbor, and (2) the US could still shift capital ships and carriers from the Atlantic Fleet to cover Hawai'i. The element of surprise would be gone, so no more ambushes. After this it gets real interesting...

I think Japan would have been better served going south to Australia, and New Zealand. Better basing, and a better shot at the Indian Ocean.

Australia would have been as ludicrous of an invasion as Hawai'i or the US, unfortunately. Considering the deployment of manpower as it was in December 1941, actually pulling off an invasion would have been doomed from the start. Considering you can take 2/3 of an entire continent and only then make contact of the enemy is a daunting enough challenge, much less for a severely overstretched enemy.

Even only taking say Darwin wouldn't work for the Japanese as despite have ing a foothold on Australia they would have to protect it from the Australian army attacking from Eastern Australia or even a counter-amphibious landing. It would have been much easier to keep a modest-sized bomber force on New Guinea to keep heads down in Darwin and shift the main naval force to say Singapore if they wanted to challenge in the Indian Ocean.

This review of a book outlining a flawed idea for continental defence gives a quite concise reason for the inability of Japan to try to invade Australia.

Here's the most relevant point:

I've always felt that the Japanese started the war incorrectly. Instead of mounting a air raid which was intended purely to destroy/disable ships, they would have been far better off combining that with a seaborne raiding party who's intention was to occupy the harbour installations at Pearl Harbor and destroy them. Without the drydock, the US Navy's recovering would have been set back far more significantly than what it was. The war would have been lengthened by at least one to two years, while the US was forced to rebuild first the infrastructure and then the naval forces destroyed at Pear Harbor, rather than just the ships.

The occupation would have been short, only a week or so, the US forces on the islands would have been inadequate to prevent it from achieving its objectives and the US Navy ineffectual to prevent either the initial landing or its subsequent withdrawal.

If it could have been done simulteanously with a strike on the Panama Canal locks, it would have resulted in the US being pretty hard pressed to mount an effective response for quite a long time.

Ultimately, however it has to be recognised that these would only delay, they wouldn't stop a US response from appearing. Perhaps the Japanese should have gone NE, instead, into the USSR?

Tis been mentioned a number of times that the designation was rather unfortunate. USPacFleet doesn't sound as odd as CINCUSPAC (Sink US Pac). They Japanese were just following the suggestion...

It seems that had the Japanese paid slightly more attention to electronics before the war, and more attention to communications during the war, and made even rudimentary plans for convoys to exploit their new watery empire, they might have had more success. Come to think of it they could simply have communicated with their German colleagues at the outbreak of hostilites & performed some technology exchange programs. Worst comes to worse, just don't communicate over the airwaves. Give battle fleets autonomy, let them communicate internally with visual signals.

And if every torpedo had had a human pilot... Well it seems to me that a submarine would be capable of sinking destroyers before the latter could close the range, and Japan had a formidable array of submarines.

We did a thread on a possible Hawaiian op in 1941. I postulated using the 25th Army under Yamashita (which took Malaya) and delaying ops in the NEI - SE Asia. The NEI/SEA weren't going anywhere and they weren't going to be massively reinforced either.

The plan collapsed when I checked the oilers. Virtually every one of Japan's oilers were used just to support the PH raid. There was nothing to fuel an invasion force crossing the Pacific. They would have had problems with food and fresh water for the troops on a trans-Pacific voyage as well.

IMHO, the best alternative approach for Japan in 1941 was to not attack the US at all. All Pearl Harbor did was really piss the US off. The US Fleet wasn't going to SE Asia, especially without a declaration of war (no certain thing if the Japs had confined themselves to British and Dutch colonies). We didn't have enough oilers to move the Fleet that far either....

The Philippines could have been bypassed and the invasion forces could have gone directly to the oil fields in NEI. The US forces in the PI were pretty impotent (although the B-17s were a lot scarier for the Japanese than they turned out to be) and aren't going to be attacking Japanese invasion convoys, especially if the 1st Air Fleet is supporting the SE Asian ops instead of beating up Hawaii.

It would at least have given FDR more headaches trying to convince Congress to get into the war when the Japanese were scrupulously avoiding striking American people or possessions.

That is a very scary suggestion.

The carriers used for PH could have screened the Philippines, in case the USA did decide to join in, with strict orders not to provoke anything. Put Yamamoto in charge & those orders would have been scrupulously obeyed.

That would have left them with time & resources to tidy up the SW Pacific & neutralise Australia & New Zealand (no need to invade) fairly easily, & either build up forces in Burma for a better supplied invasion of India, or work along the coast (feasible, once the Pacific is no longer occupying most of the IJN), or even invade Ceylon (a much shorter move from Singapore than Hawaii is from anywhere) & deprive the UK of the use of Trincomalee - or use it as a base themselves. We'd have been in deep doo-doo with the IJN loose in the Indian Ocean in force, able to raid our oil supply route from Persia. IJN subs lurking off the mouth of the Red Sea & Persian Gulf - shudder!

In 1942 Darwin was essentially an island with 800 miles of dirt track (to call it a road would be misleading) to a railway line. It is also 1000 miles from Port Moresby. The bombers came from places like Timor - only 400 miles.

The oil and the oiler are the Achilles heels for both sides, King, your point is well taken. Few of us remember that the JA/IJN have the most advanced and capable amphibious forces in the world through 1942. The Canton landings of 1939 were corps sized. The little USMC/Army could maybe land a regiment at the time.

The decision to attack PH assured the US entry and the Japanese demise. A gambler would have done the Philippines bypass, and that is much less a gamble than a direct attack on US forces.

The decision for the IJN to make in March 1942, best put by H.P. Wilmott, is among the following:

(1) E to Hawaii
(2) So to Australia
(3) W to Persian Gulf, linking with the rest of the Axis

The distances to 1 are horrendous, the army would not cooperate for 2 and there was no alliance with the Germans to effect 3, but Wilmott still maintains it (3) was their best shot, certainly a strategic blow unlike any accomplished by the Axis anywhere.

Yamamoto, frustrated, opts for a modified 1, hoping he can trick the USN into a decisive Midway battle, which they would lose, leaving Hawaii ripe for the taking once Midway became a staging base. But first losing the services of 2 CVs for no gain at Coral Sea [Pt. Moresby being a modified 2] places the whole strategy in jeopardy. The Japanese, it would seem, could never wean themselves of the divided approach of separate forces, and dividing in face of an enemy was something only a genius like l'Empereur could try.

tsk, tsk, the Japanese didn't use naval oilers for Pearl Harbor, but fast commercial tankers adapted, so while there was little else to refuel the fast carriers, there were still tankers and oilers to keep the invasion force going, albeit sincronisation with the attack may be a problem, due to the different speeds.
On the other hand, a lot of troops are going to be needed to overcome the 2 divisions and the coast defences, plus beaches were not suitable for a landing.

Very nice idea grasshopper, but what was the Japanese raiding party going to do with the two Coast Artillery forts that guarded the entrance to Pearl Harbor, not to mention the Coast Artillery forts that guarded the west side of Oahu and Honolulu? Then there was that overstrength Hawaiian Division that was scattered all over the Island, not to mention a regiment (plus) of Marines. Or were the Japanese going to "beam down" from a spaceship instead of the usual coming ashore in a boat?

The only hope for a Japanese invasion of Hawaii, in any form, would have been to start preparation for it around about 1935, in order to build the correct and necessary shipping tonnages for it. As it was they didn't have a snowballs.

A country capable of landing a field army on the coast of Manchuria in 1904 or a modern corps on the Cantonese coast in 1939, and multiple-separate divisional landings in 1941, another corps landing at Linguyan Gulf in early 1942 would not lack assault shipping for the Hawaii op, if the other operations were made inactive. We should not take it for granted [witness Singapore] that Oahu would have been the immediate target. Maoi [sp!] or the Big Island would have been easy pickings, allowing airfields to be built up, as they mnaged in the distant Solomons. Sustainment, as always, would have become the prime difficulty, all provided an IJN decisive battle had ensued before the landing phase.

Japan started the war with about 5M tons of shipping, of which at least ~3.5M was required for military purposes alone. By late 1942, it is a stretch to think that they could keep their existing garrisons supplied, and so it was.

It's not the carrying or landing capacity of the shipping, it's the lack of tankers/oilers. The IJN's carriers would have had to hang around to provide aircover, and they just didn't have the fueling capacity to support them and their escorts.

Air cover against what? a simple re-run of the historical attack will leave little to defend Oahu in terms of ships and planes, much less to attack the Japanese fleet. As I pointed out before, there Japanese had enough oilers, what they lacked were fast oilers, but if they plan on staying around the neighbourhood, they don't need the speed, nor would they need all their carriers.

There is a basic prinicple of war that the further an agressor advances, the longer, (and consequently, more vulnerable and unreliable) his lines of communication become, while the defender's conversly become shorter and more secure. Eventually, the mechanics of moving enough supplies to just sustain what you have already will be the maximum that your existing logistical support can move, as they themselves have to consume resources for every extra mile they travel. The Japanese military understood this, and never intended to fight a long war with the U.S. - especially with Russia on their back door - a country harboring a deeo grudge against Japan since 1905, and with whom Nippon had fought an undeclared war of varying intensity both by proxie and directly starting in 1936. Given this, one must examine Japan's hostility on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Strategic - why did Japan seek a war with the US, and what did they hope to accomplish?

The answers are both startling, and disturbing - (and definately NOT what you were taugh in your history class!) FDR was determined to become involved in WWII on the side of the Brittish and Russians - this is a mater of historical record - this despite a strong isolationist sentiment in the US that 88% of the population agreed with. FDR embarked on a series of actions designed to provoke Germany into declaring war on us - Lend-Lease, escorting convoys part of the way to Brittain, having American warships and aircraft mark German subs for attack by Brittish ships, etc. These are all established and well-recognized acts of war - how did the US react when the Panay was attacked and sunk by Japan? Despite the Greer and Reuben James incidents, neither did Hitler rise to the bait by declaring war, nor was there a signifigant reduction in isolationist sentiment. Again, as historically documented in numerous sources, the (soon to be) Allied powers knew through intercepted German and Japanese diplomatic coded messages that Hitler had promised to declare war on the US IF the US declared war on Japan. Numerous quotes, as well as the recently declassified McCollum memo, reveal a mindset on the part of the Administration that they could get into the war through the "back door" by provoking Japan into attacking. McCollum was an officer in Naval Intelligence that had spent many years in Japan - his memo outlined an 8 step program that essentially was designed to goad Japan into attacking us - all 8 points were implimented. The short version is they froze Japan's assets, cut off oil and metal shipments, and told Japan that it had to abandon it's hard-won conquests in China and leave Indochina alone, or no resumption of normal trade. Japan had armies in the field at the time, and insufficient reserves of oil (which it had been importing from the US) and steel (ditto) to support its navy and army. (None of this is intended to white-wash the attrocities that Japan foisted upon its victims in the process of attempting to acquire an empire like Brittain's or America's - they were fully as vicious and evil as the Nazis...) Finally, the point - the WHY of the war was to secure by hook or by crook the means to supply itself with enough raw materials to either supply all its own needs, or to guarantee that other nations would have to trade with them dispite any distaste for their imperial designs.

What they hoped to accomplish - seize the Phillipines, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies and a handful of other islands . The East Indies could supply Japan with the oil she needed - even more importantly, some of the oil from there could be burned directly in ship engines without refinement into "bunker oil" - (although with an increased smoke signature). This was critical to the Imperial Japanese Navy - it had to replace the oil it could no longer get from the US without relenquishing its dreams of empire. French Indochina, along with other areas soon to be in Axis control, was source for almost all the world's natural rubber - this at a time when there WAS NO synthetic substitute such as neoprene. With a stranglhold on rubber, as well as the other raw materials she sould get from her conquests, Japan could compel any nation to trade with her - there is no way to build warships, aircraft, vehicles, or electronics without consuming vast quantities of rubber - not to mention other war material such as gas masks, gaskets, life rafts, mae wests, etc.

Next post - operationa considerations...

Operational considerations:
The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to put enough of the Pacific Fleet out of action long enough for Japan to accomplish a series of goals without having to worry over-much about interference from the only sizeable big-gun fleet that could oppose it. They wanted to complete operations in Indochina, the East Indies, and the Phillipines without 8 old battleships chugging onto the scene and making mincemeat out of their transports, (as almost happened to us at Leyte...). At the time, carriers were thought to be auxilleries to the fleet, and the big gun battleships were considered the real naval might - (...one of the ironies of the PH strike is that it pretty much simultaneously proved the striking power of a carrier task force AND compelled the U.S. to operate on that model by knocking out the battlewagons...). By the time the battleships were repaired or replaced, Japan would have "run wild" to quote Yamamoto for a year to 18 months, (about all they could count on Russia to be tied up with Germany one way or another...) and would have reached the limits of their ability to logistically support any new conquests in the Pacific anyway. Thence to he bargaining table - perhaps trading back bargaining chips such as Wake and Midway in return for peace and recognition of her new empire. A complete failure to appreciate American reaction to the Bataan death march and other assorted attrocities on top of a "sneak attack" at Pearl doomed Japan to failure at the strategic level - at the operational level, the Pearl Harbor strike accomplished its goals.

Next post - tactical!

Tactical:

Much "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" has been directed against the Pearl Harbor strike - much of it without regard to the operational and strategic concerns that of necessity forced tactical decisions. The much-criticized failure to destroy oil storage and transfer facilities, dry docks, submarine suport facilites, and the like becomes more understandable when one realizes that Yamato had to be governed by the principle of calculated risk, in the light of the operational goal of preventing naval gunfire interference with Japan's operations in Indonesia, Indochina, China, and the Phillipines. His first and foremost goal was to put the battleships out of action, whilst destroying any shore-based air power that could threaten his strike force. Yamamoto was on the horns of a dillema - ha had to use his carrier force to strike, but could ill-afford to lose a substanial portion of it IF he was to support the other operations that the Pearl Harbor strike was to make possible. Viewed in that light, one can understand his decision not to continue to strike Pearl Harbor to destroy the facilities - of what use are the oil storage tanks, when the ships and aircraft themselves no longer exist to use the oil? Why care about the submarine facilities, when the whole intent is to negotiate a peace long before a submarine blockade of the home islands can be effectively implimented? On the other hand, every minute he remains in range, he is risking losing signifigant parts of the strike force should the carriers or submarines find and strike him. An invasion of Hawaii or the West Coast was never a real possibility - extra tankers had to be modified to support underway replenishment just to enable the Pearl Harbor strike - as it was, the Aleutian Islands proved to be too far away to support when seized. Tactically, the PH strike did what it needed to do in order to support the Japanese operational and strategic goals as they understood them to be - however wrong those goals were in hindsight, they could not help but dictate the tactical measures employed in the Pearl Harbor strike operation.

I am interested to know from whence this little tidbit comes.


There weren't two divisions in Hawaii at the time. There was the old two-brigade Hawaiian Division, which had very recently had its two brigades re-flagged as the 24th and 25th ID. There were still only the four regiments of the old Hawaiian Division, the support assets and artillery had not been increased. Basically all the creation of the 24th and 25th did was screw up the chain of command and C&C of the old division.

"A lot of troops" is what the British thought it would take to overcome Malaya. 25th Army and Yamashita overran Malaya and Singapore in 70 days. The Brits had more people in Malaya than the US had in Hawaii. Provided they could get there and land on the north side of Oahu (coast defense there was minimal due to budget cuts), 25th Army should be able to do the job, especially if 1 Air Fleet is hanging around providing support.The coast defenses at the time were open (they were casemated during the war) and Vals and strafing Zeroes should make life miserable for the Cosmoliners.

One interesting result of 1 Air Fleet staying around to keep Hawaii covered is that the Enterprise and Lexington task forces would be written off. Both were returning to PH from ferry missions, both were sucking wind in the oil bunkers, and they didn't have range to get to the West Coast without refuelling at PH.

Hawaiian Division was not overstrength and had recently been split up to create 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions around the two brigades of the old "square" HD. However the "new" divisions only had the same four infantry regiments of the HD's two brigades had only the HD's old Artillery Brigade, and the Command and Control of the old HD was thoroughly fouled up by the "paper chase.".

The presence of a "regiment (plus)" of Marines in Hawaii in December 1941 is going to be news to a whole lot of people. I suppose that if you combined all the Marine detachments of the Fleet ships, you might get a jack-leg regiment in strength, but not in cohesion, training, or assets.

I've no idea. Perhaps they might choose to land elsewhere? I wasn't suggesting a direct assault on Pearl Harbor. As to the understrength division, do you really think they'd have been any more effective than other forces were in 1941-42 in places like the Philippines and Malaya? You appear to believe that US forces were going to perform miracles, whereas I expect they'd end up being brushed aside (at least initially) while they reorganised and attempted to create a credible force, while the Japanese settled in for some determined demolition work. Remember, the Japanese would have the advantage of their carrierborne aircraft to totally dominate the skies, while the US forces would be hard pressed to resist. It might not go completely the way of the Japanese but realistically one has to expect that an effective resistence and even defeat for them wasn't a realistic option.

If you are going to seize the Pearl Harbor Dry Docks, you have to stage a direct assault on Pearl Harbor, a place literally swarming with military (albeit navy) personnel. And where are you going to land on Oahu that would be within convenient walking distance, and still be able to bring all the stuff you need to accomplish the mission? Now you are going from being a "raiding party" to a full Corps size operation.

Having air superiority doesn't mean a whole lot when trying to suppress a coastal artillery fort. Having air superiority when you can't communicate with troops on the ground doesn't mean a whole lot either. Remember the Japanese Navy didn't have radios in their aircraft that talked to their Army or Naval infantry units and the ground radios were rather big and bulky. As to the Japanese ability to dominate the skies, it wasn't all that long of a time even on the morning of Dec 7th. What were the Japanese going to do when the American Carriers came back? And how long can a Japanese Carrier Group stay on station off Oahu? 4 or 5 Months? Or are they being supplied by Space craft?

The American Military did perform miracles in the Philippines, Java and other Pacific Islands. How many months were the Japanese behind schedule in the Philippines? A Japanese war of maneuver wound up being a siege and didn't go the way the Japanese envisioned.

Yes, there were problems in Hawaii as far as Command and Control goes, but every American Division had similar problems in 1941-42. There were more military forces than the Regular Army on the Island. Hawaii, while still a territory, did have National Guard units and they could have been incorporated into the Regular Army (which they could not have been prior to a declaration of war or state of emergency). There were other reserve units that were also armed and were assigned positions and performing duties by the evening of December 7th. Two regiments (plus) of artillery (National Guard) along with a FA Brigade HQ (46th FA Bde) were a day or twos steaming away from Hawaii (Pensacola Convoy) and could have been returned. And there was a rather large debate as to whether or not it should return to Hawaii or procede to the Philippine Islands.

Yes I am counting the Marine detachments that were on the Fleet ships and also the Marines that guarded the bases. They were available and could have been placed in defense of the Harbor and other naval installations, just as could have (and would have) naval personnel. The history of the Marine Corps, to include the interwar years '20-'41, is repleat with ad hoc Marine detachments cobbled together to perform missions, some a rather complicated.

Wearing a uniform doesn't necessarily make you an effective infantryman. Look at the experience of the Germans at war's end when they were shoving any likely looking bod into a uniform, including naval personnel and giving them a rifle and expecting them to defend the homeland to the death.

By "direct assault" I mean across the beaches (or in this case, harbour quays). I'd assume any force to land on the beaches away from the harbour and then force their way into the harbour from the landward side.

I am also assuming a large force, perhaps of several divisions to accomplish the task.

I believe the defenders of Corrigedor, Singapore and Sevestapol, just to name three, might hold a very different opinion to yourself.



Errr, I am at a loss why you assume that. The Japanese were quite adapt at communicating with supporting aircraft during all their offensives. Why do you assume they couldn't or wouldn't be the same in this hypothetical situation?

Destroy them. Their loss would only add larger to the victory. Remember, it was their failure to find them which effectively saved the US Navy's ability to strike back at the Japanese. Bringing them back against nearly the entire Kota Bahru (I think thats the spelling) would have been suicidal.

As for the effect of not having air superiority, it would have made any effort to move or form up ready for an attack in daylight nearly impossible, as the Germans discovered in Normandy. Coupled with naval gunfire support, I'd expect the American response to be pretty well subdued.



I've suggested the operation would be able to be completed in all likelihood in less than a week.



"Miracles"? Mmm, an interesting idea. Funny, Singapore fell ahead of schedule, the NEI fell ahead of schedule, as far as I can tell. The Philippines actually had forces withdrawn from it in order to reinforce Malaya and the NEI. Perhaps the "miracle" was that the Philippines became rightly considered a backwater?

The odds are very much against the Americans I believe in this scenario.

Sure you aren't counting Marines and Sailors who'd have been casualties? How many went down with the ships sunk or were injured in the ones damaged?

You also seem to be under-estimating in my opinion the effect the initial air attacks had on American command and control. From my understanding they were running around like chooks with their heads cut off after the Japanese air attacks. Facing a determined enemy advancing across land towards the harbour would have been pretty difficult to counter, particularly if, as you've mentioned, most of the forces are spread out and not organised, armed or commanded effectively.

Correct but with a nit. The intent was to break the square divisions into triangular ones. The 24th and 25th would received "freed" regiments from the guard. The Hawaii National Guard was to provide the two regiments. The 298th (HNG) regiment was due to be the 3rd regiment for the 25th so they were in place. The 24th also received a HNG regiment that was in place. The HNG regiments were activated in 1940 but the "Hawaii Division" wasn't broken in two until October of 1941. After PH, they decided that the HNG regiments had too many soldiers of Japanese ancestry so they substituted mainland NG regiments instead (25th ID received the 161st Washington NG Regiment).

So the 24th and 25th could have been full strength on Infantry. Assuming you allow the Japanese decended troops to form up. The two HNG regiments were broken up and eventually formed the 442nd regiment so we know they knew how to fight hard....

Doesn't change any of your points though. Two months does not a division make.

[Mr Nitty again]
The first 4 NG divisions were called to federal service on September 16th of 1940. By October of 1941 there were 18 NG divisions and 28 seperate regiments in federal service. The 32nd and 34th divisions were two of the first divisions committed to battle in the PTO and ETO respectfully. Parts of the 32nd and other NG divisions fought in the PI (192nd Tank).

Excluding the PI, the first two army divisions to enter combat in the PTO were both NG (32nd and Americal) (Americal division was formed from 3 seperate NG regiments (132nd IL, 164th ND, and the 182nd MA)).

The first US division to leave the US was the NG 34th. They started departing in January of 1942 for Ireland.
[/Mr Nitty]

[Mr Picky again]
While the 48th division was withdrawn, replaced by the much less capable 65th Brigade, this wasn't at Homma's urging at all. The 48th was withdrawn in early January of 1942. On the 26th the post-landing assault by the Japanese 14th Army was launched. On the 8th of February the offensive was halted due to resistance and the 14th Army actually withdrew from it's forward positions. Homma then requested reinforcements from Toyko. The Japanese 4th Division was sent along with replacements for the divisions ground down in the fighting. The next Japanese offensive didn't get started until April of 1942. The original schedule was Homma was to have taken Luzon in 50 days.

Singapore fell on the 15th of February. Japanese casualities in Singapore were what? Japanese casualities in the Philippines, as of the surrender of Singapore, were 20,000.

Corrigidor fell in May of 1942. That is the same month that the 32nd ID arrived in Australia.

You can nit the PI all you want but it's not that the troops didn't fight. Singapore was 65,000 Japanese against 90,000 Brit, Aussie, and Indian troops. One month. I believe the US composition of the forces in the PI totaled about 22,000. The rest were Philippine troops.

Maybe the "miracle" of the Philippines was that the Philippine scouts fought so much harder than the Australian 8th division?
[/Mr Picky]

[add] Japanese 14th Army troop strength totaled about 100,000.

Here goes the oiler list:

Naval Oilers

Shiretoko class
14,050t standard, 15,450t normal
Speed 14kt

Shiretoko (4th Fleet)
Erimo (Combined Fleet)
Sata (Sasebo Dep.)
Tsurumi (?)
Shiriya (Combined Fleet)
Iro (4th Fleet)

Ondo class
14,050t standard, 15,450t normal
Speed 14kt

Hayatomo
Naruto (Combined Fleet)
Ondo (6th Fleet)

Yep, only 9 and too slow for fleet work, but that's why the Japs used the auxiliary oilers (i.e. civilan converted for naval use):

Toa Maru class
10,020 tons(gt)
13,587 tons(dt)
Speed 19.8 knots

Kenyo Maru (Pearl)
Kyokuto Maru (Pearl)
Shinkoku Maru (Pearl)
Nippon Maru (Pearl)
Toei Maru (Pearl)
Toho Maru (Pearl)
Kokuyo Maru (Pearl)
Toa Maru (6th Fleet)
Genyo Maru (3rd Fleet)
Itsukushima Maru (?)
Tatekawa Maru – requisitioned in 1941, but no idea where she was.
Nichie Maru (Combined Fleet)
Hisae Maru (?)

Akebono Maru (10,182 grt) (Pearl)

A whole bunch of other oilers appear in the IJN OOB for 1941, though I don't know their characteristics:

Nissho Maru (10,526 grt)
Otowasan maru (9,233grt)

Nissan Maru (5th Fleet)
Kaijo Maru #2 (4th Fleet)
Hayatomo Maru (3rd Fleet)
Yodogawa Maru (Combined Fleet)
Tsuruni Maru (Combined Fleet)
Soyo Maru (Combined Fleet)
Teiyo Maru (Combined Fleet)
San Clemente Maru (Combined Fleet)
Matsumato Maru (Combined Fleet)
Kyoei Maru (Combined Fleet)
Kyoei Maru #2 (Combined Fleet)
Kurashio Maru (Combined Fleet)
Koryu Maru (Combined Fleet)
Kirishima Maru (Combined Fleet)
Goyo Maru (Combined Fleet)
Hishi Maru (Combined Fleet)
Hishi Maru #2 (Combined Fleet)
Juko Maru (China)
Koryu Maru (China)
Moji Maru (China)
Toen Maru (China)


http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII...earl_Harbor.htm
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/
http://homepage2.nifty.com/nishidah/e/s_xt08.htm

Deployments thanks to Niehorster.



But on the other hand, it's difficult to do worse than at Singapore, isn't it? there would be plenty of bodies to fill up the Hawaiian divisions after the fleet has been sunk.

I seem to recall that USS Nevada was never totally put out of action, but rather beached herself near the harbor entrance, in order to avoid being sunk in the entrance, thus blocking it for months.

If the historic strike were in fact a precursor to an actual invasion of Hawaii, to include an assault on the port, I "pity the fool" who tries to drive a bunch of amphibious ships and landing craft past the guns of a beached USS Nevada, at near point-blank range.

They're liable to have a Very Bad Day ™.

Yes, but there was nothing to keep the Japanese from launching a third strike in Dec. 7 and if they were really serious about coming ashore, they could have kept hitting Pearl until they were satisified there was nothing left worth a bomb.

Carriers do not have unlimited supplies of ordnance, fuel, aircraft, and pilots. Further, they must reserve some of what have to protect themselves on the journey back to base, lest they be left defenseless on the journey. Further, every minute they stooge around Oahu, they risk discovery and attack by submarine, long-range bombers from the west coast, and the air groups of the two missing carriers. What you suggest is simply not good tactics - a good tactician, (Yamamoto), chose the sensible course of action, guided by the principles of clculated risk and the larger operational and strategic objectives that the strike was to support - which from the Japanese point of view, had been achieved.

Am not disputing that, that's why the carriers had a fighter reserve available, but on Dec. 7 they had enough ordnance to loiter around for as long as needed to finish off the PACFLT, they had a destroyer screen to protect them from submarines, and most important, they remained undetected and there was practical way to detect them with what was left at Pearl. The aircraft from the West Coast (read B-17s) reached Pearl at the limit of their endurance, there was not going to be any meaningful search time left.

The 2 carrier which were at sea could have been a problem, but as King mentioned, they were low on bunker fuel, so it would be prudent to find a watering hole first, and then, their striking power was rather poor when compared to the Japanese:

Lexington had on board:
Bombing Squadron Two (VB-2) with 15 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless
Fighting Squadron Two (VF-2) with 16 Brewster F2A-3 Buffalos
Scouting Squadron Two (VS-2) with 1 Douglas SBD-2 and 14 SBD-3 Dauntless
Torpedo Squadron Two (VT-2) with 12 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators
18 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators of VMSB-231

with heavy cruisers USS Chicago (CA-29), USS Portland (CA-33) and USS Astoria (CA-34) and five destroyers

The Enterprise, with 3 heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, had:
Bombing Squadron Six (VB-6) with 17 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless
Fighting Squadron Six (VF-6) with 16 Grumman F4F-3A Wildcats
Scouting Squadron Six (VS-6) with 10 Douglas SBD-2 and 8 SBD-3 Dauntless
Torpedo Squadron Six (VT-6) with 18 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators and 2 North American SNJ-3s

In Pearl, there were still combat ready after the attack:

B-17D: 4
B-18A: 11
A-20A: 5
P-40C: 2
P-40B: 25
P-36A: 16
P-26: 14

So 214 aircraft in the best of cases.

In contrast, after losses, the Japanese still had: 117 A6M, 146 B5N and 123 D3A for a total of 386.

The Japanese left because they had achieved their objective, not for lack of fuel, ammo or targets.
If they had come to stay, the carriers could have been putting up aircraft all day to pound on Pearl and coast defences, and beyond AA fire and the odd figther, there was nothing to stop them.

Bodies do not a division make. They require weapons and ammunition. The Hawaii NG was training with wooden MGs and AT guns. And Hawaii did not have the extensive civilian personal arsenals that many American regions could call on.

An assault landing in the teeth of heavy coast defenses is a real drag, which is why the Japanese wouldn't do it. They didn't do it in Malaya and they didn't do it in the PI, so why does everyone have visions of assault landings in front of the fort complex at the mouth of Pearl Harbor? Landing on the north shore of Oahu would mean the Japanese come in behind the US defenses. They would have had to go through the Pali, but BFD for 25th Army.
Theoretically the North shore was covered by some of the heavy CD guns that could train in that direction and shoot over the Pali. However the guns being able to train in that direction meant that they were in open mounts, easy prey for IJN a/c. {CD guns that could train to the North were 2x16" Army guns at Fort Weaver and 2x16" Navy guns in Fort Barrette. Possibly the 2x12" long range guns of Battery Closson could train North. All were in open barbette mounts.}
As for the artillery in the Pensacola convoy returning, we are postulating that 1AF is going to hang around. I think the chances of any ships in that convoy getting into PH (or Lahaina) and unloading are pretty slim.

Mr. Young has a point about fuel and ammo capacity* being a reason for Nagumo's 'early' withdrawal. However, Nagumo's operation was a raid. In the invasion scenario we must assume the Japanese to have a fleet train to replenish the CVs, as the US did when they loitered off Japan in 1945.

However, the IJN did not have that sort of fleet train, and that is what makes the invasion op moot. It is also a good argument that the Japanese did NOT plan the Pacific War many years in advance; had they planned ahead, they would have had a fleet train.

*The Japanese had only brought 40 torpedoes modified to run shallow in PH, and they only had enough heavy AP bombs for the first strike.

Ever wear a uniform? Navy personnel did very well in the Philippines as ad hoc infantry. May not have been the best, but they did give the Japanese a lot to worry about.

And to assault across the "harbour quays" you have to pass by several Coast Artillery forts, Hmmm. Landing on a beach can be rather difficult and the surf off Hawaii, isn't a great help. Apparently you never have been to Hawaii, especially on the western, northern and the southern approach was full of coast artillery guns.



So you would need about 100 ships (or more) just to haul troops and then there are supplies. WWII technology didn't favor over the horizon invasions.

Know any defendors of Corrigedor? I do. And they hold opinions close to mine.



I would suggest you investigate the radio capabilities of the Japanese in 1941/42, they weren't that successful in NEI or the Philippines.

Assuming the Japanese Navy could survive a fight against the American Coast Artillery Corps. They didn't attempt such a fight in the Philippines.



Assuming the Japanese Navy survived long enough to provide naval gunfire support for the landing parties. The Japanese Navy avoided engaging the Coast Artillery in the Philippines for a reason, they would have lost. Even a Marine Island Defense battalion with semi-prepared gun positions defeated an initial Japanese invasion of Wake.

Some people are also continually drunk or on drugs and expect miracles in a week. The Japanese would not have been able to keep a beachhead, let alone do anything else on Oahu.

The American Army wasn't in Singapore. The American Army only had 600 men in NEI and were under the control of the Dutch, but did inflict some very heavy casualties with the assistance of the Australians and the rest of Blackforce.

No American units were withdrawn from the Philippines to support Singapore. The only American units that were in the Philippines that came to Java were the surviving aircraft of the Far East Air Force and they continued attacks on the Philippines until Java fell. The American Ground unit (2/131 FA) had come from Texas via San Francisco, Hawaii, Brisbane, Port Darwin, not from the Philippines.



Only if you don't know history.

I see you are back, Mr. Young. Six months older, but not necessarily more knowledgeable.

This post is like so many others of yours that I have read. If you read it in isolation, it is well-reasoned and hangs together if the facts and assumptions in the post are correct. Unfortunately, they are not.

Your thesis in this post appears to be that the failure to attack oil storage and repair and engineering facilities in the Pearl Harbor attack represents a strategic choice by Admiral Yamamoto, and that the decision to cut off the attacks was made by Yamamoto ("one can understand his decision not to continue to strike Pearl Harbor to destroy the facilities").

This is completely wrong.

First, you seem to be unaware that the Pearl Harbor attack force was not commanded by Yamamoto, but by Nagumo. After the success of the first two attack waves, many people on Nagumo's staff proposed further attacks to destroy whatever had escaped the first attacks. It was Nagumo as the local commander of Kido Butai, not Yamamoto, who was back in Japan as the commander of the whole Combined Fleet, who made the decision to break off the operation and return to Japan.

Second, I have a magazine article written postwar by Rear Admiral Tomioka, who was the head of the operations section of IJN High Command at the time of Pearl Harbor. His explanation of the failure repair facilities was that it was simply left out of the plan, because no one thought of it (he points out that an attack on Pearl Harbor was not formally decided until end of September, and earlier than that he as chief of operations section had no acquaintance with it). He admits that it was a mistake, rather than as you claim a conscious decision by Yamamoto.

Hojutsuka