I have a general question regarding the command methodology of current armies.

This is my take in broad terms of development over the last few centuries:

1. Traditional (can't think of a better term) where commanders at all levels operate to a set repertoire of manouvers and strict directions from above. E.G. the commander of wing in an 18th Century army.

2. Impulse where a commander of a corps or division will have a clearly defined order but it is left to him to set the formation and tactics of his own troops. E.G. French Napoleonic commanders and then most Western armies through to beyond WW2.

3. Mission where commanders of all levels are given a mission objective and left free to work out the best way to achieve it, higher authority limiting themselves to ensuring the subordinate stays within mission parameters and providing support. E.G. the German army from 1916(?).

In this forum we often discuss technical, tactical, strategic and even logistical aspects of campaigns, but to my knowledge have never considered them in the context of command methodologies. This I think adds a further dimension and should be considered, for instance the British in the Western Desert during ' 41 and the early to mid ' 42 constantly got a bloody nose trying to compete with Rommel at open manouver type warfare, but their command and control just could not match the Germans mission based orders for speed of action and speed in reaction. When Monty took over they never again tried this and only ever engaged the Germans in set piece battles in which they excelled, and consequently generally beat the Germans after this time. A similar process of events took place on the eastern front where after '42 the Germans were only really successful in counterpunches to breakthroughs that occurred after set piece Russians offensives.

Do you agree with my broad analysis? Do all armies now use mission based orders? When did they adopt them?

I suppose you're more or less right in general outline, but some of the details are a bit off. Though some room for initiative existed in most 19th Century armies the initial tactical formation was set at the Corps level, except in close terrain, and the entire corps usually conformed to the same mission and axis of advance. Also, when given latitude to maneuver, divisions still often adopted stereoptyped formations whenever possible. During the Napoleonic Wars, for example, the Fench often adopted a two line formation, while the Prussians had a thee line one. Deploying divisions in two lines as a matter of standard practice persisted at least through the American Civil War.

With new technology involving GPS systems and computer mapping tied into encripted radio/data systems. Manovers are going to be more liking to playing a RTS game for a comander giving a whole new meaning to the phrase "micro managed to death."

I (unfortunately sometimes) spend a lot of my working day working with non military C&C systems and related technology.

A couple of things make me nervous - a lot of people (who maybe should know) do not know the capability of existing technology in this field and the urge to micro manage is so strong that very often I think the best way to elimintae it is by gene therapy or as an alternative - a base ball bat

WRW

IMO it is exactly the fear of micro-management that has held up the development/acceptance of land C2 systems to our disadvantage. I call it the Big Brother syndrome, and to be honest I've yet to see these fears actualized.

Let's not forget the Navy has had functional C2 systems since the 60's, the air force also has been subject to this type of scrutiny, Commanders have not played pupet master with them why would one assume that it would or could be done with the army?

The people with these systems sitting back in HQ were also field commanders at one point. They know they can not see the ground, they are smart enough to realize that there is no effective way to command from afar on the basis of a computer generated display. To be honest I'd really like to see an example of this micro-management. I think it is a combat legend or a very rare occurance at worst.

During the Vietnam war it was not at all uncommon for a platoon or company firefight to have the battalion commander on the radio net (okay so far), the brigade commander in a helicopter above the battle, the division commander in a helicopter above him, and sometimes even the corps commander somewhere in the mix. They didn't even need a tactical internet to do this, just enough FM radios. This was arguably a symptom of counterguerilla operations; IOW, too much army fighting too little war on any given day, but when you consider the type of battles that we are likely to fight in the future, is it not the shape of things to come?

Even with all of the simultaneous action going on in the initial stage of OIF, I sometimes wonder if the much commented necessity of using Iridium for tactical communications wasn't a blessing in disguise. After all, it did limit the number of people that a division commander could bother to 50-60, and then only one at a time.

In Rick Atkinson's book about the 101st Air Assault Division in OIF, "In the Company of Soldiers," he mentions the division commander personally controlling attack helicopter strikes. The author does not discuss the conduct in depth, and there is nothing from which the reader can discern whether the division CO's involvement had a positive or negative effect. Either way, I would characterize this as micromanagement.

The US Army is drifting towards a C2 method I would call "Oversynch" in which digital C2 systems allow unit commanders up to division level to manuever their 'pawns' across the chessboard. It is ineffective. The SAMS school, and FBCB2 or BLUEFORCE Tracker is making this disturbing possibility a reality.

Digital C2 systems need to be focused on freeing up lower unit commanders (much like radios did for the Wehrmacht) rather than provide higher unit commanders additional opportunities to micromanage his units.

Some please define "Set Piece" for me, I have heard wayyyy too many conflicting definitions.



Falken

CG: "1st/63rd AR, ZERG RUSH!!!"


Falken

Re-read my posts from Iraq. Although I agree that WAY too much precious sat uplink/downlink bandwidth is being consumed by HQ elements that are absolutely useless and add nothing to the fight. "Read Not a Good Day to Die" to get an idea of the useless lateral command structure we tend towards. Pick 50-75% of officers over O5 at random and retire them. S/F....Ken M

Scott and I (as well as others) discussed this a few years back when FUM/SLB was first introduced for the Swedish Army. Seems even the Swedish Army (which pays much more than lip service to auftragstaktik, and whose officers do tend to forcefully argue that the US and Britain should let loose their small unit leaders) is becoming enamoured with micromanaging, a situation exasperated withthe currnet drawdowns, which lead to newly commisoned 2nd Leuitenants (who have done 10-15 months conscript service, and then attended the academy for 2 years) now command squads.

C4I advancs should be used to push information,set operational parameters, and encourage small unit initiative. Anything else andyou're screwing withthe efficiency of the unit.

I am at Ft Irwin right now and just fought 3 battles against a 4th Gen unit. All the fancy C2 stuff did them little good. They should have been VERY fast to react (if they had pushed info/intel down), but instead were abnormally slow. We had little trouble maneuvering within their decision cycles.

Oversimplification of course, and this C2 stuff was not the only factor, but it certainly played a part.

My understanding is that, at least in the US military, the commander of a vessel and the PIC of an aircraft have final authority, which offers greater latitude than ground units.

In some book I read on Vietnam, it might have been "Hunters and Shooters", a story is told wherein a saenior NCO in command of a ground element ignored the orders from an officer orbiting above, and the courts martial quickly determined the NCO was in the clear. What was remarkable about the story was that few involved were aware of the reg establishing final authority.

Well, the first example that came to my mind was the bit from Somalia, as portrayed in Black Hawk Down, where the convoy is trying to reach a downed chopper. Instead of just saying the crash site is four blocks north and two blocks east (or whatever it was) the commanders hovering overhead were giving detailed driving directions to the CO on the ground, eg "turn left now", which he had to relay to his driver, which were too late to actually turn. So the convoy ended up going in circles, getting shot up, and having to retire without reaching the chopper.

Just an example from literature, as I don't have personal mititary experience.

ag

It is interesting that Moltke started the process of lower level control within an overall strategic plan/framework, because armies were growing beyond the point where a general on horseback could control them. Modern technology is giving generals the means to now achieve that control, and it is probably inevitable and natural that they try to do so.

It would be interesting to know what direction the Germans and Israelis are currently moving in.

I think Moltke was philosophically inclined to mission orders and optional control. But in practice his instrument was terribly suited to such methods. The Prussian victory at Koniggratz was an accident of operational deployment. (Yes, I know we have long been taught that the Prussians did it that way on purpose, but it's pretty much undisputed that their logistics capabilities demanded a dispersed deployment along the frontier.) Likewise, Gravelotte-St. Privat was an unalloyed tactical disaster, largely caused by incompetent corps and division commanders, redeemed only by the fact that the French had already lost operationally before a single shot was fired.

I would agree, and additionally add that Molke was thinking only of army and corps commanders. The system in use at that time worked well at Tannenberg with Hoffman's initiative being decisive, but not so well with Kluck and Bulow deciding amongst themselves to scrap the Schleiffen plan on the Marne. Kluck and Bulow were not being provided with any direction by the younger Moltke and it can be argued this actually shows the strength of the method in that they reached the Marne while their overall commander had turned to jelly.

The practice giving junior commanders mission based orders and allowing them the initiative to act on them was fully embraced on the Western front when Lossburg saw it as the way to make “flexible defence” workable, and Ludendorf saw that the “rigid defence” adopted in the Somme battles was ruinous so implemented flexible defence as the German standard.

I find 1918 interesting because the Germans used the system in attack allowing small units to infiltrate through defences, but had not managed to train their whole army to act that way. And the British while trying to learn from the German defensive arrangements copied the “blob defence” tactics but still tried to rigidly control the actions of the lower level defence.

There are detailed orders, and mission-type orders; I see no discrete instance of 'impulse', which could naturally occur in either type. It is the character of the commander and the intervening commanders, the service doctrine and the state of training of the troops that will dictate how these are accomplished. Interestingly, the reading of the operations orders will give little insight, although the maneuverist pundits and their imitators place great store in the use of a paragraph for 'commander's intent' also known as 'desired end-state' to distinguish the modern mission type order. In absence of the requirements for Auftragstaktik, they will still be detailed orders. Thanks to the technical advances and the desire to 'synchronize' [mentioned above] and an even scarier technique, the 'templating' of op plans -- a method that could be applied to the French in early 20th C, USSR in mid20th C and now the US Army and its imitators -- we will have real problems finding Auftragstaktik, and instead we will find 'helicopter syndrome' [VN era, now satelite or real-time display syndrome] . Thus we have both styles available at the same time, maybe in the same commander.

How can one leave the details of execution to a subordinate, when the technical aids allow the senior commander at the theater level [and above] the capability to adjust the formation of the right squad/platoon of the right company/battalion/brigade/division?

Mission orders can be done, but will require the utmost in restraint and the confidence in the service's doctrine, training and the personalities of the commanders to uphold a true mission-oriented atmosphere. So, we are already talking about a matter of ambience, not the system of command and control, which remains high tech, detailed and comprehensive. For instance, when fire support goes to the desired 'sensor-to-shooter' this implies mission oriented execution, yet the inevitable parameters and protocols [read ROEs] introduced into the system by the command will amount to detailed orders.

War is simple, except in its execution....

We have touched on this idea, especially when talking about France 1940.

The Germans used the mission statement, while the French used a doctrine called colmatage, which was carefully planned and rehearsed set-piece battle using coordinated artillery support. This had worked for them in 1918 and the results of earlier battles which had not been planned in detail were bloody enough that the French adopted colmatage with relief.

However, colmatage didn't work once the opponent had gotten inside your decision cycle. In 1940, the French commanders could not react quickly enough to counter German thrusts. When the Allies were falling back from the Dyle line, troops would move into a new defensive position as ordered, only to find the Gremans had already passed it and were in their rear. After a generation of training for a set-piece battle, the commanders just couldn't think fast or 'shoot from the hip.'

To be fair to the French lots of others had the colmatage idea, including many of the Germans - especially the ones who got upset and tried to stop Guderian.

The French never caught on to the disadvantages of their doctrine because their training was rehearsed and formalized, and the annual maneuvers were not war-games so much as playlets designed to let the conscripts see how well it worked. Colmatage was fine as long as both sides used it but it was outclassed by the German Auftragstaktik.

I see you early arisen and alert in Festung Alaska, King, but please do not grace Guderian with any credit for Auftragstaktik, German tactics in general, tank pioneering, or the Blitzkrieg...I liked Macksey's books too, but they are cooked. G was a parvenu, at best.

Certainly we can look to the FR as the example of mid20th detailed tactics, but so were the Brits, Rus, etc. The US, Weigley asserts, waged mission orders tactics in Europe, although the Benning and Leavenworth training was detailed...the advantage of a small peacetime army and Marshall's remowned black book?

The wrding seems a bit odd to me - in french 'colmatage' has te meaning of plugging a leak.

I suppose that the idea was to create a 'watertight' front line, then set plans to plug the breachs that might appear.

something like : 'if frotn get breached a X location, then Y and Z units are to move this way and do that thing, artilley bateyr x will shoptt there' and so on.

Unfortunately it appears that the nation which gave birth to Auftragstaktik is headed the same direction as many others, i.e. micro management and rank inflation. Back when I was in, an infantry squad was led by an E-5/6 (Unteroffizier/Stabsunteroffizier) with an E-4 (Hauptgefreiter) as second, a platoon would as often have an E-9 (Hauptfeldwebel) in command as a Lieutenant.

I hear that now a squad will be led by upwards of an E-7 (Feldwebel) with E-5/E-6's as fire team leaders, and a line infantry platoon will only have two squads and the platoon leader's team. And you hear of instances where they put a lieutenant colonel in charge of a checkpoint because lowly grunts cannot be trusted to make sensible decisions in sensible spots (that might be tales from disgruntled oldtimers, of course).

Several reasons behind this, chiefly that the Bundeswehr seems to be lacking in qualified recruits. Auftragstaktik requires a modicum of smart soldiers in the mix, which obviously wasn't a problem when the draft pulled in large numbers of young folks from all educational levels, with quite a few staying in for a couple of years to become NCO's or officers. Unfortunately over the last decades those of higher education have increasingly tended to claim conscientious objection to armed service, which became not chic, politicially incorrect or uncool.

With the threat of the cold war gone and token conscription reduced to a nine month term (kept mostly for political reason in a much-reduced force, though conscripts basically never get out of training and cannot serve abroad unless they volunteer, including a somewhat extended term), the number of those going on alternate civilian service actually exceeds those on armed service. The Bundeswehr now finds itself in the same position as most Western all-volunteer forces: Smart folks can make a lot more money in the civilian economy, and people "wasting" their time in the armed forces are often considered stupid by their peers. Generally, wearing your country's uniform carries a lot less prestige in Germany compared to other places, especially the U.S. (or at least so it looks from here).

As a consequence, even with record unemployment numbers the Bundeswehr now seems to get a disproportionate number of recruits that nobody else would have taken (also insert appropriate complaints about the educational system going down the drains here). In true army style they have lowered the standards to bait people with higher rank (and corresponding pay), to include creation of new enlisted grades Stabs- and Oberstabsgefreiter (non-NCO E-5/6 ... this in a force that used to mock the U.S. practice of making anybody capable of more than firing an M16 a "specialist"). As a result there often seems no choice but to lead by order tactics rather than mission tactics nowadays ...

A complementary details I've heard is that a disproportionate number of both conscripts and volunteers are from a Russian-German immigrant background (some of which are very much removed from their German roots, if they actually have some at all) who still have a different notion about the duty of national service, but also about ... uh ... the way it is conducted. A lot of them seem to be not readily disposed to the principles of "modern human leadership", and/or infact to the use of the German language. They also tend to gravitate towards combat units as the only ones having a remote semblance of armed service by their standards. Bundeswehr lore knows of at least one Battalion order to not speak Russian at all goddammit.

I don't understand it either, but that was the term given and explanation of meaning in a recent history on France '40.

Ken, I didn't say Guderian had anything to do with developing it, I was referring to the orders for him to stop from Kleist and later OKW in May 1940.

IMO, nothing the Germans did in WW2 was that novel -- they just applied motorization (both on the ground and in the air) to their traditional operational methods.

Best short description I've seen:

Befehlstaktik: directive orders: the orders say "what to do, and how to do it". The assumption is that the order-giver knows best how to achieve the task. The order-receiver puts their effort into telling their own sub-units how to do the job.

Auftragstak: mission orders: the orders say "what to do, and why it has to be done". The assumption is that the order-receiver is best-placed to decide how to do the job, but needs to understand the bigger picture. The order-receiver puts their effort into describing how the sub-units fit into the bigger plan.

Add to that the difference of "systems" (e.g. the NATO descriptions of artillery control, "System 1" and "System 2"; or perhaps the relative rank of the Bn S-3 and the Company Commanders). For instance, a US infantry company is commanded by a younger and more junior officer than a British infantry company - does this mean that the British are victims of creeping rank, or that the US is less able to operate independently below battalion level?

There's always more of a temptation to make defence orders directive, because of the need to achieve mutual support between neighbouring positions where possible.

There's always more of a temptation to micromanage in a COIN war, because there's less going on at any one time; one single firefight in the divisional area, and the Div watchkeepers will try and find out what's happening. Fifty-five firefights going on the the divisional area, and the Div watchkeepers will wait for the summaries.

There's always the problem of the ability of the troops concerned; as BansheeOne points out, Auftragstaktik is successful with better-trained troops. That can be made more difficult by the addition of short-tour conscripts, or less capable recruits (Devil's Advocate - or the addition of lots of reservists). Exactly how much Auftragstaktik can you expect when 90% of your army were civilians just eighteen months beforehand? (Somme 1916)

I've been involved in writing or executing OPORDs for my entire career, either as a unit leader/commander, or as the operations/plans officer (the only jobs I have held). I have seen a lot of C2 techniques, but the ones employed by the OPFOR at Ft Irwin are easily the most effective I have seen.

Overall the current OPOFOR is a lot different than the traditional OPFOR of the Cold War days. Even on the attack we are expected to fight outnumbered. We never have air support, except for helicopters, but often have decent ADA and good artillery support, and our weapons and technology is never cutting edge. Its a lot more like the 1940's Wehrmacht than it is like the 1980's Warsaw Pact. We have to fight it the same way.

We focus on centralized planning and decentralized execution. We use very detailed mission planning to create our operations. We use decision point tactics, so we have to have 2-4 courses of action to handle whatever the enemy may do, all linked with decision points and intel indicators that would lead us to choose COA's once the battle has started. We create simple task/purpose statements for each maneuver element (named by the role the fulfil, not their organizational designation). the staff then focuses on the synchronization and integration of all the shapers and assets.

Folowing our 1 hour OPORD each commander does a confirmation brief with the squadron commander to ensure that he understands the squadron mission and intent, overall scheme of maneuver, and his role in in (his task and purpose). Its almost like a mini-mission analysis brief.

Before the operation we will do a 1 hour rehearsal on a terrain board (preferred) or a coordination meeting off of a giant map. We usualy focus on critical events and timing/synchronization). At that rehearsal each subordinate commander is responsible for briefing no only what he is supposed to accomplish (his Task/Purpose), but how he plans on doing in (scheme of maneuver). In this way the commanders are allowed the leeway to create their own plan to execute their T/P's, the plan recieves its final synchronization, and most possibilities and contingencies are discussed. We also put out intel updates, deconfliact issues, confirm Task Organization linkups, and issue any last minute FRAGO's at these rehearsals.

OPFOR tactics are very recon intensive, to the point we sometimes dedicate up to 1/3 of our combat forces in the fight for information. This ensures that we have decent battlefield vision, and allows us to choose the most appropriate COA to fight whatever plan the enemy seems to be using. The COA decision is not made until well after the battle starts. Since we always fight outnumbered we need to have our forces at the exact spot and time where they can have the greatest impact.

By contrast the BLUFOR guys we fight usually pick their COA days in advance, then synch that one COA to death, without leaving space for any other options Then they fight it regardless of what OPFOR is actually doing on the day of the battle. Its the only way the can have the time to synchronize all of the things into the fight that they want to. Its a disease SAMS and Ft Leavenworth have inflicted on the Army, and it shows no sign of deing corrected.

OPFOR is really big on reserves, organizing at least 2-3 reserve elements available for use in emergencies or for opportunities. As soon as a reserve is comitted we start pulling out someone else and reconstituting the reserve. The reserve is your flexibility.

On the battlefield we usually fight with a small command group TAC (the commander, S3, an artillery guy, S3 Air (who controls SOKOL) and 1-2 map/radio guys out of two BRDM/HMMWV-VISMODS. The TOC will be operational, but merely as an aid to the commander. It doesnt really control anything. It keeps track of data, works minor (but time consuming issues) helps with comms, and has the intel guys who do all the analysis and feed the results to the CDR. It evolves a bit each time we fight, but thats how we do it now. Its pretty effective.

Scott,

Could you elaborate on these synchronization efforts? I am currently designing/programming a computer wargame, and would like to reflect C3I concepts. I have seen the term "sychronization" thrown around often in discussions of US doctrine, but rarely a concrete description of what it entails. Also, do the OPFOR C3I methods, notwithstanding their efficacy, nonetheless result in less "synchronization"?

Marc

In Auftragstaktik, do OPORDS move up the chain of Command, as well?

I.e. the Platoon Leader, having recieved his What-How instructions, formulates an OPORD to get the mission accomplished. Does he inform the Company CO/XO of his intentions (i.e. his 5 Paragraphs), or does the CO allow one or all of his Platoons to wander off independantly?

Befehlstaktik allows the CO to know the When/where/why/how for each of his subordinate units, as HE issued the plan. Does this knowledge mechanism exist in auftragstaktik?


Falken

Depends how much time you've got; if you wargame the unit plan, part of that will be a briefback of the sub-units plans. If there's no time, then the briefback might not happen. Note that the key thing is that the task is achieved; not that the boss understands how it is to be done. That assumption is "directive"........

However, it does show up why one of the necessities of getting Auftragstaktik to work is "trust your subordinates"...... if you don't trust them, (i.e. by creating a zero-tolerance-of-failure command environment, or by micromanaging them), then Auftragstaktik just won't deliver.

After all, the whole point of Auftragstaktik is to create a system where subordinates can operate successfully when the situation changes, and they're not in communications with the boss; rather than having to wait for a new set of directive orders to cope with the new situation. Hence the big emphasis on "Main Effort".

SCFalken, subordinates infor the higher commander of their scheme of maneuver (how they plan on executing their task/purpose) during the Backbrief. Also, at a rehearsal they usually brief their scheme of maneuver so that others get a chance to see what their neighbors are planning. If its just a verbal FRAGO on the FM then you don't get a backbrief unless specifically requested.

OPFOR battle command techniques allow synchronization, we just don't take it to the levels of idiocy that BLUFOR tries to achieve. OPFOR maneuver emphasizes flexibility over synchronization, speed over control. It allows us to easily maneuver within the decision cycles of BLUFOR units, even those equipped with state of the art battle command technologies.

Does auftragstaktik require constant communications passed back up the line?

I.e., following up reconaissance on the fly.
("1st Platoon moving to infiltrate towards OBJ A, through dead ground at 17256809, unless otherwise directed") (CO's intent being to assault OBJ A).

Compared with befehlstaktik, where the CO -knows- that 1st Platoon is doing this, as he -told- them to do so.

It seems to me that some units following the CO's intent, rather than issued directives, run the risk of interfering with other subordinate units or running into friendly arty.

This is still academic for me, as ROTC concerns itself with Squad and Platoon size movements, with considerably less involved than a Company or Battalion engagement.

Falken

On our Task/Purpose statements, the purpose is the intent.

FRAGO: MB1 defends vicinity BP-3, orienting into EA BOXER, in order to prevent enemy penetration of EA BOXER, or enemy bypass of EA to the North.

You take the risk of guys blundering into each other, but thats what the staff watches during the fight. Its far better to give mission orders than it is to be prescriptive as to how to accomplish something. Most subordinates prefer working in an environment that allows them autonomy. Those that don't usually aren't fit for combat arms command slots anyways, so they are removed rapidly.

Scott, your example of a FragO given under the Battle Comamnd system may pass as Auftragstaktik, but it is based upon an original order that was backbriefed, rehearsed and templated...and here is where I think contemporary tactics are mixing detailed and mission-orders, almost inevitable given the technology.

Part of Auftragstaktik is the concept of "Recon Pull" wherein subordinate units can in fact, shape the actions of higher echelons. Rommel's "Infanterie Greift An" has some really good examples of Recon Pull actions on the reinforced company and lower levels. Complete with hand-drawn charts by Der Feldmarschall himself--he was quite a good cartographer.

Yeah yeah, I know that a lot of it is self-serving. It's still a good book on small unit tactics.

Your example is directive; it says what to do (infiltrate towards OBJ A) and how to do it (through dead ground at 17256809). It's also a bad example because it focusses on the means (infiltrate) rather than the ends (secure OBJ A / destroy En at OBJ A).

Routes would come out in "coordinating instructions", probably as boundaries rather than specific routes. Depoends whether you're moving the company into its FUP as a single group or in separate groups (advantages and disadvantages to each).

A mission consists of a task and its purpose; your mission-based OC would give orders that read something like (and apologies for the gaps in the following, it's the result of five minutes effort)

Note also that this is just the beginning of the "Execution" paragraph; before this would be a description of the situation, and after this would be descriptions of the logistics and C3I involved.


A Coy Mission: A Coy is to destroy en at Obj LITTLE, in order to allow Bn to secure Obj BIG. Be prepared to conduct forward passage of lines for B and C Coys.

Concept of Ops:
A Coy will infiltrate forward along a route cleared by Bn Scout Pl, and carry out a silent night attack on Obj LITTLE. 3 Pl will lead the move forward and secure the FUP; 1 Pl will lead the assault; Coy Wpns Sect will provide Fire Support from the left; 2 Pl will act as the cut-off group in the dead ground to the rear of the obj. After H-Hour, 3 Pl will become the Coy Reserve.
MAIN EFFORT is the destruction of the enemy at Obj LITTLE.

Sub-unit Missions:
- 3Pl is to secure FUP by H-10, in order to allow A Coy to destroy en at Obj LITTLE. Be prepared to act as Coy reserve after H+5. Be prepared to lead B and C Coys forward through A Coy positions.

- Coy Wpns Sect are to provide Fire Support for assaulting troops, in order to allow A Coy to secure Obj LITTLE.

- 1 Pl is to secure Obj LITTLE, in order to allow A Coy to destroy en at Obj LITTLE.

- 2 Pl is to act as a cut-off group to the rear of Obj LITTLE, in order to allow A Coy to destroy en at Obj LITTLE.

Coordinating Instructions
- Fire Sp Gp / Cut-off Gp move from Assy Area at H-40
- Order of March to Fire Sp Gp loc 2Pl, Coy Wpns Sect
l
- Assault Gp move from Assy Area at H-30
- Order of March to FUP 3Pl, TAC HQ, 1Pl

etc, etc, etc.

There have been some excellent posts so far. It would seem that there is a consensus that modern armies are moving ever further away from mission orders and more towards directive orders. Achieving this by ever more sophisticated communication and intelligence facilities.

There also seems to a consensus that this trend is bad and mission based orders are best. This assumes they will automatically always work better. I would question this point of view. There were times when mission orders failed because the lower level command trying to carry out its mission was not aware of the overall situation and carried out the "staff college” solution automatically. The "inevitable German counterattack" once a position was taken is an example from WW2 and WW1. Lossberg at during the Paschendale battle actually suspended his flexible defence tactics for a while because they were not working against the "bite and hold" tactics of the British. (Artillery bombardment, advance 1000 yards behind creeping barrage, consolidate ground captured and protect with DF barrage to smash German counterattack)

The point here is that the lower levels of command do not see the whole picture and the solution they attempt may not be the most effective given the overall situation. The ability to give them that information or direct them to the “best” solution has never existed before.

Could it be that we now have a better solution in place?

I've always argued that the "transparent", "networked" or "digital" (whatever's the current fashionable term) battlefield could greatly benefit Auftragstaktik in that it supplies the lower echelon with the big picture. If junior leaders know their trade and higher leaves them alone, I believe it would be a tremendous increase in effectiveness. Unfortunately, in reality I fear the "leave them alone" part is always going to work the other way round.

Edited because I can't tell my tactics apart ...

"Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik"
http://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/jf96/1auftrag96.pdf
Well the paper above really seems to advocating direct command, with the concept of independent action a dead end in US Army minds. So who practices independent manouver warfare? Opfor and the Israeli army??? Thats it?

Aside from the potential for micromanagement, the problem with the networked battlefield is the signal/noise ratio. How does a platoon leader access all of the information relevant to him, in time for it to make a difference? How does he weigh this information against his orders? Maybe that enemy company that he wants to maneuver away from or around is less of a problem than what he might run into while maneuvering. Or maybe higher wants that enemy company to focus on Our Hero's platoon, for good and sufficient reason. This in fact leads to the directive effect of networked forces -- only those at the highest level possess the tools and perspective to use most of the increased information flow, so they tell the lower echelons to sit tight and wait for orders.

Tony, the problem lies in the question of where do you set the deciding echelon? The guys sitting back in Florida whose primary concern is the daily CoS brief and the fact that the coffee was cold? And also, who says the echelons who aren't there have the complete picture? They know what's reported to them, that's it, and it's a tiny little picture, when you come down to it. You think the KH-11 feeds and JSTARS, etc crap actually makes up for not knowing what the enemy looks, smells and acts like in real life? Not likely. Directive orders work at the squad, platoon and occasionaly at the company level, by the time you're at Bn level, there's no reason you can't have 90%+ of the information that is fed to a corps or theater command, plus you actually have the reports and conversations from folks out doing the work for a much more accurate picture of the enemy. Take all the C4I hardware that's currently sitting CONUS feeding data to useless fat assed donut chomping REMF's and push it to the Bn's and BCT's and you'll be far more effective at actually fighting the war.

This may shift slightly one way or the other based on the type of fighting: For the Gotterdammerung with the Chicoms or what have you, then directive orders are probably acceptable, for insurgencies, which promise to be the primary way that wars for the foreseeable future are going to be fought, then mission orders are the only way to be effective.

Never going to happen, as this will obviate the billets for a large number of GO's and staff officers, and that can't possibly be allowed to happen. We'll lose this war and throw away the combat arms before we allow that. S/F....Ken M

The essential ingredients for Auftragstaktik or mission-orders tactics are training, doctrine and competent leadership. So your question is well-taken. Units in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq had trained and rehearsed beginning as early as 2001 [V Corps]. These days, the personnel turnover and deployment schedule may be much thinner to bring all up to speed in this regard. Mission Orders tactics can conceal Incompetency Syndrome the same way that Detailed Orders promote Helicopter [now LED Display] Syndrome. For poorly trained units, others without real cohesion, Detailed Orders would be commended.

In Mellenthin's "Panzer Battles" he gives very high praise to 11th armoured div commander General Balck, who he says was a born leader of armour. At this time Mellenthin was chief of staff of 48th Pz Corps part of which was Balck's 11th Armd Div, during late '42 around Stalingrad. So Balck should be a good example of how it should be done. Balck describes his command methods as follows:

...Orders were exclusivly verbal. The divisional commander made his decision for the next day during the evening, and he gave the necessary orders verbally to his regimental commanders on the battlefield; then he returned to his main HQ and discussed his intentions with the chief of staff of 48th Pz Corps. If approval was obtained the regiments were sent the wireless message: " no changes," all the moves were carried out according to plan. If there were fundamental changes, the divisional commander visited all his regiments during the night and gave the necessary orders, again verbally. Divisional operations were conducted from the forward position on the battlefield. The divisional commander had his place with the group which was to make the main effort; he visited the regiments several times a day. The divisional HQ was somewhat further back and did not change its location during operations. There information was collected and collated, supplies were handled, and reinforcements sent on their way. Communication between the divisional commander and his staff were maintained by R/T...

Trying not to read too much into this, it would seem Balck makes plans that he hopes will be valid for a days operations, he then leaves regiments to get on with it except the main effort, where he positions himself and probably takes over.

It seems to me this method of command has similarities to the examples given in the "Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik" article. The higher commander in this case having to use his own senses rather than the digital ones used in the example, where he positions himself to achieve this is irrelevant. He is also trusting in highly competent subordinates able to cope.

This is where the problems to be worked out lie. How far should the digital empowered commander take his control? He cannot do everything. But there are circumstances he will have greater knowledge of than the subordinate, and also a theoretical ability to change the main point of effort in a shorter time scale than Balck's daily cycle.

This is from a British MOD research paper that I downloaded ages ago:

This Premise also suggests that operation orders can be very short. In 1992 the HQ of the United Kingdom Mobile Force26 attended the Brigade and Battlegroup Trainer (North)27. After due battle procedure, the Operation Order was produced and presented to subordinate commanders at an Orders (‘O’) Group. The Order was about 8 pages long with a number of annexes. The O Group took about an hour. As an experiment, the Order was condensed to give the situation, mission, tasks and critical coordinating instructions on one side of A4 paper, supported by a small number of annexes. A battlegroup commander28 was asked to comment on the product. He was completely satisfied with the top page alone, as a basis for planning his battlegroup’s part in the operation, on the understanding that the Annexes would follow in due course.

A similar exercise was subsequently conducted with all 28 Operation Orders produced by the Directing Staff to support the 1994 British Army Staff College Course. Almost without exception, they could be reduced to one side of A4. The few exceptions occurred where a wordy Concept of Operations could not be significantly condensed. In each of those few cases the enemy’s response to
first contact was assumed in later stages of the operation. According to Moltke’s dictum, those plans were invalid. Thus Operation Orders can be very short.

The key appears to be precise use of language. Interestingly, the German Army has 2 contrasting expressions to reflect this issue29. The term ‘Telegramstil’ (the style used in writing telegrams) is used to describe the appropriate form of brevity. Conversely ‘Gefechtsfeldlyrik’ (literally ‘battlefield lyricism’) is used to describe an officer who unable to master such linguistic precision. Similarly, poetry can convey considerable meaning with very few words. Imprecise language tend to be verbose, unclear and ambiguous. Given appropriate standards of linguistic precision, operation orders can be very short.

E5M:

I was being descriptive, not prescriptive. I couldn't begin to guess what a workable solution might look like.

pi:

In 1993, right before I got out of the service, my company commander was experimenting with what he called a "matrix order". Basically, it was a sheet of paper with spaces for abbreviated Situation, Mission, Logistics and Communications paragraphs. The Execution portion was a two dimensional matrix where the rows were sub-units and the columns were steps in a timeline (only about four or five, IIRC). It seemed to work pretty good at the company level -- whenever an order was issued, everyone would whip out their laminated matrix sheets and take notes. The whole process, including briefback, could be done in 15-20 minutes. The key was a common vocabulary and well developed SOP. Each platoon would be designated a row of the matrix, which corresponded to a position in the scheme of maneuver (IIRC, top to bottom in the matrix mapped left to right on the ground), and each column represented a coordinated action, so that the completed matrix represented a combined maneuver diagram and timeline.

Here is what the Israeli's plan to do:

The Israel Defence Force (IDF) has unveiled a new command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) system dubbed Tirat Ha'agam (Castle of the Lake) developed for the senior
command……………………………………..."It enables the decision-makers to access information up to very high resolutions. Apart from presenting a real-time battle situation, including both friendly and enemy forces on the ground and in the air, the system provides information such as units' weaponry, real-time serviceability and ammunition supply,"…………………………………………………..Tirat Ha'agam includes maps and aerial images of all of the IDF's relevant theatres of operations. In addition it presents a 'target bank', enabling the prime minister or defence minister to examine strikes proposed by the IDF and negating the need for military personnel to physically appear before the decision-makers and present plans…………………………………………………
Jane’s Defence Weekly - 05 October 2005

I spent all summer "fighting" against 4th ID, who has the most advanced C2 systems in the world. One thing that was obvious is that fancy toys does not promise tactical success. Over reliance on technology at the expense of solid soldier skills (scouting, aggressiveness, mass, etc...) will not bring victory against a competent enemy.

Technology promises much, but doesn't always deliver. The difference between the potential increase in effectiveness and the actual increase in effectiveness can be large.

"Tirat ha Agam", by the way agam can be translated as "operational branch" instead of lake, is mostly a better name for a database, it makes life simple, but it's not the future.

While there were some articles in Israeli defence related magazines, claiming that Auftragstaktik isnt' deeply rooted in the IDF, it is being taught on all levels of command.
From basic squad commander's courses, to the national defence college.
I guess that the reason it's used is largley because of "lessons learned" on the field, and because in the kind of wars the IDF is intended to fight, there won't be much time for decision making, therefor the need to make decisions at the lowest possible level.
In operations in the territories it's not unusual to have very high commanders (Division (Ugda), or district (Pikud)) overseeing the operation, so the level of micromanagment isn't constant.

There was a book reviewed in JMH this issue on Operation Theory, and I skimmed the review, which seemed favourable. When I get some time (after finishing my lesson plans, etc.) I'll post some details on it. I figured I'd post this to remind me to do it before I forget!